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I. INTRODUCTION
A doctor is denied staff privileges at a private hospital after a
negative recommendation from the hospital's medical staff.2 A real
estate agent is denied membership in a multiple. listing service by a
vote of the current members.3 A golfer is deemed ineligible to com-
pete in a professional golf tournament by a committee of the Pro-
fessional Golf Association.4 A college is refused accreditation by a
private accrediting association.5 Plywood of type three ply one half
inch is found not to meet the commercial standard for douglas fir
plywood established by the Douglas Fir Plywood Association.6 A
fuel cutoff device is said to be in uncertain compliance with the
safety standards of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers
(ASME) by the ASME's Boiler and Pressure Vessel Committee. 7 A
ceramic gas burner fails the tests needed for a "seal of approval"
2. E.g., Robinson v. Magovern, 521 F. Supp. 842 (W.D. Pa. 1981), afl'd mem. 688 F.2d
824 (3d Cir. ), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 971 (1982) (upholding hospital's denial of privileges).
Feminist Women's Health Center, Inc. v. Mohammed, 586 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 924 (1979) (denying hospital's motion for summary judgment).
3. E.g., United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351 (5th Cir. 1980) (con-
demning restriction on membership in MLS); Brown v. Indianapolis Bd. of Realtors, 1977-1
Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 61,435 (May 6, 1977) (upholding restriction on membership in MLS);
Pomanowski v. Monmouth County Bd. of Realtors, 175 N.J. Super. 212, 417 A.2d 1119
(1980), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 908 (1982) (condemning restriction on membership).
4. E.g., Blalock v. Ladies Professional Golf Ass'n, 359 F. Supp. 1260 (N.D. Ga. 1973)
(condemning disciplinary suspension of player); Deesen v. Professional Golfers Ass'n of Am.,
358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir. ), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 846 (1966) (upholding exclusion of player).
5. Marjorie Webster Jr. College v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges, 432 F.2d 650 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970) (reversing judgment for unaccredited college).
6. Structural Laminates, Inc. v. Douglas Fir Plywood Ass'n, 261 F. Supp. 154 (D. Or.
1966), aff'd per curiam, 399 F.2d 155 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1024 (1969)
(upholding defendant association's disapproval of plaintiff's plywood).
7. Hydrolevel Corp. v. American Soc'y of Mech. Eng'rs, 635 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1980),
aff'd, 456 U.S. 556 (1982) (condemning association's disapproval of plaintiff's product).
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from the American Gas Association." A golf ball is denied approval
for tournament play by the United States Golf Association after
consultation with the Golf Ball Manufacturers Association. 9 A pro-
ducer's film is given an "X" rating by the Motion Picture Associa-
tion of America, a film board established by competing film pro-
ducers. 10 A screw thread gauge is found to violate the standards of
the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) by the ANSI's
Screw Thread Committee.1 A bowling center is denied approval
for official play by the Bowling Proprietors Association of America,
an association of other bowling centers. 2 A chiropractor is denied
access to a hospital's laboratory after the Joint Commission on Ac-
creditation of Hospitals, an association of medical doctors, tells the
hospital that allowing access would jeopardize accreditation.'5
In each situation those immediately harmed, like the doctor or
the real estate agent (the plaintiff), may consider an antitrust suit
under section one of the Sherman Act for treble damages against
the private association and its members (the defendants) whose ac-
tion caused the harm. Each suit is likely to be analyzed as a "group
boycott"' 4 and is likely to share the following features: The plain-
tiff can establish without difficulty the "combination" and the req-
uisite connection with interstate commerce that section one of the
Sherman Act requires. 15 The defendants are, at least in part, the
8. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961) (deny-
ing defendant association's motion to dismiss).
9. Polara Enterprises v. United States Golf Ass'n. No. C-78-1320 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 30,
1984) (condemning as unreasonable U.S.G.A.'s failure to sanction plaintiff's golf ball).
10. Tropic Film Corp. v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 319 F. Supp. 1247 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)
(upholding film board's rating of plaintiff's film).
11. Hamilton, The Role of Nongovernmental Standards in the Development of
Mandatory Federal Standards Affecting Safety or Health, 56 TEx. L. REv. 1329, 1374
(1978) (description of The Johnson Gauge Case).
12. E.g., Washington State Bowling Proprietors Ass'n v. Pacific Lanes, Inc., 356 F.2d
371 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 963 (1966) (condemning association's refusal to sanc-
tion bowling center).
13. Wilk v. American Medical Ass'n, 719 F.2d 207 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467
U.S. 1210 (1984) (upholding association's threat to withdraw hospital's accreditation).
14. The defendants' action need not constitute a "refusal to deal" as that term nor-
mally is understood in order to be condemned as a "boycott." E.g., Silver v. N.Y.S.E., 373
U.S. 341 (1963) (withdrawal of wire connections between plaintiff and member brokers is a
boycott, as is any concerted action that puts a rival at a significant competitive
disadvantage).
15. That is, the plaintiff would have little difficulty establishing a combination and an
effect on interstate commerce under the normal standards used for these requirements. In
fact, because the traditional legal approach toward the merits of these cases is so hostile to
defendants, many judges strive to avoid the merits and dismiss the case before trial by
twisting the normal standards for these requirements and then finding that the require-
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:1507
plaintiff's horizontal rivals or, more precisely, firms on the same
horizontal level as the plaintiff.16 The defendants' action, directly
or indirectly, 17 puts the plaintiff at a significant competitive disad-
ments have not been met. See, e.g., Cooper v. Forsyth County Hosp. Auth., 604 F. Supp. 685
(M.D.N.C. 1985), aff'd, 789 F.2d 278 (4th Cir. 1986) (staff privilege case dismissed for lack of
Sherman Act agreement); Pontius v. Children's Hosp., 552 F. Supp. 1352 (W.D. Pa. 1982)
(staff privilege case dismissed for lack of Sherman Act agreement); see also Cardio-Medical
Ass'n v. Crozer-Chester Medical Center, 552 F. Supp. 1170, 1176-1204 (E.D. Pa. 1982),
rev'd., 721 F.2d 68 (3rd Cir. 1983) (staff privilege case dismissed for lack of effect on inter-
state commerce). See generally Note, Sherman Act "Jurisdiction" in Hospital Staff Exclu-
sion Cases, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 121 (1983). Another ground for dismissal short of trial is that
the state has so compelled the defendants' self-regulation that the defendant's action be-
comes "state action." E.g. Marrese v. Interqual, Inc., 748 F.2d 373 (7th Cir. 1984).
16. That is, at least some of the defendants are businesses or employees of businesses
that compete on the same horizontal level as the plaintiff or would so compete were it not
for the defendants' action. Often horizontal rivals in fact will make the decision that injures
the plaintiff although the decision formally comes from a vertical level. In hospital staff
privilege cases, for example, the hospital formally denies privileges, but in fact the hospital
acts on the recommendations of the doctors on its staff. Dolan & Ralston, Hospital Admit-
ting Privileges and The Sherman Act, 18 Hous. L. REV. 707 (1981).
Professor Lawrence Sullivan, among others, attaches significance to whether the
defendants are horizontal rivals of the injured plaintiff, a factor that cuts sharply against
the defendants. L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST § 91 (2d ed. 1977).
Granted, being the plaintiff's horizontal rivals may increase the defendants' incentive to use
self-regulation in order to put the plaintiff at a competitive disadvantage. Too much, how-
ever, is made of this factor. The result is a distressing, formalistic tendency to decide these
cases by diagramming the defendants' and the plaintiff's relative positions in the chain of
distribution and then jumping to conclusions based on that diagram. See, e.g., M & H Tire
Co. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 733 F.2d 973 (1st Cir. 1984); Cascade Cabinet Co. v. West-
ern Cabinet & Millwork, Inc., 710 F.2d 1366, 1370-71 (9th Cir. 1983); Blalock v. Ladies
Professional Golf Ass'n, 359 F. Supp. 1260 (N.D. Ga. 1973); E.A. McQuade Tours, Inc. v.
Consolidated Air Tour Manual Comm., 467 F.2d 178, 186-87 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1109 (1973). Yet, even when the defendants clearly are the plaintiff's rivals, the
"boycott" of the plaintiff could be conceptualized as vertical in nature.
17. One unfamiliar with antitrust precedents might assume the method by which the
defendants injured the plaintiff would matter in these cases. For example, in Hydrolevel
Corp. v. American Soc'y of Mech. Eng'rs, 635 F.2d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 1980), af'd, 456 U.S.
556 (1982) the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) merely expressed an
opinion about whether the plaintiff's product conformed with ASME's safety standards. In
light of the benefits of allowing testing agencies to express opinions, one might assume that
the ASME would be safe from liability. See Note, Antitrust Problems of Trade Association
Product Safety Standardization, 55 IOWA L. REV. 439, 449 (1969) (recommendation about
products should not give rise to liability). In contrast, one might expect liability in Wilk v.
American Medical Ass'n, 719 F.2d 207 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1210 (1984),
when the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals went beyond expressing its views
about chiropractors and pressured presumably neutral hospitals into denying the chiroprac-
tors use of their facilities.
However, the traditional antitrust approach does not, by its terms, show concern for the
defendants' method. E.g., Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234
U.S. 600 (1914) (agreement merely to exchange information about wholesalers found illegal).
Rather, the antitrust rules focus on the result of the defendants' concerted action, namely
whether it put a rival at a significant competitive disadvantage. Because of this formal indif-
1510
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vantage to his rivals, reduces the plaintiff's revenues, or raises his
costs.18 The defendants' action imposes this harm even though the
plaintiff has not violated any criminal law or any rule created or
imposed by the government. The defendants' action against the
plaintiff is not authorized by any legislative or administrative mea-
sure. The defendants' action, therefore, may appear a privately im-
posed restriction of the plaintiff's opportunity to compete on the
merits.
On the other hand, the antitrust laws aside, the defendants'
action does not violate any federal or state criminal law. The ac-
tion does not prevent the plaintiff from operating legally, as occu-
pational licensing or mandatory standard setting by the govern-
ment would. If pressed, the defendants can offer reasons for their
action which may make that action appear "reasonable," using
that term in the colloquial, rather than economic, sense. Assessing
these reasons often will require a more intimate understanding of
the industry than a court can acquire. 19 Moreover, the defendants'
formation of their private association, as distinct from their subse-
quent action that injured the plaintiff, is not challenged. Indeed,
ference to the defendants' methods, the law gives little guidance about permissible con-
certed conduct toward rivals.
The only antitrust rule that expressly addresses the methods by which the defendants
may act against the plaintiff is the famous Noerr-Pennington doctrine. This doctrine holds
that defendants who combine to hurt their competitors through lobbying to influence legis-
lation are in a safe harbor, free from antitrust exposure. Eastern Railroad Presidents Con-
ference v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127 (1961). At least one court also would include in
the safe harbor a consumer boycott to influence legislation. Missouri v. National Org. for
Women, Inc., 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980); see also Note,
Application of the Sherman Act to Politically Motivated Boycotts, Missouri v. National
Organization for Women, Inc., 1981 UTAH L. REV. 599.
18. The magnitude of the plaintiff's injury varies greatly from case to case. The domi-
nant antitrust precedents, however, indicate that as long as the plaintiff is put at a signifi-
cant competitive disadvantage, the magnitude of the injury, while it affects the plaintiff's
damages, does not affect the defendants' antitrust liability. See, e.g., Associated Press v.
United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); see also Associated Gen. Contractors v. California State
Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 528 (1983) (substantial competitive disadvantage is
sufficient).
19. The difficulty of review is most pronounced when the defendants' decision-making
process deals with specialized knowledge. A court is most reluctant to review the activity of
defendants enjoying equal or greater prestige than the court. Higgins v. American Soc'y of
Clinical Pathologists, 51 N.J. 191, 202, 238 A.2d 665, 671 (1968); Note, Expulsion and
Exclusion from Hospital Practice and Organized Medical Societies, 15 RUTGERS L. REV.
327, 329 (1961); see also Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not For Profit, 43
HARV. L. REV. 993, 1021-23 (1930); Note, Exclusion from Private Associations, 74 YALE L.J.
1313, 1314 (1965); cf. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. OF ECON. 3, 13-
14 (1971) (the occupation's per capita income and concentration in large cities directly af-
fects the occupation's power to obtain favorable regulation).
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the defendants' formation of their private association can be con-
ceptualized as an efficiency-enhancing joint economic activity that
lowers costs, increases demand, or helps to overcome a market
imperfection like the "free rider" problem. Such joint activities il-
lustrate the general principles that efficiency may call for coordina-
tion between firms as well as for rivalry, and that joint activities
are just one of the ways in which rivalry may occur. Judicial inter-
ference with an efficiency-enhancing joint activity will reduce the
incentives for engaging in the activity below optimum levels and
therefore would be inefficient.20 In addition, the defendants can de-
fend their specific action against the plaintiff as ancillary to their
efficiency-enhancing joint activity. For example, the exclusion of a
rival from a multiple listing service may maintain the efficient
number of realtors in the service, thereby lowering the cost of pro-
viding the service, or increasing the consumer demand for the ser-
vice, that is, increasing its value. Thus, the defendants may ad-
vance an hypothesis, more or less plausible in each case, suggesting
that both their original joint activity and their later action against
the plaintiff are efficiency enhancing. In economic theory at least,
the plaintiff-by expansion or combination-can form a rival pri-
vate association, thereby achieving the efficiencies the defendants
have achieved and overcoming the competitive disadvantage the
defendants have imposed.21 Viewed this way, the defendants' ac-
tions are merely a type of rivalry on the merits, and the plaintiff's
injury is identical to that any business suffers from being unable to
share its rivals' more efficient production techniques, better organi-
zation, special talents, and resulting lower prices or higher quality.
In any event, the continued existence of other rivals at the plain-
20. As the ability to control how the joint activity will act toward rivals, decide mem-
bership matters, and distribute gains decreases, the incentive for attempting the activity,
and thus the likelihood of the activity being attempted, also decreases.
21. Allowing the defendants to exclude the plaintiff from their joint activity (such as
their association) may increase output by pressuring the plaintiff to form his own rival joint
activity. The resulting rivalry among joint activities should reduce any output-restraining
power the defendants may possess, thus providing a clear benefit to society. Unfortunately,
forming a rival private association often will prove impractical. For example, the real estate
market in many communities will be too thin to support a second multiple listing service.
Certain economies also may favor a single multiple listing service. Thus, the existing mem-
bers of the multiple listing service may enjoy "first mover" advantages. Cf. Williamson,
Dominant Firms and the Monopoly Problem: Market Failure Considerations, 85 HARv. L.
REv. 1512, 1521 n.33 (1972) (discussing "first mover" advantage enjoyed by dominant firms).
See also Liebeler, Market Power and Competitive Superiority in Concentrated Industries,
25 UCLA L. REv. 1231, 1258 (1978) ("first mover" advantages spring from efficient behavior
and should not become the predicate for a firm's dissolution).
[Vol. 39:1507
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tiff's horizontal level, against whom the plaintiff can prove neither
monopolization, price fixing, nor other output-restraining behavior,
suggests that output 22 may not be affected even if the plaintiff
ceases to function altogether. Thus, the defendants' action cannot
confidently be characterized as output restraining.23
Lower courts encounter many cases that share these features.
For lack of a better term, I call them "industry self-regulation"
cases. 24 Albeit on a small scale, the cases seem to present a colli-
22. I use the words "output" and "rivalry" rather than "competition" because the
word "competition" so often is understood to refer both to the output that results from
rivalry between firms (in contrast to the reduced output that results from a price-fixing
cartel, a monopoly, a successfully coordinating oligopoly, or an industry protected by restric-
tive occupational licensing) and to the process of rivalry (the process by which more efficient
firms take business from less efficient firms). I do not suggest, however, that achieving a
competitive output is a satisfactory economic definition of competition. See McNulty, Eco-
nomic Theory and the Meaning of Competition, 82 Q.J. EcoN. 639 (1968) (no satisfactory
definition of competition exists).
Unfortunately, separating the concepts of "output" and "rivalry" suggests a clear dis-
tinction between voluntary restraints on rivalry that reduce output, said by some to be the
target of antitrust laws, and excesses of rivalry deemed improper on ethical and other non-
economic grounds, said by some to be the target of the tort law of unfair competition. This
distinction emphasizes the conflict between the laws of antitrust and unfair competition.
See Northwest Power Prods., v. Omark Indus., 576 F.2d 83 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1116 (1979); cf. Callmann, Boycotts and Price Wars: Violation of the Antitrust Laws
or Unfair Competition, 23 OHIO ST. L.J. 128, 136-142 (1962) (antitrust measures aim at
agreements imposing peace when there should be rivalry, while unfair competition measures
aim at nonconstructive acts of rivalry). Although the distinction often aids understanding, it
ultimately separates what cannot be separated. Excesses of rivalry that exclude, handicap,
or raise rivals' costs also may reduce output. Moreover, the Sherman Act was aimed against
excesses of rivalry at least as much as against restraints on rivalry. Northern Sec. Co. v.
United States, 193 U.S. 197, 405 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("It was the ferocious ex-
treme of competition with others, not the cessation of competition among the partners, that
was the evil feared.") See infra text accompanying notes 182-230.
23. The defendants' action often threatens common byproducts of rivalry even when
the action does not threaten output. The defendants' action against the plaintiff, for
instance, could narrow the range of consumers' choices, depriving the plaintiff's specialized
patrons of their opportunity to patronize him. Of course, the plaintiff's demise through his
own inefficiency would hurt these specialized patrons in exactly the same way. Judge Posner
has expressed the Chicago School's unwillingness to recognize the harm to these specialized
patrons:
Now there is a sense in which eliminating even a single competitor reduces competi-
tion. But it is not the sense that is relevant in deciding whether the antitrust laws have
been violated. . . . The consumer does not care how many sellers of a particular good
or service there are; he cares only that there be enough to assure him a competitive
price and quality.
Products Liability Ins. Agency v. Crum & Forster Ins. Co's., 682 F.2d 660, 663-64 (7th Cir.
1982).
24. The concept of industry self-regnlation attempts to cover the kind of conduct
referred to in the first part of Silver v. N.Y.S.E., 373 U.S. 341 (1963), namely concerted
conduct that puts the plaintiff at a significant competitive disadvantage. Use of the term
"regulation" is unfortunate because it suggests defendants have some authority to enforce
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:1507
sion between the religion of equal (or at least "fair") opportunity
and the logic of economic efficiency. The traditional legal
approach, which applies the law of group boycotts, is formalistic,
unrealistic, and bewildering.25 This Article in Part II first reviews
the traditional approach exemplified by Silver v. N.Y.S.E. 26 and
Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management.27 It then discusses the
Chicago School's opposing approach exemplified by Judge Posner's
claim that "boycotts are properly attacked under the antitrust laws
when, and only when, they are employed to enforce a practice that
is objectionable on the basis of substantive antitrust policy."2 8
Compared to Silver's approach, Posner's approach generally
applauds industry self-regulation and opposes any judicial interfer-
ence with it in order to aid the plaintiff. The Article next reviews
the pro-defendant modifications to Silver's traditional approach
announced in the Supreme Court's 1985 decision Northwest
Wholesale Stationers v. Pacific Stationery and Printing Co. 29 It
their actions and often they do not. Indeed, as in the Hydrolevel case, defendants merely
may be offering suggestions or information to buyers or sellers. Hydrolevel Corp. v. Ameri-
can Soc'y of Mech. Eng'rs, 635 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd, 456 U.S. 556 (1982).
The many economists who focus on whether defendants' activity is efficiency-enhancing
would not group these cases together based on the common features mentioned in Silver.
Rather, they would insist on learning more details about each case in order to identify the
efficiencies, if any, that the defendants are creating.
Franchisor-franchisee disputes, dealer terminations, and all intrabrand cartel behavior
like that in United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966), call for separate
analysis and are not considered industry self-regulation cases. See Buxbaum, Boycotts and
Restrictive Marketing Arrangements, 64 MICH. L. REV. 671 (1966) (explaining why such
cases call for a separate analysis); Liebeler, Intrabrand "Cartels" Under GTE Sylvania, 30
UCLA L. REv. 1 (1982) (explaining why such behavior properly is viewed as a vertical re-
straint and does not threaten to reduce output).
25. A rich tradition of critical comment has developed around the industry self-regula-
tion cases. See Austin, Real Estate Boards and Multiple Listing Systems as Restaints of
Trade, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1325 (1970); Barber, Refusals to Deal Under the Federal Anti-
trust Laws, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 847, 880 (1955); Bauer, Per Se Illegality of Concerted Refus-
als to Deal: A Rule Ripe for Reexamination, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 685 (1979); Coons, Non-
Commercial Purpose as a Sherman Act Defense, 56 Nw. U.L. REv. 705 (1962); Rahl, Per Se
Rules and Boycotts Under The Sherman Act: Some Reflections on the Klor's Case, 45 VA.
L. REv. 1165 (1959); Woolley, Is a Boycott a Per Se Violation of the Antitrtust Laws, 27
RUTGERS L. REV. 773 (1974); Note, Trade Association Exclusionary Practices: An Affirma-
tive Role for the Rule of Reason, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 1486 (1966); Note, Use of Economic
Sanctions by Private Groups: Illegality Under the Sherman Act, 30 U. CHL L. REV. 171
(1962). Fortunately the results ultimately reached in these cases usually satisfy as much as
the doctrinal approach disturbs.
26. 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
27. 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
28. R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAw 210 (1976).
29. 472 U.S. 284 (1985). Many courts anticipated Pacific Stationery's modification of
Silver. E.g., United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 679 F.2d 1351 (5th Cir. 1980). See also
"GROUP BOYCOTT"
then suggests the best approach for a lower court that supports the
goals of the traditional approach, but wishes to give prospective
parties clear guidelines to conform their behavior to the law. To
explain the suggested approach, the Article in Part III surveys the
wide variety of benefits and dangers these cases present and illus-
trates the shortcomings of the other approaches.
II. APPROACHES TO INDUSTRY SELF-REGULATION
A. Silver's Traditional Approach
The traditional approach invites a court faced with an in-
stance of industry self-regulation to undertake an analysis that
may consist of as many as nine steps. The court first will cite Sil-
ver,3 0 its clarifying progeny, Denver Rockets,31 and Silver's famous
predecessors, Klor's v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc22 and Fashion
Originators' Guild of America v. FTC,"s for the principle that the
defendants' concerted action that places the plaintiff at a signifi-
cant competitive disadvantage is "in simple terms a group boycott.
Hence, absent any justification derived from the policy of another
statute or otherwise, the [defendants] acted in violation of the
Sherman Act."'34 Second, in order to allow the defendants' action
to fall within the "or otherwise" language and escape immediate
condemnation, the court usually adopts the policy justification for
the self-regulation suggested by the defendants' attorneys. Typi-
cally, the court finds that the industry's structure inherently
Jones, Multiple Listing Services and the Sherman Act: Fifth Circuit Applies "Facial" Rule
of Reason Analysis, 32 MERCER L. REV. 1295 (1981).
30. 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
31. 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971). The same Silver-Denver Rockets approach
often is used for industry self-regulation cases in which the defendants are not the plaintiff's
horizontal competitors. Denver Rockets was itself such a case. Nevertheless, the court in
that case felt driven to the same analysis used for "horizontal boycotts." Other courts han-
dling "vertical boycotts" also have employed the same analysis used for "horizontal boy-
cotts." Compare Linesman v. World Hockey Ass'n, 439 F. Supp. 1315 (D. Conn. 1977) (de-
fendants' action against vertical rival deemed unreasonable and condemned) with Marjorie
Webster Jr. College v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges & Secondary Schools, 432 1.2d 650
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970) (defendants' action against horizontal rival
deemed reasonable and upheld) and with Robinson v. Magovern, 521 F. Supp. 842 (W.D.
Pa. 1981), aff'd mem., 688 F.2d 824 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 971 (1982) (defendants'
action against horizontal rival deemed reasonable and upheld). This suggests that the
sharply different treatment some would accord "vertical" and "horizontal" boycotts is
unwarranted. See, e.g., L. SULLIVAN, supra note 16, at § 92.
32. 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
33. 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
34. Silver v. N.Y.S.E., 373 U.S. 341, 347-49 (1963).
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requires some self-regulation. 5 Only then, as its third through fifth
steps, will the court examine whether the defendants' particular
action against the plaintiff accomplishes "an end consistent with
the policy justifying self-regulation, is reasonably related to that
end, and is no more extensive than necessary."36 In what may be
its sixth step, the court then examines whether the defendants
afforded the plaintiff adequate procedures when they took the
harmful action. If the defendants prevail in all these inquiries,
the court may3s inquire, as its seventh through ninth steps,
whether, despite the sufficiency of the reasons the defendants gave
for their action, the defendants' "true" motive was in part "an-
ticompetitive" 9 (for example, the plaintiff's price cutting), arbi-
35. See, e.g., Eliason Corp. v. National Sanitation Found., 614 F.2d 126, 129 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 826 (1980); Hatley v. American Quarter Horse Ass'n, 552 F.2d 646,
653-54 (5th Cir. 1977); Roofire Alarm Co. v. Royal Indem. Co., 202 F. Supp. 166, 169 (E.D.
Tenn. 1962), affd, 313 F.2d 635 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 949 (1963).
36. Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1065 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
Steps three through five often will involve more than three inquiries, especially when the
defendants claim the plaintiff has violated one of their rules of general application. In some
cases the court first identifies the defendants' asserted reasons for their action; for example,
the plaintiff-real estate agent's failure to comply with the defendants' rule that multiple
listing service members must be full time agents. The court then must evaluate the merits of
those reasons; for example, whether the policy justifying self-regulation calls for (or, as some
courts say, demands) the rule requiring agents to work full time. This step may require the
court to evaluate whether the rule of general application overbroadly reaches firms or prod-
ucts that, in light of the policy justifying self-regulation, need not be reached. For example,
is the full-time rule overbroad in applying to agents who have arranged some method for
handling clients when those agents are not on the job personally? This step also may require
the court to balance the dangers of the defendants' rule against its benefits. For example,
does the full-time rule, despite being rationally related to a policy justifying self-regulation,
cause more harm than good? The court next must evaluate the application of those reasons
to the plaintiff. For example, did the defendants have a reasonable basis for concluding that
the plaintiff was not working full time and did the defendants enforce their rule evenhand-
edly against all part-time agents? Finally, the court must explore the universe of less dam-
aging actions that the defendant could have taken against the plaintiff and that also would
have fulfilled the policy justifying self-regulation. For example, could the defendants have
taken some lesser sanction, such as identifying the plaintiff as a part-time agent?
37. McCreery Angus Farms v. American Angus Ass'n, 379 F. Supp. 1008 (S.D. Ill.),
afl'd mem., 506 F.2d 1404 (7th Cir. 1974).
38. But see Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 582 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (no
need for inquiry into defendant's true motive).
39. E.g., Hydrolevel Corp. v. American Soc'y of Mech. Eng'rs, 635 F.2d 118 (2d Cir.
1980), aff'd, 456 U.S. 556 (1982). To the extent possible, I will avoid using the word "an-
ticompetitive" to describe defendants' conduct. Arguably, the adjective "anticompetitive"
ought to apply only to conduct that reduces output, for example, conduct eliminating a rival
whose underselling threatens to disrupt an ongoing price-fixing agreement. Unfortunately,
courts often use the term to describe any conduct that hurts rivals by foul means and with-
out any legitimate purpose. Used in this sense, the term is so broad as to be useless. Much
business conduct, unilateral as well as concerted, that is governed by tort, contract, prop-
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trary40 (for example, the plaintiff's hair color), or otherwise unjus-
tifiable41 (for example, the plaintiff's willingness to testify in
medical malpractice cases against his fellow doctors).
A major effect of Silver's traditional approach is to deny the
court a principled basis on which to dismiss an industry self-regu-
lation case short of an expensive and lengthy trial.42 Assuming the
plaintiff alleges that the defendants' action was "more extensive
than necessary," resolving that allegation alone will require the
court to conduct fact-finding about alternative, less damaging
methods or actions available to the defendants. Assuming the
plaintiff alleges an anticompetitive or arbitrary motive, the fact
finder must evaluate witnesses' credibility in order to ascertain the
defendants' "true" motive.
Silver's traditional approach reflects a degree of judicial hos-
tility toward industry self-regulation that is rarely appreciated. In
this respect, the facts' 3 of the Silver case are instructive. The
defendants, officers of the New York Stock Exchange's Depart-
ment of Member Firms, withdrew private wire connections be-
tween exchange members and the plaintiff, a broker not a member
of the Exchange. The Exchange was in essence an association of
brokers and therefore was on the same horizontal level as the
erty, or fiduciary principles and that poses little threat to output then would be considered
"anticompetitive."
As applied to defendants' motives or reasons for hurting a plaintiff, the term "anticom-
petitive" is equally ambiguous. Sometimes courts use the term to mean that defendants
unreasonably are hurting a plaintiff's opportunity to compete, even though the defendants
have some colorable justification for their act. Sometimes courts use the term to mean that
the defendants are hurting a plaintiff unreasonably solely because of his commendable
rivalry on the merits. Again, the term ought to apply only when the defendants' motive or
reason for hurting the plaintiff is to reduce output, by, for example, enforcing a price fixing
agreement.
40. E.g., United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
41. See, e.g., Areeda, Antitrust Immunity for "State Action" After Lafayette, 95
HARV. L. REV. 435, 451 (1981).
42. E.g., Saez v. UIL, 469 F.2d 1266 (5th Cir. 1972) (plaintiff's allegations render sum-
mary judgment inappropriate).
If the plaintiff only could prevail when he showed that the defendants possessed
monopoly power, many cases could be dismissed short of trial because of the obvious ab-
sence of monopoly power. Silver's approach, however, did not clearly require monopoly
power. Despite some hedging, the 1985 decision Northwest Wholesale Stationers Inc. v. Pa-
cific Stationery and Printing Co., 472 U.S. 289 (1985), requires at least market power but
not, apparently, monopoly power.
43. Technically, Silver itself was not an industry self-regulation case, as that category
is conceived here, because the New York Stock Exchange possessed some statutory author-
ity to regulate the industry. Silver's stature as the leading boycott and industry self-regula-
tion case derives from its dicta.
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plaintiff. Withdrawing the wire connections hardly amounted to a
"refusal to deal" as those unschooled in antitrust doctrine would
use that concept. Member brokers remained willing to deal with
the plaintiff for the purchase and sale of securities, and the plain-
tiff would not have used the wire connections at all in substantial
dealings with other nonmember brokers. The Court, however, did
not require a refusal to deal. Instead, the Court invoked the "group
boycott" category merely because the inability to obtain quota-
tions quickly, the inconvenience to other traders, and the stigma
resulting from the defendants' disapproval imposed a significant
competitive disadvantage on the plaintiff.44 Ultimately, the Court
upheld summary judgment for the plaintiff, finding the defend-
ants' action a per se 45 violation of section one of the Sherman Act.
While the Silver opinion is most often cited for its accommo-
dation of government regulation and antitrust policy, I believe its
greatest significance lies in the Court's starting point. The Court
held that any concerted action that puts a business at a significant
competitive disadvantage and that occurs in a context free of fed-
eral regulation is a "group boycott" and a per se violation of sec-
tion one:
It is plain, to begin with, that removal of the wires by collective action of the
Exchange and its members would, had it occurred in the context free from
other federal regulation, constitute a per se violation of Section 1 of the Sher-
man Act. The concerted action of the Exchange and its members here was, in
simple terms, a group boycott depriving petitioners of a valuable business
service which they needed to compete effectively as broker/dealers in the
over-the-counter securities market. Fashion Originators' Guild v. Federal
Trade Commission, 312 U.S. 457; Associated Press v. United States, 325 U.S.
44. 373 U.S. at 347-48.
45. The ambiguity of the notion of per se illegality has largely nullified its usefulness.
The Supreme Court has construed the notion to mean that the defendants' behavior need
not be shown to have affected price in any way, Container Corp. of Am. v. United States,
393 U.S. 333 (1969); that defendants' behavior need not be shown to have raised price or
lowered output so as to harm consumer welfare, U.S. v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392
(1927); that defendants need not be shown to possess monopoly power or the capacity to
reduce output, Klor's v. Broadway Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207 (1959); that no evidence or
argument about the ultimate goal of defendants' behavior (for example, the control of tortu-
ous style privacy) will be admissible, Fashion Orginators' Guild of Am. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457
(1941); that no evidence or argument about the efficiency-enhancing benefits of the defend-
ants' conduct will be admissible, United States v. TOPCO Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); that
no evidence or argument about the non-economic benefits of the defendants' conduct will be
admissible, National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1979); that
no evidence or argument of any kind in justification of defendants' behavior will be admissi-
ble, United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). This Article avoids the
ambigious notion of per se illegality as much as possible and instead attempts to specify the
evidence and arguments that the various approaches hold to be unnecessary or inadmissible.
"GROUP BOYCOTT"
1; Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207; Radiant Burners,
Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656.46
What a sweeping rule this is! It pays no attention to the rea-
son for the defendants' action. It applies to actions based on ethi-
cal concerns, narrow housekeeping concerns (such as the plaintiff's
failure to pay dues), cost-saving concerns, and quality control con-
cerns, as well as to actions based on the defendants' dislike of the
plaintiff's hair color, politics, or rivalry on the merits. It applies to
actions affecting merely technical aspects of the services or prod-
ucts the plaintiff provides as well as to actions affecting the indus-
try's economic organization. It applies to actions increasing output
as well as to actions reducing output.
Furthermore, this sweeping rule does not distinguish between
the various methods that can place the plaintiff at a significant
competitive disadvantage. In Silver the defendants withdrew the
plaintiff's wire connections to member brokers. The Court's lan-
guage, however, would apply equally to any concerted action im-
posing a competitive disadvantage. For example, suggesting mini-
mum educational standards for brokers or reporting a broker's
past unethical practices also would place a broker at a competitive
disadvantage. In other contexts, such concerted conduct as pub-
licizing the results of product safety tests, promulgating standards
designed to assure that complementary products will interconnect,
or, indeed, ordinary trade association advertising also would place
some rivals at a competitive disadvantage.
The Court could have interpreted the brace of famous cases
cited in Silver short of this sweeping rule. In Klor's47 and Radiant
Burners,48 for instance, the Court merely reversed summary judg-
ments for the defendants, which had been entered despite the
plaintiffs' allegations about the untoward circumstances surround-
ing the defendants' concerted action. To say, as Klor's and Radi-
ant Burners do, that the plaintiff possibly may win depending on
the circumstances surrounding the defendants' concerted action
stops short of saying, as Silver does, that absent federal regulation
or other justification, the plaintiff will win whenever he is hurt sig-
nificantly by any concerted action. Silver creates a heavy presump-
tion in the plaintiff's favor that the earlier cases did not.
After listing the business advantages of wire connections, the
46. 373 U.S. at 347.
47. 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
48. 364 U.S. 656 (1961).
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Silver Court repeated its sweeping rule:
These important business advantages were taken away from petitioners by
the group action of the Exchange and its members. Such "concerted refusals
by traders to deal with other traders ... have long been held to be in the
forbidden category," Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. at
212, of restraints which "because of their inherent nature or effect ... injuri-
ously restrained trade," United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S.
106, 179. Hence, absent any justification derived from the policy of another
statute or otherwise, the Exchange acted in violation of the Sherman Act.4 9
Fortunately, lower courts have interpreted the "or otherwise" lan-
guage in the last sentence, which grammatically could be under-
stood to mean only a justification derived from the policy of
another legislative or administrative enactment, to mean a justifi-
cation derived from any consideration that seems compelling.
Hence, industry self-regulation efforts have escaped instant judi-
cial condemnation on various grounds, the most common being
that the nature of the industry calls for some self-regulation. The
United States Tennis Association avoided instant condemnation
for banning the spaghetti-string racquet by citing the need to pre-
serve the character of tennisY' The American Contract Bridge
League avoided instant condemnation for banning the plaintiff's
scoring system by claiming the system would reduce the conve-
nience of play in ACBL tournaments."' Although the Silver Court
avoided instantly condemning the Exchange only by finding au-
thorization for its self-regulation in the Securities and Exchange
Act, a lower court today probably would reach the same result
even in the absence of the Act. A lower court probably would ac-
cept for this limited purpose the Exchange's argument that its ef-
forts to police the ethics and financial soundness of brokers with
wire connections increases a potential trader's confidence in the
Exchange. A lower court that followed the Chicago School would
go further still and ultimately uphold any exclusion-even one
based on the plaintiff's politics-if it increased the appeal and
value of the Exchange, that is, increased the demand for what the
Exchange has to offer. In general, considering Silver's facts without
the escape provided by the Securities and Exchange Act under-
scores the severity of Silver's clear (albeit negative) implication: In
the absence of the Act, the mere withdrawal of wire connections by
49. 373 U.S. at 348.
50. Gunter Hartz Sports, Inc. v. United States Tennis Ass'n, 665 F.2d 222, 228 (8th
Cir. 1981).
51. Bridge Corp. of Am. v. American Contract Bridge League, Inc., 428 F.2d 1365,
1370 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 940 (1971).
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the Exchange deserves instant condemnation, regardless of reason,
motive, effect on output, or procedure.
Although defendants have avoided instant condemnation
under this first step of Silver's rule,52 they still confront the eight
remaining steps at which a plaintiff might prevail. These include,
in particular, the requirement that the defendants' action be no
more extensive than necessary to fulfill whatever policy justifies
self-regulation. A mere reasonable relation between the defend-
ants' action and the justifying policy apparently is insufficient. A
plaintiff who can conceive of an alternative action that would have
addressed the justifying policy equally well and hurt the plaintiff
less will prevail. The possibility that the alternative policy may be
more expensive to the defendants seems, incredibly, to be immate-
rial. Thus, Silver's approach creates a substantial risk of antitrust
liability-with the attendant spectre of having to pay the plaintiff
treble damages plus attorney's fees-whenever concerted conduct
places one of the defendants' rivals at a significant competitive dis-
advantage. This spectre inhibits defendants from taking any action
that might hurt a potential plaintiff and even from collaborating
originally if that collaboration eventually may hurt a potential
plaintiff.53
Although earlier decisions did not mandate Silver's approach,
Silver is no aberration. Its antecedents contain equally sweeping
language about industry self-regulation, which courts still cite with
approval. In Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. FTC,54 for
example, the Court held that a group of fashion designers could
not agree to refuse to deal with style pirates or with manufacturers
and retailers who dealt with the pirates. The Court declared the
purpose of the agreement, namely the suppression of tortuous style
piracy, to be irrelevant. Writing for the Court, Justice Black
sweepingly condemned FOGA for creating an "extra-governmental
52. Lower courts increasingly were ignoring Silver's rule before the Court modified the
rule in Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S.
284 (1985). See, e.g., Phil Tolkan Datsun v. Greater Milwaukee Datsun Dealers' Advertising
Ass'n, 672 F.2d 1280 (7th Cir. 1982) (Silver's rule criticized); United States Trotting Ass'n v.
Chicago Down Ass'n, 665 F.2d 781, 788-90 (7th Cir. 1981) (Silver's rule criticized).
53. Silver's approach will deter many individuals from participating in such private
organizations and will deter those who do participate from taking actions that might hurt
the plaintiff. Cf. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982).
The chilling effect on association activity is accentuated by the liberal rule for holding
associations vicariously liable for the acts of their employees and members. See American
Soc'y of Mech. Eng'rs v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556 (1982).
54. 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
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agency, which prescribed rules for the regulation and the restraint
of interstate commerce, and provides extra-judicial tribunals for
determination and punishment of violations, and thus 'trenches
upon the power of the national legislature and violates the statute
' "55
Justice Black's notion that private firms may not act in con-
cert to judge and control other firms has an endearing place in the
mythology of liberalism. The notion assumes that the only permis-
sible regulator of business-the only rule-maker and rule-enforcer,
especially on normative grounds-is the government. "Abide by
the government rules," the notion tells the budding entrepreneur,
"and you need worry only about the impersonal forces of demand
and supply." Among other benefits, the notion tends to distract
attention from the existence of entrenched private power and to
suggest that liberalism's claim of entrusting all normative author-
ity to the government carries significance. But no observer of the
modern economic order can expect a trial judge to take the notion
seriously. To be sure, private groups acting outside legal channels
lack authority to imprison business rivals. As discussed below,
however, private groups can and do routinely judge rivals and act
in ways that put rivals at a competitive disadvantage. Implicit in
any joint activity, from a merger, partnership, or joint venture, to a
less complete integration like a trade association, standard-setting
body, multiple listing service, or a single effort at joint advertising,
is a judgment about rivals, which may put some, especially those
not included, at a competitive disadvantage. Moreover, rivals often
make the best judges of each other, thanks to their expertise and
interest and to the efficiency with which they can reach and imple-
ment their judgments.56 Whatever the merits of Justice Black's
language in his populist vision of liberalism where only the govern-
ment makes and enforces rules and where private groups never
control another's opportunity to compete, we can see at a glance
that his language would condemn without further inquiry all the
concerted conduct in our original list of cases. In each case, the
55. Fashion Originators' Guild of Am. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 482 (1941). See also
American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 130 F.2d 233, 249 (D.C. Cir. 1942); FTC v. Wal-
lace, 75 F.2d 733 (8th Cir. 1935). The court in Wallace denounced extra judicial judgments
about rivals in the same sweeping terms: "It is not a prerogative of private parties to act as
self-constituted censors of business ethics, to install themselves as judges and guardians of
the public welfare, and to enforce by drastic and restrictive measures their conceptions thus
formed." Id. at 737.
56. For the claim that a private rule may be more efficient than a public rule, see
Landes & Posner, Adjudication As A Public Good, 8 J. LEG. STUD. 235, 257 (1979).
1522 [Vol. 39:1507
"GROUP BOYCOTT"
defendants were judging a rival or a potential rival and taking
action that placed that rival at a competitive disadvantage. 57
The policy underpinnings of the traditional approach-with
its hostility toward industry self-regulation-appear to spring from
judicial commitment to at least five overlapping principles. One is
an attempt to assure entrepreneurs equal opportunity, limited only
by the impersonal forces of demand and supply rather than by the
approval and acceptance of an entrenched private group.58 This
principle ignores the possibility that the entrenched private group,
thanks to its coordination of effort and ability to exclude, may of-
fer sellers or buyers subtle advantages that ultimately enhance effi-
ciency. A second principle is the wish to retain civil and criminal
law as the only police mechanisms for controlling private conduct.
Private rulemaking and adjudication, therefore, is viewed with a
jealous eye. This principle ignores the possibility that private adju-
dication, including the monitoring and policing of rivals, may pro-
vide an inseparable ingredient of and incentive for an efficiency-
enhancing collaboration. A third principle is judicial fear of the po-
tential for abuse in allowing businesses to decide a rival's fate.
Thus, courts view with suspicion whatever salutary reasons defend-
ants give for their actions and whatever apparently neutral rules
they invoke. Defendants are suspected of using the reasons as a
subterfuge to hide their true motive of disciplining or suppressing
the plaintiff to keep him from legitimately diverting their business.
57. The Court is beginning to adopt a more realistic attitude toward the kind of vigi-
lantism Black condemned: "[W]e would not expect that any market arrangements reasona-
bly necessary to effectuate the [copyright] rights that are granted [by law] would be deemed
a per se violation . . . ." Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1,
19 (1979).
58. See A. NEALE, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 421-23 (1968); H.
THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTIrRUST POLICY: ORIGINATION OF AN AMERICAN TRADITION 1, 53
(1955) (one purpose of the Sherman Act is to give a newcomer a fair opportunity to com-
pete); Blake & Jones, The Goals of Antitrust: A Dialogue on Policy: In Defense of Anti-
trust, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 377, 382-84 (1965).
The different temporal frames of Silver's traditional approach and the religion of
opportunity, on the one hand, and the Chicago School approach and the logic of economic
efficiency, on the other hand, help to explain the different approaches generally. Like much
of tort law, the traditional approach insists on a narrow temporal frame that factors out
events occurring before the plaintiff first appeared, attempted to compete, and then was
injured by the defendants. Taking the plaintiff's perspective, the religion of opportunity
commands that the plaintiff must at that time be assured an opportunity to compete for
success on the competitive merits that is roughly equal to the opportunity of his rivals. In
contrast, the Chicago School aproach employs a broader temporal frame that takes the per-
spective of the defendants back when they were considering whether to undertake their
original joint activity. See infra accompanying note 90.
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In other words, the courts wisely ignore the economic postulate
that a firm has no reason to care about the fate of a particular rival
in a world of perfect competition. Instead, the courts recognize
that imperfect competition and active rivalry between firms are
the norm.59 They recognize that firms may face a downward-slop-
ing demand curve and have a keen interest in hurting a rival even
when the firms, individually or collectively, do not possess "mo-
nopoly power" under the current legal standards for finding such
power, and even when the firms are not planning or committing a
substantive antitrust violation such as price fixing. A fourth princi-
ple is judicial reluctance to presume that the creation of a private
association that gives a competitive advantage to its members is an
acceptable form of rivalry on the merits and nothing else. A fifth
principle is a judicial willingness to review and interfere with the
business decisions of any private association that can be deemed a
combination within the meaning of the Sherman Act; for example,
the judicial deference given to an individual firm to pick its associ-
ates is not given to a combination. This principle ignores the fact
that, as an economic matter, an efficiency-enhancing combination
may deserve freedom from government interference no less than
an individual firm.
This Article attacks both Silver's traditional approach and the
commentators who call for a hostile approach toward defendants'
conduct whenever defendants are the plaintiff's horizontal rivals.60
By presuming illegal all concerted conduct that puts one of the
defendants' rivals at a significant competitive disadvantage, the
Silver approach operates at too high a level of generality to be use-
ful. Attempting to find general principles that govern all concerted
conduct putting a rival at a significant competitive disadvantage is
a profitless endeavor. 1 Such a generalized approach sweeps within
its terms conduct that differs dramatically in its social value. In
59. By "active rivalry" I mean the activities that constitute "competition" in every
day parlance: rivalry for sales by underselling identifiable, named rivals and by advertising a
favorable comparision with those rivals, close watch of the actions of one's rivals; keen con-
cern about the exit of old rivals, the entrance of new rivals, and the number of rivals within
one's particular locale. Such active rivalry indicates imperfect competition.
In contrast, a perfectly competitive market is completely impersonal. With perfect com-
petition, rivals do not behave "competitively" in the word's ordinary sense and, indeed, pay
no attention to each other.
60. E.g., L. SULLIVAN, supra note 16, at § 92.
61. Because of the extraordinary variety of conduct that the "group boycott" concept
purports to govern, reviews of "group boycott" cases typically run more than one hundred
pages in length. E.g., Annot., 41 A.L.R. FED. 175 (1979).
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addition, the Silver approach distracts attention from the wide va-
riety of benefits and harms that defendants' concerted conduct
presents. It also distracts attention from the method of concerted
conduct by which defendants hurt the plaintiff. For instance, the
Silver approach does not by its own terms distinguish between
hurting the plaintiff through truthful advertising and hurting the
plaintiff through deceitful manipulation of an apparently neutral
testing service, between certification efforts that merely suggest
minimum standards and standardization efforts that enforce stan-
dards by threatening to deny access to essential facilities.2 Silver's
approach also hinders a lower court from concluding short of trial
that the defendants' concerted conduct was appropriate. Instead,
the approach allows a lower court to avoid an antitrust trial only
by dismissing the plaintiff's case on grounds such as lack of an ef-
fect on interstate commerce, lack of a Sherman Act agreement, or
lack of personal jurisdiction. Because so many industry self-regula-
tion cases are resolved on such grounds, Silver's approach retards
the evolution of guidelines that will indicate with increasing speci-
ficity what concerted conduct by rivals is appropriate.
B. The Chicago School Approach
The Chicago School faults Silver's approach because it is not
tailored to condemn only concerted conduct that restrains output.
By definition, conduct restraining output will disturb allocative
efficiency and, unless offset by savings in productive efficiency, will
reduce the gains from trade and reduce the sum of consumer and
producer surplus.63 By giving an antitrust action to an injured
plaintiff when his injury does not restrain output, Silver's tradi-
tional approach protects competitors, not competition . 4
Major examples of output-restraining concerted conduct are
horizontal mergers to acquire a monopoly and horizontal price fix-
ing. Price fixing here includes bid rigging, horizontal division of
customers or territories, and horizontal agreements to restrict out-
put, but does not include resale price maintenance or any other
62. See Q. LAMB & C. SHIELDS, TRADE ASSOCIATION LAW AND PRACTICE 89-95 (1971)
(current law fails to distinguish between suggesting and enforcing standards); See Monroe,
Trade and Professional Associations: An Overview of Horizontal Restraints, 9 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 479, 492 (1984).
63. Liebeler, Interbrand Cartels, 30 UCLA L. REv. 1, 16 (1982).
64. E.g., Product Liability Ins. Agency Inc. v. Crum & Forster Ins. Co., 682 F.2d 660,
663-64 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3501 (1985) (criticizing traditional approach
for not focusing on the danger to output).
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vertical restraint.6 5 Another major example is a horizontal agree-
ment among rivals about the nonprice dimensions of their prod-
ucts or services, such as the design or composition of their prod-
ucts, credit terms, cancellation terms, marketing tactics, or the
characteristics of eligible buyers. Like price fixing, such a horizon-
tal agreement prevents the parties to the agreement from respond-
ing to consumer desires. If the parties have market power (and the
Chicago School insists that market power be shown), the agree-
ment will restrain output. When not justified by productive effi-
ciency concerns, such an agreement on dimensions other than price
often is categorized simply as an unreasonable restraint of trade.6
National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States7 pro-
vides an example. In that case the defendant engineers agreed not
on the price of services but on the practice of not discussing prices
until after the customer initially had selected an engineer. By
preventing a customer from basing his initial selection of an engi-
neer on price, the agreement interfered with the market's ability to
respond to consumer desires. As a result, the market did not pro-
duce the services consumers most desired, the consumers did not
spend their money on their highest valued use, and the gains from
trade were reduced. In theory, the agreement reduced, however
slightly, the output of engineering services. In order to emphasize
the close theoretical relation between such conduct and price fix-
ing, this Article will refer to such output-restraining concerted con-
65. E.g., Liebeler, Book Review, 66 CAL. L. REV. 1317, 1322-23 (1978) (review of R.
BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF) (vertical restraints present
no threat of reducing output).
The Chicaco School's condemnation of price fixing is difficult to explain in light of the
School's assumption of free entry and its adherence to price theory. As long as no entry
barriers exist and entry is free, price fixing either should fail in its goal of reducing output
and increasing profit or should succeed only because it provides efficiency-enhancing bene-
fits that increase consumer welfare. There is no reason for condemning price fixing in either
case. Dewey, Antitrust and Economic Theory: An Uneasy Friendship, 87 YALE L.J. 1516,
1518-23 (1978).
66. Philip Areeda's well-known textbook, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS (3d ed. 1981), sensibly
put the cases involving this conduct in the chapter on horizontal restraints and in a section
entitled "Unreasonable Restraints of Trade," immediately after the section on price fixing.
Other examples of such concerted conduct are found in Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc.,
446 U.S. 643 (1980) (agreement about credit terms extended to customers); United States v.
Gasoline Retailers Ass'n, 285 F.2d 688 (7th Cir. 1961) (agreement to limit advertising);
Mardirosian v. American Inst. of Architects, 474 F. Supp. 628 (D.D.C. 1979) (agreement not
to solicit customers who may be contractually committed to another architect); United
States v. Texas Bd. of Pub. Accountancy, 1978-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 62,039 (W.D. Tex.
1978), (agreement to limit competitive bidding), modified, 592 F.2d 919 (5th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 444 U.S. 925 (1979).
67. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
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duct not justified by gains to productive efficiency as "concerted
conduct related to price fixing."6
Judge Posner has offered the most influential explanation of
the Chicago School's approach toward the example cases. He
explains that boycotts simply are "an enforcement device, a sanc-
tion (akin to ostracism), ' 69 and "a method of self-help enforce-
ment, '70 rather than a substantive antitrust practice. As simply
one of many tools for many possible ends, boycotts have no anti-
trust significance. 1 Courts therefore should attack a boycott only
when a firm uses the device to enforce some other behavior, such
as price fixing, that is itself a substantive antitrust violation.72 In
68. A more common term would be "cartel" conduct. But the term "cartel" is some-
times used to include any concerted behavior, thereby including conduct that has no ten-
dency to restrain output and that may provide substantial gains to productive efficiency.
The goal here is to find a general term for that conduct, other than price fixing, that Judge
Posner would deem objectionable on the basis of substantive antitrust policy. See supra text
accompanying note 29. Admittedly, the concept "concerted conduct related to price-fixing"
is at once too vague and too narrow.
When concerted conduct related to price fixing occasionally is analyzed as a group boy-
cott, it often is classified as a group boycott to improve the defendants' bargaining position
in relation to buyers and sellers. This classification distinguishes this concerted conduct
from the classic group boycott, which attempts to improve the defendants' competitive posi-
tion in relation to rivals. Compare United States v. First Nat'l Pictures, Inc., 282 U.S. 44
(1930) (bargaining boycott) and Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S.
30 (1930) (same) with Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 234
U.S. 600 (1914) (competitive boycott). M. HANDLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TRADE REGU-
LATION, (7th ed. 1982). The traditional approach tolerated bargaining boycotts more than
competitive boycotts. The Chicago School's approach reverses the preference.
69. R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST 724 (2d ed. 1980). Perhaps the most
thorough application of Judge Posner's antitrust analysis to industry self-regulation cases
appears in W. LIEBELER, ANTITRUST ADVISER § 1.32, at 45-59 (C. Hills ed. Supp. 1983).
70. R. POSNER, supra note 28, at 207.
71. R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, supra note 69, at 734.
72. In his earlier works Judge Posner did not condemn boycotts only when the defend-
ants were engaged in a substantive antitrust violation, but more generally when defendants
were engaged in any practice objectionable on the basis of substantive antitrust policy:
Boycotts are properly attacked under the antitrust laws when and only when they are
employed to enforce a practice that is objectionable on the basis of substantive anti-
trust policy ....The test of a boycott challenged under the antitrust laws is whether
it is being used to enforce a practice that is contrary to the policy of those laws.
R. POSNER, supra note 28, at 210.
In a decision for the Seventh Circuit, Posner has written:
A boycott is illegal per se under the antitrust laws only if used to enforce a rule or
policy or practice that is itself illegal per se . .. .If a rule of a private association is
not illegal per se, neither is the enforcement of the rule. . . as by expelling a noncom-
plying member-the normal method by which a private association enforces its rules.
Vogel v. American Soc'y of Appraisers, 744 F.2d 598, 600 (7th Cir. 1984). See Wilk v. Ameri-
can Medical Ass'n, 719 F.2d 207, 221 (9th Cir. 1983); Bruce Drug, Inc. v. Hollister, Inc., 688
F.2d 853, 859-60 (1st Cir. 1982). Judge Posner has suggested further that a boycott would be
illegal under the rule of reason if and only if the defendants' related rule, policy, or practice
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effect, the plaintiff must show that the defendants are engaged in
price fixing or related concerted conduct and that the defendants
have acted against the plaintiff in order to ensure the conduct's
success. Under this rule, the plaintiff does not succeed by showing
merely that the defendants agreed to take the action that put the
plaintiff at a competitive disadvantage. The defendants' concerted
action against the plaintiff is in itself insignificant. The action at
best is only evidence, and inconclusive evidence at that, of the de-
fendants' illegal price fixing or other related concerted conduct.
Judge Posner's rule puts the plaintiff in the same position as any
person who buys from or sells to the defendants. The plaintiff
must show that the defendants either fixed prices or engaged in
other related concerted conduct that led them to act against him.
If the plaintiff cannot prove such conduct, he is without a rem-
edy.73 In this dramatic departure from Silver, the court's attention
focuses less on the defendants' action against the plaintiff and
more on the defendants' formation of the private association or
their other previous joint activity. It is not the defendants' imme-
diate but their original action that counts.74
Judge Posner's rule may allow defendants to escape liability
even when their action facilitates oligopolistic coordination by
keeping down the number of rivals in the industry. Conventional
economic wisdom maintains that coordination of prices and other
dimensions of rivalry becomes more possible, ceteris paribus, the
fewer the number of rivals.75 Thus, defendants may be tempted to
handicap or exclude rivals in order to maintain an industry struc-
ture favorable for coordination. Defendants who use industry self-
regulation for this end will escape condemnation under Judge Pos-
ner's rule. After all, oligopolistic coordination is not an antitrust
violation; therefore, these defendants are not injuring the plaintiff
in order to enforce a practice that is an antitrust violation .7  Be-
is itself illegal under the rule of reason. Vogel, 744 F.2d at 604.
73. Some Chicago School members argue that the injured plaintiff would not have
standing to recover when the defendants are engaged in price fixing because the harm to the
plaintiff does not correlate with the degree of output restriction. Page, The Scope of Liabil-
ity for Antitrust Violation, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1445, 1468 (1985) (the fact that the plaintiff's
injury is a means by which the price fixing agreement was policed is irrelevant).
74. Although Judge Bork is associated with the Chicago School, he takes a more hos-
tile view toward boycotts. Judge Bork believes boycotts adversely affect consumer welfare
when they disrupt the plaintiff's optimal distribution pattern and deprive consumers of a
preferred outlet. R. BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 332 (1978).
75. E.g., F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
(1980).
76. Judge Posner may claim that although oligopolistic coordination is not a substan-
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cause successful coordination restrains output in much the same
way as price fixing, the defendants' escape represents a shortcom-
ing of Judge Posner's rule. Although Judge Posner has suggested
that he would expand the concept of "agreement" in order to in-
clude oligopolistic coordination as a Sherman Act violation, thus
capturing these defendants,7 7 those courts adopting his rule on
boycotts have not expanded the concept of "agreement"
accordingly?8
The Chicago School might further criticize Silver's traditional
approach because it discounts the productive efficiency gains from
the defendants' joint activity, gains to which the injury to the
plaintiff may be considered ancillary.79 For example, the defend-
ants' joint activity may reduce production or transaction costs or
increase consumer demand. The joint activity may create or mar-
ket a product that otherwise would not exist. Shopping malls,
sporting leagues, private hospitals, real estate multiple listing ser-
vices, and other joint activities may increase demand for the par-
ticipants' products and thus may deserve to be considered effi-
ciency enhancing. Whenever excluding additional firms helps the
joint activity operate more efficiently (for example, by maintaining
a number of teams in a sporting league that will maximize con-
sumer demand) or helps to provide an optimum incentive for in-
vestment in the joint activity (for example, by eliminating free rid-
ers who originally did not invest in the joint activity), the exclusion
properly can be considered ancillary to the efficiency-enhancing
gains.80
Silver's traditional approach does not ignore productive effi-
ciency considerations entirely. The approach calls for a court to
examine whether the defendants' joint activity that injured the
tive antitrust violation, it is a practice objectionable on the basis of substantive antitrust
policy. Judge Posner's rule, therefore, would capture a boycott designed to enforce such
coordination. R. POSNER, supra note 28, at 210.
77. Posner, Oligopolistic Pricing Suits, The Sherman Act and Economic Welfare. A
Reply to Professor Markovitz, 28 STAN. L. REv. 903 (1976); Posner, A Program for the Anti-
trust Division, 38 U. CHL L. Ray. 500 (1971).
78. E.g., Vogel v. American Soc'y of Appraisers, 744 F.2d 598, 600 (7th Cir. 1984);
Wilk v. American Medical Ass'n, 719 F.2d 207, 221 (7th Cir. 1983); Bruce Drug, Inc., v.
Hollister, Inc., 688 F.2d 853, 859-60 (1st Cir. 1982).
79. For the claim that the consumer welfare gains from a horizontal integration often
will exceed the welfare losses, see Williamson, Economics As An Antitrust Defense, 25 U.
PA. L. REv. 699, 707 (1977).
80. E.g., Deesen v. Professional Golfers' Ass'n, 358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir.) (exclusion of
some golfers from PGA events necessary to maximize the marketability of the product),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 846 (1966).
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plaintiff is "justified by the policy of another statute or other-
wise." '81 Defendants who can explain how their productive effi-
ciency gains constitute a justifying policy will avoid immediate
condemnation. The burden for meeting this test, however, clearly
falls on the defendants.82 Moreover, the traditional approach's
eight subsequent inquiries pay far too much attention to whether
the plaintiff's injury was "fair" and pay far too little attention to
the gains from the defendants' initial joint activity and to the
effect of judicial intervention on the defendants' incentives to en-
gage in that activity.
Under the Chicago School's approach set forth by Judge Pos-
ner, productive efficiency gains play a much more central role. As
noted, the plaintiff must show that the defendants' original joint
activity reduces output. Even then, however, the defendants will
prevail by showing that the productive efficiency gains from that
activity offset the reduction in output. By definition, a joint activ-
ity that yields a net increase in efficiency is not objectionable on
the basis of substantive antitrust policy. Therefore, no later action
against the plaintiff that is designed to enforce or maintain such an
activity will be actionable. Moreover, in order to show productive
efficiency gains, defendants apparently only need advance a plausi-
ble explanation of how their activity lowers costs, increases de-
mand, or mitigates some market imperfection. 4
Because the Chicago School approach deemphasizes the
defendants' action against the plaintiff, the approach does not fo-
cus attention on whether the injuring action "accomplishes an end
consistent with the policy justifying self-regulation, is reasonably
related to that end, and is no more extensive than necessary."85
Defendants are spared the heavy burden of showing that their
action was necessary to achieve some legitimate, justifying end.
81. Silver, 373 U.S. at 348-49.
82. For an alternative statement of this burden, see Boddicker v. Arizona State Dental
Ass'n, 549 F.2d 626, 632 (9th Cir. 1972) (professional regulation allowed only if defendants
show that it "contribute[s] directly to improving service to the public"), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 825 (1977).
83. See supra text accompanying notes 34-57.
84. For example, Professor Liebeler apparently would allow a decisionmaker to reject
a defendant's efficiency-enhancing claim only when "it becomes clear that such productiv-
ity-enhancing potential is not involved" in the joint activity. The type and amount of evi-
dence required for this showing is left unclear, both in theory and in application to any
particular case. Liebeler, Market Power and Competitive Superiority in Concentrated
Industries, 25 UCLA L. REV. 1231, 1283 (1978).




Thus, the plaintiff will not prevail merely by suggesting a plausible
alternative action the defendants could have taken that might have
achieved the same productive efficiency gains while hurting the
plaintiff less. 6 Indeed, the Chicago School approach does not
invite any inquiry into less restrictive alternatives. Its proponents
are unwilling to let the judge and jury second-guess the defendants
with some untested alternative business action. They appreciate
the difficulty defendants may have in explaining and courts may
have in appreciating why such alternatives are inferior.8 7 The Chi-
cago School assumes defendants possess the incentive and-at
least compared to the courts-the acumen to take the most effi-
cient action. 8
In addition to ignoring the less restrictive alternative require-
ment, the Chicago School approach ignores other factors central to
the traditional approach. For example, the Chicago School ap-
proach does not inquire whether the defendants' action places the
plaintiff at a competitive disadvantage. It does not inquire whether
the defendants' action against the plaintiff is arbitrary, spiteful,
unfair, or based on rivalry avoidance. It does not inquire whether
the defendants hurt the plaintiff "unreasonably," as other
branches of the law and Silver's traditional approach use the term.
These inquiries are relevant, if at all, only to suits based on princi-
ples of tort, property, contract, fiduciary obligations, or the law of
private associations.8 Instead, the Chicago School approach toler-
ates the defendants' action against the plaintiff as long as the orig-
inal joint activity's net effect on consumer welfare appears to be
positive. The Chicago School approach strives to analogize the
plaintiff's injury to the injury that any business suffers from its
rivals' lower prices or better service. The approach also strives to
analogize the defendants' joint activity, such as their formation of
a private association, to individual businessmen's formation of a
partnership. Just as a partnership does not face antitrust scrutiny
when it excludes others interested in joining it, business associa-
86. See Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 Tax. L. REv. 1 (1984).
87. The danger that courts will fail to appreciate the efficiency-enhancing potential of
joint, horizontal activities is a genuine one. Professor Easterbrook has pointed out the fail-
ure of several courts to appreciate how maximum price-fixing, for example, may overcome
the market imperfection from the moral hazard problem. Easterbrook, Maximum Price Fix-
ing, 48 U. CHL L. REV. 886 (1981). See also Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457
U.S. 332 (1982).
88. W. LIEBELER, supra note 69, at 54 ("fine toothed examination of the breadth of
these membership criteria [of a multiple listing service] seem misplaced").
89. Id. at 53-56.
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tions should not face scrutiny when they exclude or injure rivals.
These features of the Chicago School's approach follow logi-
cally from the Chicago School's emphasis on viewing these cases ex
ante. An ex ante view starts the relevant story, or statement of
relevant facts, back at the moment when the defendants first con-
template the creation of their private association or the pursuit of
their original joint activity. The Chicago School asks in essence:
"What is the effect of our ruling on the incentive to engage in the
joint activity?" The legal outcome will turn largely on the net wel-
fare effect of the joint activity in the generality of cases, not neces-
sarily in the plaintiff's particular case. The Chicago School natu-
rally wants the law to encourage an activity that enhances
efficiency. At least, the law should not discourage the joint activity
by threatening to compel defendants to share their success with
rivals, by threatening to reduce the defendants' gain from the ac-
tivity, or by threatening to interfere with defendants' management
of the activity.
The Chicago School approach does not begin the relevant
inquiry in the plaintiff's suit at the moment when trouble among
the parties breaks out-when the plaintiff is injured by the de-
fendants' joint activity or, more likely, by his exclusion from the
joint activity. The "temporal frame" of the ex ante view, to use a
term of Mark Kelman,90 renders irrelevant the circumstances sur-
rounding the moment of the plaintiff's injury. For example,
whether the defendants' action was arbitrary, discriminatory, or
based on a rivalry-avoiding motive is irrelevant under the Chicago
School approach. Similarly, the ex ante approach in Ronald
Coase's famous example of a rancher's cattle trampling a farmer's
crops insists on a "broad temporal frame" that focuses all atten-
tion on the earliest moment when the parties or their predecessors
with perfect foresight might have reorganized their activities to
minimize costs."1 As Bruce Ackerman has explained, Coase's ex
ante approach renders irrelevant the circumstances surrounding
the moment of trampling, for example, whether the trampling oc-
curred by justifiable or unjustifiable mistake, by unavoidable acci-
dent, or by the rancher's deliberate efforts.2 Indeed, the ex ante
approach renders irrelevant all doctrines, such as the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions, that focus attention on the immediate
90. Kelman, Interpretative Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 32 STAN.
L. REV. 591, 593-94 (1981).
91. Coase, The Problem of Social Costs, 3 J.L. & EcON. 1, 25-31 (1963).
92. B. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW 47-51 (1984).
1532 [Vol. 39:1507
"GROUP BOYCOTT"
reason for injuring a particular party.93 The Chicago School never
asks whether distribution of entitlements at or immediately after
the moment of injury are fair, nondiscriminatory, and based on
some ground other than a suspect criterion.
The plaintiff plays an insignificant role in the Chicago School's
relevant story. When mentioned at all, he is depicted as a rival
who was unwilling to incur the risks of the joint activity at its crea-
tion but who now wants the court to compel his admission and let
him free ride on the defendants' past efficiency-enhancing efforts.
Often, of course, the plaintiff did not exist when the joint activity
was created and cannot now duplicate the joint activity except at
seemingly prohibitive costs. Rightly or wrongly, such a plaintiff's
dilemma touches upon liberalism's commitment to an equal oppor-
tunity for each businessman to compete. The Chicago School, how-
ever, ignores this commitment.
One shortcoming in Judge Posner's rule is its implicit over-
statement that output never will be reduced by the plaintiff's
injury as long as the defendants are not engaged in a substantive
antitrust violation such as price fixing.9 4 This overstatement
ignores several possibilities. Others have demonstrated that a firm
or group of firms facing a downward sloping demand curve (a finite
elasticity of demand) may benefit themselves and reduce output
through actions that raise their rivals' costs and that provide no
efficiency-enhancing benefits.95 Output may be reduced regardless
93. Cf. Easterbrook, Forward: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARv. L. REv.
4, 19-21 (1984) (applying an ex ante approach to a prosecution of demonstrators in a
National Park, an approach that ignored the immediate reason for prosecuting the demon-
strators, namely, that they had attempted to sleep); contra Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618 (1969) (imposing improper conditions on government privileges violates the
constitution).
94. R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST* CASES, ECONOMIc NoTEs, AND OTHER
MATERIALS, 732-33, 768-69 (2d ed. 1981).
95. For a diagramatic explanation of this possibility, see Salop & Scheffman, Raising
Rival's Costs, 73 AM. ECON. REv. 267 (1983); Page, The Scope of Liability for Antitrust
Violations, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1445 (1985). Salop and Scheffman demonstrate that a firm fac-
ing a downward sloping demand curve will profit from raising a rival's costs if the rival's
extra costs lead it to prefer a lower output, thereby raising residual consumer demand for
the firm's product. One proviso, however, is needed. The increase in residual demand must
exceed the increase in the firm's costs that results from whatever action raised the rival's
costs. In addition, the action that raised the rival's costs may reduce the combined output of
the firms if the action so increases the firm's own marginal costs or so decreases the elastic-
ity of the residual demand curve facing the firm that the firm actually prefers a lower out-
put despite the increased residual consumer demand, and if the action also so increases the
rival's marginal costs that the rival likewise prefers a lower output. In short, unless one
knows how a firm's action against its rival will affect the residual demand and the elasticity
of the residual demand facing the firm and how that action will affect the rival's marginal
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of the rivals' and the defendants' relative costs and even when the
finite elasticity of demand is due to factors other than any sub-
stantive antitrust violation. Moreover, in a world in which sellers
face a finite elasticity of demand even when not engaged in an out-
put-restraining antitrust violation and even when the firms collec-
tively lack a monopoly, as that term currently is defined in the law,
the elasticity of demand facing firms may turn on the number of
their rivals. Excluding rivals, therefore, may decrease the elasticity
of demand facing the remaining sellers.96 Concerted action that
reduces the elasticity of demand facing sellers enables the sellers to
increase prices by reducing output.9 7 The Chicago School model,
however, contains no theory of how an increased number of rivals
may affect the demand, or the elasticity of demand, that each
seller faces.98 The model instead allows only for two possibilities:
perfect competition (an infinitely elastic demand curve facing each
firm) at one extreme, or monopoly, cartel, or oligopolistic behavior
by firms who together wield a monopoly at the other. As long as no
hope of acquiring a monopoly exists (and the legal definition of a
monopoly requires at least sixty percent of the relevant product
costs and preferred output, one cannot predict the action's effect on total industry output.
Thus, Judge Posner's implicit assertion-that defendants' action against plaintiff never will
affect output in the absence of price fixing or some other substantive antitrust viola-
tion-necessarily would be true only in a world of perfect competition, that is, only when
each firm faces an infinitely elastic demand curve.
96. When sellers' output is limited, as the output of rival doctors is limited by the
number of working hours available, an increase in the number of rivals per a given popula-
tion of potential buyers ought to decrease the demand and increase the elasticity of demand
that each rival faces. Sloan, Physician Fee Inflation: Evidence for the Late 1960's in THE
ROLE OF HEALTH INSURANCE IN THE HEALTH SERVICES SECTOR 321-54 (R. Rosett ed. 1976).
97. The elasticity of demand facing sellers may vary between markets even when there
is no collusion. The ratio of marginal revenue to price will vary similarly. This explains why
prices will differ between geographic areas although the sellers' costs are the same. The
phenomenon of a seller transporting his products from one area and dumping them at a low
price in another area (while preventing resale of the items from the low-price area to the
high-price area) takes advantage of the differing elasticities of demand. Accordingly, those
who aim to assure consumers a competitive output and a price near the seller's cost ought to
be concerned not only about price fixing, but also about any acts that may reduce the elas-
ticity of demand facing the seller. Acts that eliminate rivals and thereby reduce the availa-
bility of substitute products or services may, therefore, be of concern.
98. Sometimes additional rivals actually will make the demand curve facing the
existing producers less, rather than more, elastic. This may occur, for example, when the
new rivals significantly increase consumer search costs. See Pauly & Satterthwaite, The
Pricing of Primary Care Physician's Services: A Test of the Role of Consumer Information,
12 BELL. J. OF ECON. 488, 491 (1981). Other times the new, additional rivals will lead existing
sellers to persuade consumers to purchase more goods or services, thereby increasing
demand. Evans, Supplier-Induced Demand in THE ECONOMICS OF HEALTH AND MEDICAL
CARE 162-73, (M. Perlman ed. 1974).
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and geographic market), each firm in the Chicago School model
ought to be serenely indifferent to the fate of any particular rival.
Thus, the model cannot explain why such a group of firms (with no
hope of a monopoly and no wish to enhance efficiency) would ever
want to injure or exclude a rival. Because the model does not allow
for entry barriers,99 it likewise is unable to explain how eliminating
rivals may affect supply.
Judge Posner's rule also ignores the possibility that the plain-
tiff may enjoy lower long-run costs than his rivals, and, had the
defendants' action been different, would have been able to expand
his output while maintaining his lower costs. In this case as well,
the injury to the plaintiff, like a tariff on a low-cost foreign pro-
ducer, may reduce industry output. The irrelevance of the plain-
tiff's fate to industry output, therefore, is less certain than Judge
Posner's rule implicitly assumes.
Equally pertinent is the sharp distinction that an economic
approach maintains between means and ends. The Chicago School
tends to assume that means or methods yield no value indepen-
dent of the ends that they promote. Accordingly, the Chicago
School shows no interest in distinguishing between approved and
unapproved concerted methods of injuring a rival, at least when
the injury is not designed to maintain an output-restraining agree-
ment. Except for the effect on efficiency, the Chicago School is not
concerned with whether the defendants injure the plaintiff through
widely approved forms of rivalry on the merits, deceitful manipula-
tion of natural monopolies, other dirty tricks (which are not yet
independent civil wrongs), civil wrongs (which are not yet indepen-
dent crimes), or crimes. Silver's approach, however, like the ap-
proach proposed in this Article, reflects an implicit judgment that
means and methods matter. As Lawrence Tribe states: "In many
realms of human experience, process is intuitively and widely felt
to matter in itself . . .-. 0
The strongest argument against Judge Posner's rule, however,
is probably historical.' 0  The rule ignores the traditional
99. The Chicago School approach recognizes that entry barriers may arise from gov-
ernment action. G. STIGLER, TiH ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 67 (1968).
100. Tribe, Ways Not to Think About Plastic Trees: New Foundations for Environ-
mental Law, 83 YM.sL L.J. 1315, 1339 (1974).
101. Another shortcoming of the Chicago School approach is the difficulty of applying
it in particular cases. Whenever a restraint on output exists, the approach calls for a judge
to balance the gains to productive efficiency against the loss in output in order to ascertain
the net effect of the defendants' conduct on consumer welfare. Others have noted the diffi-
culty, indeed the incoherence, of such an effort. Easterbrook, supra note 86, at 11-14; Kis-
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approach's clear (albeit implicit) message that concerns other than
allocative and productive efficiency need to be addressed. °2 As
Professor Coons has claimed: "In these grand legal fossils [such as
Klor's and FOGA] inheres a respect for values other than those of
the market." 03 Among these values is the social desirability of the
defendants' conduct on noneconomic grounds. To be sure, Silver's
traditional approach does not identify these values explicitly or
suggest how courts should take them into account in specific cases.
Nevertheless, these other values have been built into antitrust doc-
trine, however crudely, and a lower court determined to remain
faithful to the thrust of the traditional approach cannot ignore
them.10
4
C. The Traditional Approach Modified-Northwest Wholesale
Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery and Printing Co.
The 1985 Supreme Court decision Northwest Wholesale Sta-
tioners, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery and Printing Co.'0 5 modifies Sil-
sam, Webber, Bigus & Holzgraefe, Antitrust and Hospital Privileges: Testing the Conven-
tional Wisdom, 70 CAL. L. REv. 595, 661-62 (1983).
102. Behavior which does not threaten output, but threatens only to injure a rival has
so often constituted an antitrust violation that output and productive efficiency cannot be
said to be antitrust's sole concerns. See, e.g., Perryton Wholesale, Inc. v. Pioneer Distrib.
Co., 353 F.2d 618 (10th Cir. 1965) (defendants liable for conspiring to entice away rival's
employees), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 1032 (1967); Albert Pick-Barth Co. v. Mitchell Woodbury
Corp., 57 F.2d 96 (1st Cir.) (defendants liable for conspiring with rival's employees to use
rival's business records), cert. denied, 286 U.S. 552 (1932); see generally Note, The Pick-
Barth Doctrine: Should Unfair Competition Belong Under the Sherman Act?, 31 BAYLOR
L. REv. 253 (1979); Note, Antitrust Treatment of Competitive Torts: An Argument for a
Rule of Per Se Legality Under the Sherman Act, 58 TEx. L. REv. 415 (1980).
The debate about antitrust's proper goals is well known, see, e.g., Flynn, Antitrust
Jurisprudence: A Symposium on the Economic, Political and Social Goals of Antitrust
Policy, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 1182 (1977), and is beyond the scope of this Article. The legisla-
tive history of the Sherman Act and the continuing condemnation of behavior that does not
threaten to reduce output require a lower court to acknowledge that the current goals are
not merely allocative and productive efficiency. Among the other goals is the establishment
of a code of conduct for concerted business behavior. H. THORELLI, THE HISTORY OF THE
SHERMAN AcT (1966).
103. Coons, Non-Commercial Purpose as a Sherman Act Defense, 56 Nw. U.L. REV.
705, 742 (1962).
104. In attempting to identify a few patterns of such concerted business conduct that
have been condemned, this Article hopes to sharpen discussion generally about what con-
certed business conduct is proper, while also helping lower courts decide how to approach
these cases. Once the concerns addressed by the "code of conduct" aspect of antitrust law
are brought into the open, an ultimate policy maker, like the Supreme Court, will be better
able to decide whether to discard this goal and the laws that reflect it. Should that Court
reject a "code of conduct" goal for antitrust, state courts deciding tort cases may draw some
guidance about undesirable concerted conduct from the discarded antitrust law.
105. 105 S. Ct. 2613 (1985).
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ver's traditional approach and increases the plaintiff's burden in
an industry self-regulation suit. The case involved the expulsion of
an office supply retailer from a joint buying cooperative of retail-
ers. The Ninth Circuit,106 citing Silver, had found a per se violation
of the Sherman Act based on the defendants' failure to give the
plaintiff a reason for its expulsion or any procedural opportunity to
challenge it. The Supreme Court reversed the holding on the nar-
row ground that the defendants' failure to afford the plaintiff pro-
cedural protection should not trigger per se condemnation.
More importantly, the Court held that per se condemnation is
appropriate, at least for expulsion from a joint buying cooperative,
only if the plaintiff shows that the cooperative possesses "market
power or unique access to a business element necessary for effec-
tive competition. ' 10 7  Although these alternative requirements
apparently are intended to assure that an expulsion might restrain
output, in practice they serve mainly to increase the degree of
injury that the plaintiff must incur for per se liability to attach. In
contrast, the traditional approach requires only that the defend-
ants place the plaintiff at a "significant competitive disadvantage,"
a standard often met by a relatively minor injury.0 s
How the plaintiff is to show that the defendants possess
"unique access to a business element essential for effective compe-
tition" is unclear. At one extreme, the plaintiff may need to show
only that duplicating the defendants' "business element" would be
costly. This test is similar to the old "significant competitive disad-
vantage" test. At the other extreme, the plaintiff may need to show
that the defendants' "business element" cannot be obtained or
duplicated at any price, now or in the future.10 9 How, for example,
106. 715 F.2d 1393 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 2613 (1985).
107. 105 S. Ct. at 2621.
108. See Silver v. N.Y.S.E., 373 U.S. 341, 348 (1963); Associated Press v. United
States, 326 U.S. 1, 18 (1945).
109. The same uncertain meaning underlies the "essential facilities doctrine." The
doctrine would give an action to a plaintiff who establishes four elements: first, control of an
essential facility by a group with market power; second, a rival's inability practically and
reasonably to duplicate the facility; third, denial of use of the facility to a rival; and fourth,
the feasibility of the defendants' providing the facility to the rival. M.C.I. Communications
Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1132-33 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983); Note,
Unclogging the Bottleneck: A New Essential Facilities Doctrine, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 441
(1983).
Whether the second element of this test means that the essential facility must be costly
to duplicate, on the one hand, or impossible for some physical reason to duplicate, on the
other, is uncertain. The terms of the second element do not necessarily call for inquiry into
whether the essential facility stems from rivalry on the merits or from some natural monop-
oly. If it stems merely from rivalry on the merits by the defendants or their predecessors,
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would the requirement apply to the famous Terminal Railroad"°
case? The defendant-railroads in that case controlled access to the
only available railroad bridge over the Mississippi in the St. Louis
area. The fear was that they would deny access to rival railroads.
Applying Pacific Stationery to these facts, what proof would show
that the defendants "possessed unique access to a business ele-
ment necessary for effective competition"?"' Would it be enough
for an excluded railroad to show that the standard price of using
the defendants' facilities was less than its cost of building another
bridge? Or would such a plaintiff be required to go further and
show that to build another bridge would be prohibitively expensive
(whatever that means), legally impossible under current laws, or
physically impossible regardless of the laws or the cost?
Those plaintiffs who wish to invoke per se treatment, but who
cannot show the defendants' "unique access to a business element
necessary for effective competition," must show that the defend-
ants together possess "market power." Despite the volumes written
about "market power," the term's meaning is still unclear. In an
economic sense, virtually every firm possesses market power
because it can raise its price above the competitive level and still
sell some of its output. 12 In other words, virtually every firm faces
a finite, rather than infinite, elasticity of demand at a competitive
price, and therefore possesses some power to restrict output.
Clearly, the Court meant to require more than this minimal stan-
dard. But how much more? At the other extreme, the term "mar-
ket power" could mean that defendants together possess "monop-
oly power," which has been defined to be at least sixty-four
percent of the relevant product and geographic market."3 Presum-
ably, the Court intended a meaning of "market power" between
these two extremes. Justice Brennan may have signaled his
forcing the defendants to admit the plaintiff will reduce incentives for the original invest-
ment in the facility and frustrate productive efficiency. This uncertainty is separate from
the intractable problem of deciding appropriate terms for plaintiff's access to the facility.
Some authors assume that the only danger that the essential facility doctrine addresses
is the danger of price fixing or oligopolistic coordination among those who control the essen-
tial facility. Krattennaker & Salop, Anticompetitve Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to
Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986). That control of an essential facility
threatens values essential to the religion of opportunity and also allows those in control to
impose a "tariff" on a low cost producer apparently does not concern them.
110. United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
111. Pacific Stationery, 105 S. Ct. at 2621.
112. A. ALCIAN & W. ALLEN, EXCHANGE AND PRODUCTION: COMPETITION COORDINATION
AND CONTROL 236-42 (3d ed. 1983).
113. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 436 (2d Cir. 1945).
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intended meaning of market power earlier in the Pacific Station-
ery opinion when he noted that previous per se rulings involved
defendant associations that consisted of firms having a dominant
position in the relevant market.114 Perhaps, therefore, a court will
find market power whenever the defendants' private association
consists of the industry leaders. The usual meaning in traditional
antitrust law, however, and the position assumed by the govern-
ment on its amicus brief, is that market power in this context sim-
ply means enough power to exclude a rival.15 This meaning redi-
rects attention to the degree of injury to the plaintiff.
Unfortunately, this common meaning of market power assumes
incorrectly that the power to inflict sufficient injury on a rival to
prevent its entering or remaining in business necessarily entails the
power to restrict output. As other writers have emphasized, how-
ever, the mere ability of an association of otherwise competitive
firms to exclude rival firms from the market does not establish the
existence of power to restrict output."' The power to restrict out-
put depends on the elasticity of demand facing the defendants at a
competitive price. It does not correlate with the power to exclude;
it may not even correlate with market share. The power to exclude
is at most a helpful precondition to restricting output; it alone is
not sufficient. In any event, Pacific Stationery's requirement that
the plaintiff prove market power sharply increases the plaintiff's
litigation burden and may require him to establish the relevant
product and geographic markets.
The most important feature of Pacific Stationery is that the
case leaves intact a great deal of the traditional approach, contrary
to the Chicago School's recommendations. The Court reaffirmed
the famous and much criticized cases establishing the traditional
approach, specifically Klor's, FOGA, Radiant Burners, and Sil-
ver. 7 The Court ignored the justifications, such as Klor's' free-
rider justification,1 8 that commentators have advanced to show
that the defendants' action in those cases enhanced efficiency. Pre-
sumably, lower courts are to ignore similar arguments in the
114. Pacific Stationery, 105 S. Ct. at 2613.
115. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809, 811, 814 (1946).
116. W. LIEBELER, supra note 69, at 54. The fact that membership in a private associa-
tion (or access to some resource) is essential for a firm's financial success does not mean that
those in the association (or those with access to the resource) restrict, or have the ability to
restrict, output. See also Tobriner & Grodin, The Individual and the Public Service Enter-
prise in the New Industrial State 55 CAL. L. REV. 1247, 1254-55 (1967).
117. 105 S. Ct. at 2617-18.




Moreover, the Court continued to recognize the notion of an
"anti-competitive animus," which if "necessarily implie[d]," would
establish the "probability of an anti-competitive effect."" 9 For
example, if the defendants' motive for excluding the plaintiff from
the cooperative was to retaliate against his decision to operate as
an independent wholesaler, this "anti-competitive animus" might
doom the defendants under a rule of reason analysis. Thus, the
time-consuming search for the defendants' "true" animus, invited
by the traditional approach and rejected by the Chicago School,
will continue.
Under a rule of reason analysis, Pacific Stationery also keeps
at issue the relationship between the plaintiff's injury and the effi-
ciency-enhancing benefits of the defendants' action. The Court left
unclear how close this relationship must be and which party has
the burden of proof regarding the relationship. As long as the rela-
tionship matters, however, the plaintiff may prevail by showing
that the defendants' action was arbitrary, unnecessary, or other-
wise unrelated to efficiency-enhancing benefits. This means the
plaintiff can attempt to show less damaging, equally efficiency-
enhancing, alternative business practices that the defendants
might have used. Presumably, a jury would rule for the plaintiff if
it were convinced that an alternative practice was feasible. The Su-
preme Court's other major antitrust decision of 1985, Aspen Skiing
Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.,120 reaffirms the Court's will-
ingness to let the judge and jury decide that valid business reasons
do not justify the defendants' practices and, thus, that those prac-
tices harm rivals unreasonably. The Chicago School approach, in
contrast, would exclude evidence of possible alternative business
practices that might have hurt the plaintiff less. According to that
approach, appropriate deference to the defendants' decisionmaking
freedom militates against any inquiry into alternative business
practices.
As a general matter, the Court's assertion in Pacific Station-
ery that its holding addressed only the requirements for per se
condemnation allows the traditional approach to govern rule of
reason cases. The requirement that defendants possess either
"market power or unique access to a business element necessary
for effective competition," therefore, need not apply in a rule of
119. 105 S. Ct. at 2620.




In summary, Pacific Stationery-although written narrowly to
apply to expulsion from a joint buying cooperative-eliminates the
presumption of per se illegality embedded in Silver's traditional
approach. Moreover, the Court's language at times adumbrates the
Chicago School's economic approach and its single-minded evalua-
tion of harm to allocative efficiency and gain to productive effi-
ciency. Nevertheless, many matters remain relevant that an eco-
nomic approach discounts or does not consider. The traditional
approach's tendency to protect a rival regardless of the effect on
output survives.
One of the shortcomings of Pacific Stationery's approach is
the lack of guidance it gives to potential defendants about permis-
sible concerted conduct toward rivals. Except for the Noerr121 doc-
trine, which creates a safe harbor for concerted efforts to influence
the passage of legislation, no safe harbor rules exist to inform trade
associations or other business groups of permissible actions. The
spectre of possible antitrust exposure looms over much of the con-
duct such groups might wish to undertake. Even the much liti-
gated conduct in Pacific Stationery-expelling a rival from a
purchasing cooperative-may yet be condemned when evaluated
under the rule of reason. 122 Merely ascertaining what conduct will
be condemned per se requires private organizations to guess
whether they possess "market power or unique access to a business
element necessary for effective competition. ' 12 3 A per se rule is of
little value when potential defendants cannot determine the
behavior that will trigger the rule. This uncertainty may be an in-
evitable cost of antitrust law. If so, the uncertainty is nonetheless a
substantial cost that the courts would reduce by developing guide-
lines for lawful concerted conduct toward rivals. By eschewing a
high degree of generality, such guidelines should attempt to spec-
ify, for instance, the circumstances under which a joint purchasing
cooperative could expel a member without fear of legal liability.
D. The Proposed "Tort" Approach
The best way to understand Silver's traditional approach is to
recognize that it does not aim merely to balance allocative and pro-
121. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
122. The Supreme Court merely sent the case back to the lower courts to be resolved
under the rule of reason. 105 S. Ct. at 2621.
123. Id.
1986] 1541
VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW
ductive efficiency, but rather aims to develop some now-forgotten
(and never fully developed) tort rules on a case by case basis.
These rules reflect norms about proper concerted business conduct
and about the meaning of equal opportunity for firms. In showing
concern for firms' rights and not merely consumers' welfare, the
judicial commitment to these norms smacks more of a religious
conviction than a utilitarian assessment. Section 765 of the first
Restatement of Torts exemplifies such a rule:
§ 765. CONCERTED REFUSAL TO DEAL.
(1) Persons who cause harm to another by a concerted refusal in their busi-
ness to enter into or to continue business relations with him are liable to him
for that harm, even though they would not be liable for similar conduct with-
out concert, if their concerted refusal is not justified under the circumstances.
(2) In the issue of justifications under the rule stated in Subsection (1), the
following are important factors:
(a) The objects sought to be accomplished and the interests sought to be
advanced by the actors' conduct;
(b) the extent of the hardship caused to the persons against whom the
actors' conduct is directed and his opportunities for mitigating the hardship;
(c) the appropriateness of the actors' conduct as a means of advancing
their interest and the availability of less harmful means to that end;
(d) the relations between the actors and the persons against whom the
conduct is directed and their relative economic power;
(e) the effects of the actors' conduct and of its objects on the social inter-
est in business enterprise and competition.'2
The comments to section 765 clarify its concerns. For instance,
the comments indicate that even when the defendants are seeking
to advance a "laudable interest," their action is not justified if it
goes beyond promoting that interest or is "unduly oppressive or
otherwise prejudicial to a paramount social interest. ' 12 5 In deter-
mining whether the defendants' action is "unduly oppressive," an
important factor is the defendants' and the plaintiff's relative eco-
nomic power: "Disparity of economic power between the parties
124. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAw OF TORTS § 765 (1936) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. Sec-
tion 765 was deleted from the Second Restatement on the ground that it covered a topic
within the general field of trade regulation rather than torts. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 700 (introductory note at 2 (1977)) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT SECOND].
Tort commentators claim that the standards in the Restatement amount to the extra-
ordinarily vague rule that concerted refusals to deal that hurt another are actionable if they
are done either for an undesirable purpose, such as spite, or through undesirable methods,
such as coercion. Developments in the Law-Competitive Torts, 77 HARV. L. REV. 888, 929
(1964) (an unlawful purpose and method are the twin prongs of an actionable common-law
conspiracy). Occasionally, a judge will indicate expressly that this tort standard is the ap-
propriate test in an antitrust case. E.g., United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362,
368-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
125. RESTATEMENT, supra note 120, at § 765 (comment 1 at 45).
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may result in undue oppression which would not exist if the power
were more nearly equal. ' 126 When the defendants design their
action to alter the plaintiff's behavior, the court appraises the
action's oppressiveness not simply by the harm the action causes
the noncomplying plaintiff, but also by the social desirability of
the plaintiff's compliance with the defendants' wishes. 127 In short,
section 765 was concerned less with consumer welfare than with
the social desirability of a particular method of injuring another
business. The section seeks to control the abuse of private power
even when the defendants' action does not threaten consumer
welfare.
Concerted conduct implicates tort concerns about abuse of
private power more than unilateral conduct does. The comments to
section 765 of the Restatement suggest three reasons for the
heightened concern:
First, the harm to individual or social interests which a concerted refusal to
deal may cause is ordinarily much greater than that which an individual's
refusal threatens. The power of the individual is ordinarily smaller and there
is greater likelihood of neutralization by the action of other individuals. Sec-
ondly, it is thought to be a more serious restraint upon personal liberty to
require an individual to justify a refusal to deal than to require a combina-
tion of persons to justify a concerted refusal.... Thirdly, the purpose of a
concerted refusal is ordinarily more definitely ascertainable than that of an
individual's refusal. 128
A fourth reason comes from Professor Austin: "The mere existence
of collective conduct carries with it the potential to effect substan-
tial changes in entrenched social norms.1 129
Although section 765 dealt with "primary" boycotts, section
766 and section 767 applied similar concerns to an even more
despised form of business behavior, the secondary boycott.130 Sec-
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at § 765 (comment 1 at 43-44).
129. Austin, Real Estate Boards and Multiple Listing Systems as Restraints of
Trade, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1325, 1325 (1970).
130. Relevant portions of these sections of the Restatement are as follows:
§ 766. GENERAL PRINCIPLE.
Except as stated in § 698, one who, without a privilege to do so, induces or other-
wise purposely causes a third person not to
... (b) enter into or continue a business relation with another is liable to the other
for the harm causes thereby.
§ 767. FACTORS IN DETERMINING PRIVILEGE.
In determining whether there is a privilege to act in the manner stated in § 766,
the following are important factors: (a) the nature of the actor's conduct, (b) the nature
of the expectancy with which his conduct interferes, (c) the relations between the par-
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ondary boycotts involve an attempt to induce a presumably neu-
tral third person to refuse to deal with the plaintiff. Like other
types of secondary pressure, secondary boycotts widen disputes,
polarize society, and provide too potent a vehicle by which one
group may acquire and exert power against another group. Because
tort law aims to allocate power among private groups, as various
authors have explained, 1 ' we can expect tort law to concern itself
with controlling secondary pressure. Fortunately for defendants,
sections 766 and 767 assumed defendants imposed the secondary
boycott through unilateral, rather than concerted, conduct. As
harsh as these sections were, defendants would have been treated
even more harshly if the Restatement editors had continued in this
vein to create a section dealing with secondary boycotts through
concerted conduct.
Silver's traditional approach incorporates into antitrust law
the concerns underlying other business torts besides "concerted
refusal to deal." Such torts include injurious falsehood (also known
as trade libel or commercial disparagement), interference with pro-
spective business advantage, interference with contractual rela-
tions, and several prima facie torts that modern courts have recog-
nized. While not aimed at concerted action, these tort categories,
of course, would extend to concerted action that satisfied the tort's
normal elements. Silver's approach also overlaps in its aims and
elements with the civil actions some states allow for civil conspir-
acy or for an association's mistreatment of its current and prospec-
tive members.3 2
ties, (d) the interest sought to be advanced by the actor and, (e) the social interests in
protecting the expectancy on the one hand and the actor's freedom of action on the
other hand.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 124, at §§ 766, 767.
131. Tort scholars from William Prosser to Duncan Kennedy acknowledge that tort
law has set the ground rules for economic combat between groups. W. PROSSER, TORTS 26
(4th ed. 1971) ("[T]he law of torts is a battlefield of the conflict between capital and labor,
between business competitors, and others who have conflicting claims in the economic strug-
gle"); Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, 41 MD. L.
REV. 563, 567-572 (1982).
Occasionally, a perceptive court will acknowledge that antitrust law also has been used
to allocate power between private groups. United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp.
362, 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) (Hand, J.) (antitrust law requires a judge "to appraise and balance
the value of opposed interests and to enforce [his] preference"). Antitrust law allocates
power between private groups, for example, when the prohibition on price-fixing limits the
freedom of action of price-fixing sellers and transfers wealth from sellers to consumers. As
economists point out, see R. Posner, supra note 28, at 96, concern for output and efficiency
does not require this wealth transfer insofar as the consumer's loss is the price-fixer's gain.
132. See Franklin Music Co. v. American Broadcasting Co., 616 F.2d 528, 549 (3rd Cir.
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Like these tort categories, Silver's traditional approach dis-
plays concern about the social desirability of the defendants' con-
duct on both noneconomic and economic grounds. The approach
seeks to establish a code of desirable concerted conduct toward
rivals based largely on such tort considerations as appeasement,
justice, deterrence, and compensation. Despite the lip service that
Silver's approach pays to protecting consumers exclusively, the ap-
proach proceeds by inquiring whether the defendants' action in-
trudes upon certain legally protected interests of the plaintiff, such
as his interest in working at his chosen trade free from unreasona-
ble handicaps.113 The traditional approach's often noted tendency
to produce opinions that read like labor law opinions reflects its
attempt to allocate power among conflicting groups. 34 Just as la-
bor law specifies proper and improper methods for the struggle be-
tween unions and management or among unions and individual
member or nonmember workers, Silver's boycott law has at-
tempted to specify proper and improper methods for concerted
groups in their dealings with other businesses, especially their
rivals.
Silver's traditional approach, even as modified by Pacific Sta-
tionery, however, does not identify the factors that determine what
concerted conduct will be socially desirable, nor does it help a
lower court take such factors into account in a particular case.
Thus, even a lower court determined to remain faithful to the poli-
cies underlying the traditional approach should not attempt to
apply that approach as it currently is set forth.
Instead, the best course for a lower court committed to the
policies underlying Silver is to eschew Silver's presumption about
the illegality of industry self-regulation and to subject the defend-
ants' conduct to the familiar analysis used in intentional torts,
especially business torts. In other words, a court should view these
1979) (describing Pennsylvania's civil conspiracy law); Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Asso-
ciations Not For Profit, 43 HARV. L. REV. 1000, 1032 (1930) (citing actions allowed when
trade associations expel members or refuse to admit applicants).
133. Protecting a person's ability to work at a lawful vocation was a major goal of the
ancient common law action for restraint of trade. Case of Tailors of Ipswich, 11 Coke 53a, 77
Eng. Rep. 1218 (K.B. 1614) ("no man could be kept from working in any lawful trade, for
the law abhors idleness, the mother of all evil"). This "right to work" notion, which often is
flatly opposed to efficiency, continues to dominate the restraint of trade doctrine in the
United Kingdom. Nagel v. Feilden, [1966] 1 All E.R. 689, [1966] 2 Q.B. 633, [1966] 2 W.L.R.
1027; Enderby Town Football Club v. Football Ass'n, [1971] 1 All E.R. 215, [1971] Ch 591,
[1970] 3 W.L.R. 1021.
134. E.g., R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, supra note 69, at 719.
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cases purely as business torts that happen to be cloaked in the gar-
ments of antitrust.
Indeed, many industry self-regulation cases decided on anti-
trust grounds are better understood as modifications of familiar
business torts. For example, the Hydrolevell s5 case, in which the
American Society of Mechanical Engineers suggested that the
plaintiff's product did not satisfy the Society's safety standards,
can be viewed just as if the plaintiff's suit was for trade libel or
product disparagement. Although the elements of the tort action
vary among jurisdictions, the essence of the action is that the
defendants made a false statement of fact about the plaintiff's
product with the intent to hurt him. Using the antitrust law modi-
fies the tort action only by requiring concerted action""6 and an
effect on interstate commerce, by not requiring "special damages,"
and by imposing treble damages.137
135. 635 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd on other grounds, 456 U.S. 556, cert. denied,
456 U.S. 989 (1982). The Hydrolevel facts do not differ significantly from the facts in a
number of trade libel or product disparagement cases. See, e.g., Testing Sys., Inc. v. Magna-
flux Corp., 251 F. Supp. 286 (E.D. Pa. 1966) (defendant allegedly published a false claim
that a government test showed plaintiff's product was only forty percent as effective as his);
Ellsworth v. Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory, Inc., 68 N.D. 425, 280 N.W. 879 (1938)
(defendant allegedly gave a lawyer a poorer rating than was warranted); Norlund v. Consoli-
dated Elec. Coop., 289 S.W.2d 93 (Mo. 1956) (defendant allegedly made libelous statements
about the dangers in using plaintiff's "LP Gas").
Other plaintiffs whose action does not differ significantly from a trade libel action are
the college denied accreditation, the plywood manufacturer whose product is found not to
comply with the industry standard, or the gas burner manufacturer who is denied a seal of
approval. See also VE-RI-TAS, Inc. v. Advertising Review Council, 411 F. Supp. 1012 (D.
Colo. 1976) (weight-reducing salon's antitrust case against Better Business Bureau that crit-
icized it), afl'd, 567 F.2d 963 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 906 (1978). See gener-
ally Prosser, Injurious Falsehood: The Basis For Liability, 59 COLUM. L. REv. 425 (1925).
Doctors denied staff privileges or association memberships also have had their suits
treated as tort suits. E.g., Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Soc'y, 34 N.J. 582, 170 A.2d
791 (1961). Some courts find for the plaintiff by recognizing a fiduciary obligation on the
private association's part to treat applicants and the members' rivals fairly. E.g., Pinsker v.
Pacific Coast Soc'y of Orthodontists, 1 Cal. 3d. 160, 166, 460 P.2d 495, 499, 81 Cal. Rptr.
623. 627 (1969). See generally Note, Hospital Medical Staff: When are Privilege Denials
Judically Reviewable, 11 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 95, 105-09 (1977).
136. The need for concert of action comes from the language of section one of the
Sherman Act. As Professor Handler has pointed out, however, in our example cases "the
element of numbers seems, at best, but an adventitious factor." Handler, Unfair Competi-
tion, 21 IowA L. REv. 175, 208 (1936).
137. Because industry self-regulation cases are better seen as business tort cases, some
will claim treble damages should not be awarded. This claim, however, assumes that alloca-
tive and productive efficiency are the only goals of antitrust law, an assumption that is
outside the scope of this Article. To be sure, awarding treble damages for some business
torts and not others, simply because some involve concerted action and affect interstate
commerce, is difficult to defend.
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Similarly, the famous case Eastern States Retail Lumber
Dealers Association v. United States,3 8 in which lumber retailers
boycotted wholesalers who sold directly to consumers, can be
viewed just as if the plaintiff's suit was for interference with pro-
spective business advantage. In such a tort suit (and several have
been brought on facts almost identical to those of Eastern
States),' 9 the defendants' boycott becomes actionable if it wrong-
fully interferes by threats or intimidation with the sales wholesal-
ers would have made to member retailers, provided the defend-
ants' action is not protected by the competition privilege. As in
Hydrolevel, the essence of the action does not lie in harm to out-
put or consumer welfare (if in fact such harm was possible), but in
the defendants' interference with the opportunity of the boycott's
target to compete without an unwarranted handicap.
Other industry self-regulation cases decided on antitrust
grounds are better understood as establishing new prima facie
torts. Silver itself offers one example and others are suggested in
Part III below.140 To handle these industry self-regulation cases,
lower courts should proceed as if they must decide whether to
establish new prima facie torts, and if so, what the elements of
those torts should be. The new torts would be subsets of the over-
all tort category "business injury by improper concerted action."
A tort approach to industry self-regulation offers many advan-
tages. Compared to antitrust law, tort law lends itself to a lower
level of generality and tends to yield more specific, more qualified,
and, therefore, more useful rules of concerted conduct. The tort
approach is more likely to generate a common law of proper and
improper concerted conduct that will help to guide prospective
defendants and plaintiffs. It is much more likely to yield a princi-
pled basis for resolving some cases short of trial than is any stan-
dard dependent on such elusive elements as "market power." For
example, the tort approach would produce guidelines of proper and
improper behavior for hospitals that deny staff privileges. A guide-
line might evolve indicating, for example, how a hospital and its
medical staff should allocate responsibility for determining staff
privileges, what procedures should be followed, whether "neutral"
experts should be used when available, whether the standards for a
decision ought to be published in advance, what reasons for a neg-
138. 234 U.S. 600 (1914).
139. E.g., Jackson v. Stanfield, 137 Ind. Rep. 592, 36 N.E. 345 (1894) (condemning
conspiracy of retail lumber dealers against direct selling wholesalers).
140. See infra text accompanying notes 240-80.
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ative decision are proper and sufficient, what reasons will be
reviewed by a court, and the standard of such review.14'
Safe harbor standards that would allow staff privileges cases
to be resolved on summary judgment may develop. For instance, a
safe harbor standard might allow a court to grant summary judg-
ment to a hospital and its staff in a surgery staff privileges case
provided experts from outside the area who do not compete with
the applicant observed the applicant perform surgery a requisite
number of times, recommended denial of privileges based on their
observations, and indicated their reasons.
Under the tort approach, separate guidelines would evolve to
govern professional sporting associations that discipline athletes;
standard-setting organizations that disapprove products; and mul-
tiple listing services that exclude realtor applicants. This low level
of generality seems the most useful. Searching for general rules to
govern all these contexts already attempts too much. Section B(2)
of Part III suggests various tort "dangers" to be considered in
fashioning guidelines for concerted conduct in each of these
contexts.
A tort approach also would allow the courts to be more sensi-
tive to defendants' methods. For example, a tort approach could
distinguish between certification efforts and standardization
efforts. Certification efforts, as the term is used here, merely an-
nounce that the plaintiff has not met the defendants' minimum
standards. Because certification efforts generate potentially useful
information, implicate first amendment values, and involve no
coercion, a tort approach may subject them only to a "minimum
rationality" test. In contrast, some standardization efforts involve
an attempt to enforce minimum standards by denying the plaintiff
access to essential facilities. An example is the American Medical
Association's pressure on hospitals to deny access to chiroprac-
tors.142 In part because these efforts produce an undesirable sec-
141. The tort approach would allow a court to take advantage of the substantial litera-
ture about the assignment of physician staff privileges. To some extent, this literature has
produced a consensus about the appropriate substantive grounds and procedures for
assigning privileges that hospitals should use. See Kessenick & Peer, Physicians' Access to
the Hospital: An Overview, 14 U.S.F. L. REv. 43 (1979); Kissam, Webber, Bigus, & Holz-
graefe, Antitrust and Hospital Privileges: Testing the Conventional Wisdom, 70 CALIF. L.
REv. 595 (1982).
142. A certification case may turn into a standardization case simply because the certi-
fiers agree not to deal with those not certified. In the famous case, Radiant Burners, Inc. v.
Peoples Gas, Light & Coke Company, 364 U.S. 656 (1961), for example, the members of the
defendant American Gas Association agreed not to buy products denied the AGA's seal of
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ondary pressure on neutral parties, a tort approach would subject
standardization efforts to a more demanding test.143 Accordingly,
those seeking a higher but still useful level of generality for classi-
fying industry self-regulation cases can break them into two
groups: cases involving product certification, grading, and seals of
approval, in which there is no attempt to enforce standards, on the
one hand, and cases involving access to essential or advantageous
facilities, on the other. The latter group could be classified further
based on the type of facility to which access is denied, for example,
hospitals, multiple listing services, trade fairs, auctions, shopping
center developments, trade associations, and sporting associations.
The tort approach acknowledges that the defendants' con-
certed action raises concerns other than a reduction in output or
the infliction of a competitive disadvantage on the plaintiff. The
tort approach will lead judges to focus on the defendants' particu-
lar concerted action and its purpose, method, justifications, dan-
gers, and alternatives, and to examine the reasonableness of that
concerted action in light of economic and noneconomic considera-
tions. The specific benefits and dangers to be assessed in applying
a tort approach are discussed in Part III.
Adopting the tort approach also allows a court to discard a
number of over-generalizations now governing industry self-regula-
tion cases. An example is the rule that the purpose and method of
the defendants' action are immaterial as long as their action is con-
certed and places the plaintiff at a significant competitive disad-
vantage. 144 The tort approach also reduces the disproportionate
attention courts now pay to whether defendants are on the plain-
tiff's horizontal level. The approach also reduces the attention
courts pay to whether defendants possess "market power," a mat-
ter economically significant but so indeterminant that the parties
at the time they act cannot know whether they are subject to the
obligations "market power" imposes.
Compared to Silver's approach, a tort approach aids defend-
ants because it would not presume a violation merely from the
approval. Other commentators argue that the AGA's antitrust liability stemmed more from
this second agreement than from the original joint denial of a seal of approval. Bodner,
Antitrust Restrictions on Trade Association Membership and Participation, 54 AM. GAS.
AJ. 27, 31 (1968).
143. See G. LAMB & C. SHIELDS, TRADE ASSOCIATION LAW AND PRACTICE 89-95 (rev. ed.
1971) (explaining why certification efforts should be treated more leniently than standardi-
zation efforts).
144. E.g., Fashion Originators' Guild of Am. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
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plaintiff's injury and the presence of concerted action. It also aids
defendants by not insisting that the defendants' action be required
by some justifying policy or be the least restrictive method availa-
ble to achieve that policy. Under tort law, any reasonable means
for achieving a purpose the court considers legitimate probably
would be acceptable. On the other hand, a tort approach would
permit a plaintiff to attack any socially unreasonable concerted
conduct that harms him. A plaintiff would not need to define the
relevant market or to show a likely effect on price and output. Nor
would a plaintiff need to convince a court to view the defendants
as its horizontal rivals. In general, the tort approach throws atten-
tion immediately on the defendants' action and the possible justifi-
cations for it. It does not, however, necessarily force an inquiry
into the defendants' state of mind. In tort law, judges commonly
deem certain actions so desirable or undesirable in themselves that
the actor's state of mind will not affect liability. 145 To some extent,
the lower courts already are following this tort approach de facto,
for they have been insisting neither that the defendants satisfy
each step of the traditional approach nor that the plaintiff show a
danger to output. Rather, they have been creating, under the guise
of the Sherman Act, a federal common law of concerted business
torts, based largely on the overall social desirability of the defend-
ants' conduct.146
Finally, thinking of industry self-regulation cases as tort cases
becomes an exercise in value clarification. What patterns of con-
certed conduct trigger judicial intervention and why? What is the
effect of the defendants' and the plaintiff's relative power? Why
are courts willing to assist the plaintiff even when his injury is un-
likely to affect output? What does the judicial hostility toward
concerted private power suggest about our society's values? This
Article now concludes with a lengthy discussion of the variety of
benefits and harms industry self-regulation presents. The discus-
145. See W. PROSSER, supra note 131, at 23-24.
146. Others who have watched the results under the traditional approach have
reached the same conclusion: "Whether a per se rule is properly applied to particular pro-
fessional group conduct will be determined largely by how the trial court views the alleged
justifications in connection with the totality of the circumstances surrounding the conduct:
the character of the defendant, the nature of the restraint, and the probability that the
defendant association acted in conformity with its stated purposes." Note, The Professions
and Non-Commercial Purposes: Applicability of Per Se Rules Under The Sherman Act, 11
U. MICH. J.L. REF., 387, 401 (1978); cf. Marcus, Civil Rights and the Anti-Trust Laws, 18 U.
CHL L. REv. 171, 186 (1951) (suggesting that section one of the Sherman Act is just a device
for striking down unacceptable concerted behavior).
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sion aims to illustrate the shortcomings of the Silver and Chicago
School approaches, to guide a court using the proposed tort ap-
proach, and to begin discussion of the questions just posed.
III. THE BENEFITS AND DANGERS OF INDUSTRY SELF-REGULATION
A. The Benefits
Although no statute authorizes or applauds industry self-regu-
lation, the public and private benefits of such joint activities
abound. The following survey suggests the wide variety of bene-
fits. 147 Neither the Silver approach nor the Chicago School
approach allows many of these benefits to be considered. Between
the two approaches, however, the Silver approach, with its pre-
sumption against and close scrutiny of self-regulation, sacrifices
these benefits to a much greater extent.
The private standards "industry," with groups such as the
American National Standards Institute (ANSI) and the American
Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME), promulgates tens of
thousands of voluntary standards to promote safety. 148 In the
Hydrolevel case, 14 9 for example, the ASME's standards called for a
particular type of cutoff device to prevent boiler explosions. Other
examples of safety-promoting standards are those the American
Water Works Association sets for the thickness and weld of pres-
sure piping to prevent pipeline explosions, 150 those the American
Society for Testing and Materials sets for polystyrene and poly-
urethane to prevent fires,"' and those the American Nuclear Soci-
ety sets for the containment of nuclear materials during transport
to prevent radiation escape.' 52 These standards alert manufactur-
147. In discussing the benefits of individual self-regulation, I am ignoring that the
defendants' actual motivation may be to forestall a public outcry that would lead to govern-
ment regulation. I am comparing the situation that exists with self-regulation with the situ-
ation that would exist with no regulation at all. Insofar as the alternative to self-regulation
may be government regulation, however, this comparison may mislead.
148. AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR TESTING AND MATERIALS, THE VOLUNTARY STANDARDS SYS-
TEM OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 22 (1975).
149. Hydrolevel Corp. v. American Soc'y of Mech. Eng'rs, 635 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1980).
150. American Water Works Association (AWWA) C 900-75: AWWA Standard for
Polyvinyl Chloride Pressure Pipe, 4 line through 12 line for Water (1st ed. approved June 8,
1975).
151. See AMERICAN SOCIETY OF TESTING AND MATERIALS, Policy Definition of Fire Haz-
ard Standards Limiting the Scope of Properties-Describing Standards and Establishing a
Committee on Fire Hazard Standards (Sept. 18, 1973); Facts About Committee E-39 on
Fire Hazard Standards, ASTM Standardization News, April 1974, at 38F.
152. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, STANDARDS AND CERTIFICATION: PROPOSED RULE AND
STAFF REPORT 228 (1978) (describing the testimony of George Wessman of the American
1986] 1551
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
ers to safety concerns and assist them in altering products to
reduce danger. A closely related goal, protecting the public health,
supports hospitals' efforts to screen doctors who apply for staff
privileges. The standards the National Sanitation Foundation
(NSF) sets for steel used in refrigerators 15 3 also are intended to
reduce health hazards. Failure to comply prevents a manufacturer
from obtaining the NSF's seal of approval, thus placing the manu-
facturer at a severe competitive disadvantage. A third related goal,
protecting the environment, is promoted by, for example, the emis-
sion control standards the American Chemical Society promulgates
for sulfur plants. These health, safety, and environmental protec-
tion goals call for high standards. When legislators address indus-
try self-regulation at all, they typically encourage standard setting
and fault private standard setters' efforts only because the pri-
vately set standards are insufficiently demanding or inadequately
enforced.15 4 In contrast, the traditional approach's antitrust goals
implicitly call for low standards in order to minimize the number
of rivals disadvantaged by a failure to comply.
Of course, an economist can translate all these benefits into
economic language in order to characterize the defendants' action
as efficiency enhancing. For instance, the collusion involved in set-
ting safety standards may be characterized as an integration to
reduce the consumer's search costs. 155 It also could be character-
ized as a method of overcoming free riders on product safety,
thereby creating incentives for optimum investment in product
safety. The argument for the latter characterization posits that
consumers who cannot evaluate a product's safety are unable to
reward safe products with higher prices. Thus, prices reflect the
average safety of all similar products-the safe and the un-
safe-and each seller has an incentive to free ride on the safety of
Nuclear Society to the FTC).
153. See, e.g., Eliason Corp. v. National Sanitation Found., 614 F.2d 126 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 826 (1980).
154. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON PRODUCT SAFETY, FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COM-
MISSION ON PRODUCT SAFETY, 48, 52 (1970). This Report stated that many industry standards
do not address all foreseeable hazards, that insufficient consideration was given to "human
factors such as predictable risk taking, juvenile behavior, illiteracy or inexperience," and
that "levels of allowed exposure to electrical, thermal, and mechanical and other energy
exchanges are frequently too high." Id. at 48. The Consumer Product Safety Commission
has recognized the contributions that industry standards have made to increased consumer
product safety. Hamilton, supra note 11.
155. Carlton & Klamer, The Need for Coordination Among Firms, With Special Ref-




the other products. The result is underinvestment in safety, which,
in some cases, only the elimination of the unsafe product may cor-
rect.1' This economic approach, however, does not begin to cap-
ture the many reasons why courts might support a safety standard,
one of those reasons being a paternalistic wish to reduce injuries
regardless of consumers' choices about the most desirable prod-
ucts.' 57 Accordingly, I prefer to explain the benefits of self-regula-
tion in noneconomic language.
Another benefit of industry self-regulation is improved quality
control. The American Petroleum Institute's standard for the min-
imum octane rating of gasoline and the International Organization
for Standardization's standard for the minimum ductility of a
meld of steel are examples. 15" These standards typically take the
form either of a design standard or a performance standard. A
design standard usually specifies the method by which a product
should be made or the characteristics the product should possess
in order to perform satisfactorily. Performance standards usually
specify the minimum performance levels for products, however
made, that are designed for specific functions. 159 In economic lan-
guage, setting the standard reduces overall transaction costs by
reducing the consumer's cost of evaluating products and the manu-
facturer's cost of competitive imitation. Of course, those firms
whose products fail to comply with the standards often will incur a
competitive disadvantage.
Industry self-regulation also may help to lower the cost of pro-
duction more directly. Conspicuous examples include standard-set-
ting efforts to assist manufacturers in producing interconnecting or
interchangeable parts. These standards assure a manufacturer that
if his product conforms, the product will interconnect with comple-
mentary products or interchange with rival products of similar
156. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons". Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mech-
anism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970).
157. Although the decision in National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States,
435 U.S. 679 (1978), suggests that only economic factors should be considered, some lower
courts continue to consider additional factors. See Wilk v. American Medical Ass'n, 719
F.2d 207, 224 (7th Cir. 1983) (noneconomic factors must be considered), cert. denied, 467
U.S. 1210 (1984).
158. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARDIZATION, STANDARD 2531, TABULATION
OF VOLUNTARY STANDARDS AND CERTIFICATION PROGRAMS FOR CONSUMER PRODUCTS, U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, NBS TN 948 (1977).
159. See generally Hamilton, supra note 11, (describing distinction between design
and performance standards); see also FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION STANDARDS AND CERTIFI-
CATION: PROPOSED RULE AND STAFF REPoRT (Dec. 1978) (submitted by J. Mooney, R.J.
Schroeder, D.C. Graybill, W.W. Lovejoy).
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specifications. 60 Indeed, the need for interchangeable parts was
one of the original reasons for the development of the modern
standards industry. The joint development and use of these stan-
dards can be conceptualized in economic terms as an integration to
reduce a supplier's search cost-one type of transaction cost. Inter-
changeability standards also widen markets. A consumer with a
flat tire, for example, is not tied to one or two tire companies, but
may turn to any company making a standard size tire. Moreover,
the existence of many suppliers reduces a consumer's risk that sup-
plies will be unavailable because of a particular seller's business
failure or because of delivery delays or production snags. Inter-
changeability, therefore, provides a type of insurance. It also
enables a tire producer to predict with confidence that the poten-
tial market for a standard size tire will be wide. By widening the
producer's potential market, the interchangeability standard as-
sists the producer's entry into the market. The standard also may
lower the tire producer's costs by making possible a longer produc-
tion run for those few standard varieties of tires.6 1 Yet those
whose products do not comply with the standards, like the screw
thread manufacturer whose product did not comply with the inter-
changeability standards of the ANSI, will be disadvantaged in
competing for the patronage of buyers who want products already
found to be interchangeable."6 2
In theory, standards also could lower costs by informing man-
ufacturers when their products are adequately safe in the view of
the standard maker and of those jurisdictions that adopt the pri-
vate standards as mandatory. Manufacturers then could avoid
unnecessary experimentation and overinvestment in safety. For
instance, the National Sanitation Foundation's standard directing
that refrigerators have covered corners and be composed of non-
galvinized steel assures the manufacturer that these measures are
likely to satisfy all government safety requirements and, if the
160. Another example of the same benefit is the agreement on the standards for elec-
tronic funds transfer systems. The agreement attempts to facilitate communication between
data networks. Horizontal location agreements also may provide similar efficiency-enhancing
benefits, despite the harsh antitrust treatment afforded them. An example is a location
agreement between rivals who ship to each other and whose location, therefore, affects each
other's costs. See Koopman & Beckmann, Assignment Problems and The Location of Eco-
nomic Activities, 25 ECONOMETRICA 53 (1957).
161. D. HEMINWAY, INDUSTRY WIDE VOLUNTARY PRODUCT STANDARDS 37-38 (1975).
162. Hamilton, supra note 11, at 1374 (describing of the Johnson Gauge Case, in
which the American National Standards Institute found that a type of screw was not
threaded as suggested by ANSI's standard).
1554 [Vol. 39:1507
"GROUP BOYCOTT"
standard makers can be believed, also are likely to keep the prod-
uct relatively safe over its normal lifetime compared to its rivals.1 63
Industry self-regulation also helps consumers evaluate prod-
ucts and services by providing information about the seller's quali-
ties and characteristics. In economic language, these efforts
represent another integration designed to overcome information
asymmetry and to reduce search and information costs, specifically
the average cost of quality assurance.16 4 The film boards that rate
films "G," "PG," "PG-13," "R," or "X," for instance, are providing
information that reduces the consumer's search costs and enables
the consumer to avoid unwelcome surprises. 165 The integration,
therefore, perfects the market and increases consumer demand for
films, the gains from trade, and net consumer welfare. The testing
organizations that grade products, such as Underwriters' Laborato-
ries, and the private accrediting associations that evaluate colleges
provide the same benefit. Although no concerted action is involved,
the magazines Consumer Reports and Good Housekeeping supply
perhaps the most well-known examples of this benefit when they
evaluate and recommend products. As the extent of industry
advertising and the difficulty of controlling deceptive advertising
increases, the need for some group to evaluate products and to
pass that evaluation on to the consumer similarly increases.16 In
each case, the consumer benefits only because one group of private
firms was willing to establish itself as an extrajudicial court whose
judgments, rarely ratified by the government, would hurt other
firms, including, perhaps, their rivals. Yet, as discussed above, the
traditional approach, at least as stated by Justice Black, condemns
in blanket terms extrajudicial decisionmaking about rivals.167
Industry self-regulation that provides consumers with infor-
mation about product quality also may help small companies com-
pete with larger ones. Grading products, for example, reduces the
value of a company's past efforts to build up its product's reputa-
tion. In economic language, grading reduces the scale advantages in
163. Eliason Corp. v. National Sanitation Found., 614 F.2d 126 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 826 (1980).
164. Elzinga, The Compass of Competition for Professional Services, in REGULATING
THE PROFESSIONS (R. Blair & S. Rubin eds. 1980).
165. Hughes Tool Co. v. Motion Picture Ass'n of Am., 66 F. Supp. 1006 (S.D.N.Y.
1946).
166. Note, Trade Association Exclusionary Practices: An Affirmative Role for the
Rule of Reason, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1486, 1488 n.22 (1966) (the need for private testing
increases with the danger of consumers being misled by deceptive advertising).
167. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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quality assurance. As a result, grading reduces one advantage of
product differentiation and ought to make the demand curve fac-
ing the larger sellers more elastic.16
By characterizing defendants' collaboration as an efficiency-
enhancing joint venture, the Chicago School approach helps to
identify further possible benefits. Defendants' action may facilitate
a desirable collaboration that exploits economies of scale and thus
develops a new and more marketable product. The collaboration
needed to develop a shopping mall may be impossible if the
organizers must accept every party who applies to participate. The
collaboration needed to form a multiple listing service may be
more expensive if the service must accept more than the optimally
efficient number of members. Thus, the self-regulation entailed in
excluding some applicants may contribute to the economic and
noneconomic benefits of the collaboration and correctly can be
considered "ancillary" to the benefits.16 9 Nonetheless, the collabo-
ration may place the excluded business at a significant competitive
disadvantage.
Self-regulation also can be characterized as efficiency enhanc-
ing in instances when it helps to lead to an industry output more
closely approximating that of the competitive model. For instance,
the regulations on membership, selling time, and space needed to
operate a commodity exchange may encourage trade under opti-
mum market conditions. 170 Similarly, a trade association rule
requiring members to submit generalized data about their produc-
tion and inventory may make possible a system of centralized in-
formation exchange. Provided that neither implicit nor explicit col-
lusion is feasible in the particular industry, the information could
help each member plan future production and help the industry as
a whole produce the optimum competitive output.17 1
Other instances of self-regulation may benefit an industry by
enhancing its reputation and, therefore, the consumer demand for
the industry's goods and services.17 2 For example, a multiple listing
168. Auerbach, Quality Standards, Informative Labelling and Grade Labelling as
Guides to Consumer Buying, 14 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 362, 366 (1949).
169. See Note, The Antitrust Implications of Restrictive Covenants in Shopping
Center Leases, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1201, 1247 n.188 (1973).
170. Note, supra note 166, at 1492-93 (rule helped commodity exchange form a better
market); see also Rogers v. Douglas Tobacco Bd. of Trade, 244 F.2d 471 (5th Cir. 1957).
171. C.f., Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925).
172. Even when the efforts do not appear likely to increase demand, I suspect courts
would consider the public image of the industry to be a valid concern of the industry mem-
ber. Weistart, Player Discipline in Professional Sports: The Antitrust Issues, 18 Wm. &
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service that excludes a real estate agent with an insufficient credit
rating avoids the harm to the member realtors' reputations that
might result if the excluded agent harms his clients. 7 3 The FTD's
exclusion of an existing member suspected of overcharging and
providing inferior flowers also relies for justification on the poten-
tial damage to the group's reputation and the concomitant reduc-
tion in demand for the group's products that might result from
failing to exclude the suspected florist.174 The self-regulation that
the American Medical Association and the American Bar Associa-
tion practice in excluding unqualified applicants serves to protect
the associations' reputations as well as to assure the consumer that
practitioners possess a minimum level of quality and compe-
tence.1 75 Many of the purely ethical rules that various groups im-
pose similarly protect the group's reputation and the public inter-
est. Silver's traditional approach, however, pressures such groups
to accept the derelicts of the industry in order to avoid putting
rivals at a competitive disadvantage. 176
Economic language can describe this ethical self-regulation as
a joint activity to prevent the plaintiff from free riding on the
defendants' reputation-enhancing efforts.'7 7 Only by hurting the
plaintiff and internalizing the cost of his reputation-harming activ-
ities can the defendants create disincentives for investment in such
activities. In other words, internalizing the benefits from reputa-
tion-enhancing activities-by eliminating free riders on those
activities-creates incentives for the optimum level of investment
in those desirable activities. By overcoming the free rider problem,
therefore, the defendants' exclusion of the plaintiff enhances effi-
MARY L. REV. 703, 728 (1977).
173. Austin, Real Estate Boards and Multiple Listing Systems as Restraints of
Trade, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1325, 1349 (1970).
174. Florists' Nationwide Tel. Delivery Network v. Florists' Tel. Delivery Ass'n, 371
F.2d 263 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 909 (1967).
175. See Note, The Professions and Non-Commercial Purposes: Applicability of Per
Se Rules Under the Sherman Act, 11 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 387, 395 (1978); see also, Hoover v.
Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558 (1984) (American Bar Association's efforts at self-regulation upheld);
First, Competition in the Legal Education Industry, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 311 (1978).
176. An implicit premise of Justice Black's hostility to all self-regulation is the belief
that government regulation preempts any private regulation. For example, if the govern-
ment certifies real estate brokers to sell real estate, the defendants' concerted action ought
not take any further measure in an attempt to assure competency or reliability. I consider
this response ingenuous. To assume the government has done all the regulating and grading
from which consumers may benefit is to ignore, among other factors, the government's
severely limited resources.
177. Gerhart, The Supreme Court and Antitrust Analysis: The (Near) Triumph of
the Chicago School, 1982 Sup. CT. REv. 319, 338-39 (1983).
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ciency through a more complete specification of property rights.
Again, however, this economic interpretation does not consider the
possibility that some courts will approve of ethical self-regulation
simply because it deters conduct deemed undesirable on moral and
ethical grounds.178
A sporting league's regulations that promote a desirable con-
test also can be seen as a joint activity designed to increase
demand for the league's product. For instance, the National Foot-
ball League's (NFL's) rules against gambling rely for justification
on the NFL's need to preserve public confidence in the players'
efforts to compete to the best of their ability.17 9 Similarly, the
United States Tennis Association's (USTA's) ban on use of the
spaghetti-string racquet in USTA events relies on the need to pre-
serve the character of the game; allowing use of the racquet alleg-
edly would slow down the game or otherwise decrease demand for
USTA events and products.' The plea that the regulation helps
to produce a good contest also may justify the Bowling Proprietors
Association of America's refusal to accept scores from a bowling
center suspected of falsely reporting high scores ("sandbag-
ging"), 181 the United States Trotting Association's refusal to admit
into an official race a horse that has not passed a blood test,'82 and
the American Contract Bridge League's refusal to approve the use
of a scoring computer that might disrupt the conditions of play.' 3
Supporters of the traditional approach might argue that the
courts should never acknowledge any benefit to the public from
this industry self-regulation. After all, the judgment that the cur-
rent character of the game of tennis ought to be preserved over a
slower and different game, for example, seems arbitrary and sub-
178. Professor Coons would add to any calculus of defendants' action the promotion of
noneconomic social advantage through group action. Coons, Non-Commercial Purpose as a
Sherman Act Defense, 56 Nw. U.L. REv. 705 (1962). He would have the outcome turn largely
on whether the group's purpose coincides with public policy. Id. at 749. See also Boddiker v.
Arizona State Dental Ass'n, 549 F.2d 626 (9th Cir.) (self-regulation acceptable only if it
promotes the public interest), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 825 (1977).
179. Weistart, supra note 172 at 728-29..
180. Gunter Hartz Sports, Inc. v. United States Tennis Ass'n, Inc., 665 F.2d 222 (8th
Cir. 1981).
181. But see Washington State Bowling Proprietors Ass'n, Inc., v. Pacific Lanes, Inc.,
356 F.2d 371, 376 (9th Cir. 1966) (condemning the bowling association's efforts to prevent
sandbagging).
182. See United States v. United States Trotting Ass'n, 1960 Trade Cas. (CCH)
69,761 (S.D. Ohio May 18, 1960).
183. Bridge Corp. of Am. v. American Contract Bridge League, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 1365
(9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 940 (1971).
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jective. Moreover, finding objectively demonstrable evidence that
the self-regulation enhanced efficiency will be difficult. Usually no
empirical evidence is available to show, for example, that box office
receipts will decline if the United States Tennis Association sanc-
tions the spaghetti-string racquet for play. Accordingly, the tradi-
tional approach demands that horizontal rivals acting in concert,
such as the rival racquet manufacturers on the USTA's testing
committee, not be allowed to take actions, such as the refusal to
sanction spaghetti-string racquets, that necessarily put one of their
rivals at a severe competitive disadvantage. In contrast, the Chi-
cago School approach applauds the defendants' self-regulatory ac-
tion. Like any other business, a sporting association should be
encouraged to act to increase the demand for its product-the
sporting events it produces. The USTA should be allowed to rely
on its own judgment about the best method for promoting its
events and should not need to consider the incidental harm to spa-
ghetti-string racquet manufacturers or to other businesses.
The Chicago School's approval of association action that
increases the marketability of the association's products renders
immaterial the reason for the increase in marketability. In the
sports discipline context, for example, the Chicago School would
approve the exclusion of any player whose participation would di-
minish the sport's appeal, without regard to the reason why the
player's participation had this effect. 1 4 The USTA properly could
exclude an uncommonly dominant athlete, like Martina Navra-
tilova, on the ground that the marketability of its tennis events
might increase without her. Likewise, the USTA could exclude a
player with a bad reputation regardless of whether the player had
done anything to warrant the bad reputation. Because one mea-
sures demand not by counting fans but by counting the dollars of-
fered for a given amount of the league's product, the league ration-
ally might exclude players who are generally well accepted, but
who decrease the appeal of the league's product among particularly
wealthy fans. That such an exclusion might encroach on a player's
"right" to play a sport for which he meets the game-related qualifi-
cations means nothing to the Chicago School. Their view of anti-
trust law allows no room for any such "right" to compete in a cho-
sen field. Thus, the judicial concern evident in past sport discipline
cases about whether the plaintiff was "reasonably" disciplined in-
dicates that the courts are evaluating more than purely economic
184. See generally Gerhart, supra note 177, at 332.
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concerns.18 5
Self-regulation also benefits the public by achieving some
goals of criminal and civil law. Self-regulation deters conduct that
would be universally considered undesirable, but that, for other
reasons, the civil or criminal law does not prohibit. 86 An example
is cheating in sporting contests.8 7 Cheating may not give rise to
civil or criminal liability because it is not considered sufficiently
serious or because an identifiable injured party who may bring suit
is unlikely to appear. The defective manufacture of a product
whose dangerous character does not draw the government's atten-
tion or result in provable civil liability provides another exam-
ple. 88 In this case the safety standards suggested through industry
self-regulation exert at least some pressure on the manufacturer to
reduce the hazard.189 In addition, self-regulation may supplement
criminal or civil law by deterring conduct that is illegal, but that
rarely is attacked through legal channels. Undue violence in sport-
ing contests offers an example here. Prosecutors reportedly are
reluctant to prosecute professional athletes for such violence, and
juries reportedly are reluctant to convict.190 As a result, industry
185. See, e.g., Molinas v. National Basketball Ass'n., 190 F.Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1961)
(court considered whether defendants' discipline of plaintiff was "reasonable," using the
term in a non-economic sense); United States v. United States Trotting Ass'n, 1960 Trade
Cas. (CCH) V 69,761 (S.D. Ohio May 18, 1960). (court considered whether defendants' disci-
pline of plaintiff was "reasonable," using the term in a non-economic sense).
186. On occasion the Court has recognized the efficacy and legality of this type of
industry self-regulation: "Voluntary action to end abuses and to foster fair competitive
opportunities in the public interest may be more effective than legal processes. And cooper-
ative endeavor may appropriately have wider objectives than merely the removal of evils
which are infractions of positive law." Sugar Inst., Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553, 598
(1936).
187. See Weistart, supra note 172, at 727-28, for the difficulty of attacking cheating
through methods other than industry self-regulation.
188. See, e.g., Bornte, Laws and Codes for Consumers, 1980 J. Bus. L. 315, 322 (self-
regulation often covers those parts of business life that the law does not reach); Farrar,
Recent Developments in New Zealand Company Law, 1980 J. Bus. L. 296, 298.
189. In the United Kingdom, the legality of defendants' self-regulation is influenced
heavily by the ability of some other government or nongovernment entity to provide the
benefit that defendants claim to provide. See In re Federation of British Carpet Mfrs.'
Agreement, [1957-59] L.R. 1 R.P. 472 (1959), discussed in Malin & Lawniczak, A Compari-
son of the American Sherman Antitrust Act and the British Restrictive Trade Practices
Act: The Trade Association Experience, 59 U. DEr. J. URB. L. 147, 163 (1982).
190. See Weistart, supra note 172, at 728-29 n.91. As the author observed:
League enforcement may in fact be preferable to that administered through the crimi-
nal process. The league is in a better position to define and enforce specific rules of
conduct than are the courts, from which standards could emerge only from a case-by-
case interpretation. Also, the range of conduct that the league might wish to control
may well include actions of a sufficiently minor nature that public prosecution would
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self-regulation may provide the only meaningful deterrent.''
Again, however, those supporters of the traditional approach who
take as an article of faith the premise that the civil and criminal
law should be the only methods for controlling undesirable con-
duct never will applaud industry self-regulation that seeks to per-
form this police function. Nor will the Chicago School, which ap-
plauds only activities deemed efficiency enhancing, necessarily
acknowledge a benefit from private efforts to supplement enforce-
ment of the civil and criminal law.
The benefits of industry self-regulation come into sharp relief
when self-regulation is compared with one likely alterna-
tive-government regulation. The technical expertise of the staff of
most government regulators cannot match that of an industry's
members. In the Hydrolevel case, for instance, the members of the
ASME's Boiler and Pressure Vessel Committee were more likely
than any government agency's staff members to possess the neces-
sary technical expertise both to develop safety standards for a fuel
cutoff device and to apply the standards to a particular device. 92
Compared to industry members, government staff members have
little reason to become familiar with a specialized field. When a
safety issue arises only occasionally, it is impractical for a govern-
ment agency to obtain the needed expertise to develop safety stan-
dards. If a government agency nevertheless attempts to set stan-
dards, those standards are likely to be less specific in focus than
those produced by the more knowledgeable, and perhaps more
be unwarranted. Thus, a system of league control may be more encompassing than that
which would be found on the public side. Moreover, a league system is likely to be
more even-handed, since it relies upon central administration, and thus avoids the vari-
ance which might be reflected in the enforcement practices of individual prosecutors.
Finally, the league has interests that are not likely to be considered fully in a public
enforcement action. Concern for preserving the athletic contest as the primary focus of
the fans' attention, concern for the individual club's responsibility to pay the medical
expenses of players, and concern for the cost of crowd control are matters which are
not typically taken account of in public prosecutions. This analysis does not suggest,
however, that it is not proper to use the public criminal law to control particular kinds
of violence.
Id.
191. Granted, one reason the activity is not prohibited by law may be that industry
self-regulation is sufficient. If industry self-regulation were not possible because of the anti-
trust laws, legislative action against the activity may be more likely. Nevertheless, at present
industry self-regulation plainly serves some of the deterrence purposes shared by the crimi-
nal and civil law.
192. Hydrolevel Corp. v. American Soc'y of Mech. Eng'rs, 635 F.2d 118, 120-121, (2d
Cir. 1981), afl'd, 456 U.S. 556 (1982).
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interested, industry members. 193 Furthermore, even given equal
technical expertise, greater familiarity with the plaintiff may place
industry members in a superior position to apply the standards.
No government regulator, for instance, is likely to be in as good a
position to evaluate an applicant for hospital staff privileges as the
existing medical staff, which has been able to observe the appli-
cant's performance over time. 194 In such cases, deferring to indus-
try self-regulation may be the only way to permit the most knowl-
edgeable judgment to prevail.
Industry standard setters intimately familiar with current
industry developments also are better able than the government to
update standards in light of technological developments. For
instance, one study9 5 attributes the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration's delays in updating its health and safety
standards, including its notorious standard against ice in drinking
193. Farrar, supra note 188, at 298 (self-regulation typically is more specific in focus
and more flexible than government regulation).
194. C.f. Dolan, Law and the Maverick Health Practitioner, 26 ST. Louis U.L.J. 627,
686 (1982) (doctors who have seen applicant are in a better position to evaluate him than is
any other decisionmaker).
195. See the OSHA-financed study by the consulting firm, Lester B. Knight and Asso-
ciates, Inc., 7 O.S.H. REP. (BNA) 307 (1977). See also COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED
STATES, THE CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION NEEDS TO ISSUE SAFETY STANDARDS
FASTER, H.R. Doc. No. 3, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1977). The Comptroller General points out
that it took the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) an average of 834 days to
develop each of three mandatory standards, in contrast to the 330 days that Congress speci-
fied. Id.
Professor Hamilton has summarized the procedures the CPSC must follow:
Section 7 of the Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2056 (1976), prohibits
CPSC from developing mandatory product safety standards internally. Rather, CPSC
must invite publicly persons from outside CPSC to offer to develop a standard for the
agency. An "offeror" may be any interested member of the public, including industry
or consumer groups. CPSC may contribute to the offeror's cost of the development of
the standard.
After an offeror has drafted a standard and submitted it to CPSC, the agency may
revise the standard if it appears inadequate. After review and revision, CPSC may pro-
mulgate the standard following the procedures set forth in 15 U.S.C. § 2058 (1976), or
it can terminate the proceeding. This procedure requires publication of a proposed
standard, an opportunity for public comment, an oral hearing, and a final notice of the
promulgation of the rule.
CPSC may omit the offeror process if a person responding to an invitation for
offers submits an existing standard (e.g., a voluntary standard) covering the same prod-
uct for which CPSC has proposed a mandatory standard. If the agency decides that the
existing standard, if promulgated, would eliminate or reduce the unreasonable risk of
injury associated with the product, it may proceed immediately with the procedure set
forth in 15 U.S.C. § 2058, omitting the offeror process. It may also omit the offeror
process if there is no response to CPSC's original invitation.
Hamilton, supra note 11, at 1401 n.233.
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water, to factors that are less likely to impede private regulators,
such as extensive statutorily mandated procedures, externally
imposed requirements of environmental and economic impact
statements, internal problems, an inability to fill high level vacan-
cies, and lack of support from high officials. These difficulties may
impede both the initial development and the revision of standards.
In general, industry self-regulators can act more swiftly and more
subtly than a government bound by due process standards and can
avoid the bureaucratic intrusiveness of a government police
force.19 6
The immediate concern is not whether self-regulation is pref-
erable to government regulation, but whether the benefits of self-
regulation effectively argue against the traditional approach's hos-
tile presumption. Even if self-regulation only serves as an initial or
threshold method of regulation, its value is still significant. When
self-regulation merely duplicates government regulation, self-regu-
lation still gives an alternate recourse to those aggrieved who can-
not inspire the government regulators to remedial action.
Another benefit of industry standard setting, especially in
health and safety, is that the government may be able to use the
standards to reduce the cost of or improve its own regulation. For
instance, at least eight federal agencies have incorporated by refer-
ence the National Fire Protection Association's fire prevention
codes. 197 The Consumer Product Safety Commission and OSHA
also have used industry standards extensively. In the words of one
commentator, "utilization of voluntary standards on a more or less
permanent basis may improve the overall effectiveness of the
agency in carrying out its broad statutory mandate."'1 98 Regardless
of whether the government should rely on industry standards,
those standards, by assisting the government, perform a service
that courts cannot ignore.
Because self-regulation often involves a private group selecting
its members, self-regulation also gains support from the value his-
196. Note, Antitrust Problems of Trade Association Product Safety Standardization,
55 IowA L. REv. 439 (1969) (self-regulation more efficient than government regulation).
Of course, government regulation has major advantages of its own, such as the increased
chance that a point of view other than the industry's will be considered in developing and
applying the standards. The point here is not that individual self-regulation is better than
government regulation, only that the comparison illustrates some of the benefits of self-
regulation.
197. Hamilton, supra note 11, at 1481.
198. Id. at 1402, 1407 (industry's cost of developing standards less than the govern-
ment's); cf. 16 C.F.R. § 1031.2 (1986) (recognition of role of voluntary standards).
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torically placed on assuring a group autonomy from the govern-
ment. The right to choose one's associates enjoys constitutional
recognition despite many inroads in recent years. 1 9 This right im-
plies that persons who voluntarily form groups, knowing they will
need to associate with the other members, should be able to con-
trol a member's admission without government interference. The
realtors who form a multiple listing service, for example, not only
will rely on fellow members' representations about property, but
also may work with fellow members more regularly and closely
than with nonmembers. Accordingly, realtors may have a personal
interest in excluding some applicants unrelated to any economic
concern or to any public policy. The pressure from Silver's tradi-
tional approach to accept all comers collides with this associational
interest as well. 00
This survey suggests that industry self-regulation produces
benefits besides those that may be called efficiency enhancing.
Admittedly, the progress of economics and especially of the theory
of the firm provides efficiency-enhancing rationales for an increas-
ing variety of business conduct and for an increasing number of
benefits not thought to be economic in character.20 ' Nevertheless,
many of the benefits surveyed here, such as the protection of
health, safety, and the environment, the promotion of proper ethi-
cal behavior, the deterrence of widely condemned, if lawful, con-
duct, and the supplementary enforcement of the civil and criminal
law support self-regulation regardless of whether they are charac-
terized properly as efficiency enhancing. To be sure, a judge must
engage in a host of value judgments in order to deem these goals
beneficial and to see them as legitimate ends for private concerted
action. After all, no constitution explicitly gives private groups po-
lice power to seek these ends. The value-laden nature of the
judge's decision may account for the Chicago School's unwilling-
ness to acknowledge that these benefits' noneconomic aspects have
199. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958); (groups freedom to select
its members is limited); Note, Development in the Law Judicial Control of Actions of Pri-
vate Associations, 76 HARV. L. REV. 983, 990-91 (1963).
Professor Chafee called the members' resentment of judicial action that forces them to
associate with others the "hot potato" argument against such judicial action. Chafee, The
Internal Affairs of Associations Not For Profit, 43 HARV. L. REV. 993, 1026-27 (1930).
200. The benefit to the members of being able to rely on each other's representations
also can be characterized as efficiency creating because it reduces search and evaluation
costs.
201. See 0. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES (1975) (explaining efficiency
enhancing benefits of integration).
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influenced industry self-regulation cases. 20 2 The Chicago School
seeks to characterize all benefits solely in economic terms. These
benefits then can be seen as legitimate without any judicial value
judgment beyond a deference to the importance of consumer wel-
fare. Hence, a judge accepting the Chicago School approach can
acknowledge the economic benefits, evaluate self-regulation in eco-
nomic terms, and still play the scientist, who need not resort to
frankly political judgments about the proper role of private con-
certed power. As Holmes said, claiming a scientific basis for deci-
sions allows the courts the "illusion of being above the fray of
groups striving for power. '20 3
When practices become institutionalized and commonplace,
discussion of their legality becomes superfluous. For many years
over four hundred standard-setting organizations have operated in
this country, each promulgating and interpreting hundreds of stan-
dards that affect the products of rivals.20 4 Academic institutions
are accustomed to being judged and influenced by accrediting
organizations composed of members of competing institutions.
Businesses and professionals are accustomed to being disciplined
by groups of fellow businessmen and professionals with whom they
202. Admittedly, the Supreme Court in National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v.
United States, 435 U.S. 679, 690 (1978), ruled out of consideration the non-economic bene-
fits of industry self-regulation. The Court's rule flies in the face of too many previous deci-
sions to be applied generally. As others have pointed out, the statement indicates that the
non-economic purposes of the restraint are immaterial. See Note, The Requirements for
ABA Approval of Law Schools: An Antitrust Analysis of the Means of Accreditation, 83
DICK. L. REV. 147 (1979). In upholding the American Medical Association's policy of oppos-
ing dealings between medical doctors and chiropractors, the Seventh Circuit has emphasized
that noneconomic matters must be considered despite the Supreme Court's statements in
NSPE:
If it should be determined eventually in this case that the Sherman Act was violated,
that determination should not rest on insistence that the Act is indifferent to, or even
hostile to, the value of permitting medical doctors to honor in their practice what they
perceive to be scientific method, or indifferent to or hostile to the value of encourage-
ment, from within the profession, to its members to honor scientific method by declin-
ing to associate with those thought to dishonor it. A value independent of the values
attributed to unrestrained competition must enter the equation. The reasonableness of
any resulting restraint on competition must be determined by a reconciliation of values
of differing kinds.
Wilk v. American Medical Ass'n, 719 F.2d 207, 227 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S.
1210 (1984).
203. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457 (1897).
204. Private groups spend more than $500 million annually on the development of
standards. U. S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, VOLUNTARY STANDARDS AND TESTING LABORATORY
ACCREDITATION, AN ANALYSIS OF PROBLEMS, IssuEs AND ALTERNATIVES FOR FEDERAL ACTION 8
(July 1977). See generally Curran, Industrial Standards, Antitrust and the Logic of Public
Health, 17 DUQ. L. REV. 717 (1979).
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could be or actually are competing. Probably none of the examples
of self-regulation in our original list of cases would seem abnormal
to persons in the industry. In short, the notion that persons will be
regulated and judged by rivals and put at a competitive disadvan-
tage by an adverse judgment is an accepted part of commercial life.
One reason already noted is that no one else is likely to have the
knowledge, capacity, or interest to regulate. Thus, Justice Black's
generalizations 0 5 about the illegality of rivals judging rivals will
war against reality.
B. The Dangers
Different instances of industry self-regulation present a wide
variety of dangers, economic and noneconomic, that may arouse
judicial hostility. While a complete review of such dangers is be-
yond the scope of this Article, this section surveys some specific
dangers that may support the traditional approach and upon
which those faithful to the thrust of that approach should focus
attention. The variety of dangers itself bears some messages. It
suggests that no one danger, especially the danger of reduced out-
put, adequately explains the traditional approach. It cautions
against striving for a general rule to resolve all these cases. Thus, it
argues for the low level of generality of this Article's proposed
approach.
1. Dangers to Output
a. Maintaining Price Fixing, Related Concerted Conduct, or
Oligopolistic Coordination
One danger to output from industry self-regulation is that the
defendants' action, whatever its asserted justification, actually may
be a tactic for maintaining output-restraining conduct such as
price fixing or other related concerted action.20 6 The danger is that
the conspirators will use industry self-regulation to discipline or
destroy rivals, such as the plaintiff, who would thwart the output-
restraining concerted conduct by deviating from it.2o 7 The classic
205. See supra text accompanying note 55.
206. A similar danger arises when one company has monopoly power, for then it also
may preserve its reduced monopoly output and artificially increased price by excluding the
plaintiff.
207. Condemnations of industry self-regulation often start by citing Adam Smith, who
warned that rules created by associations of rivals should be greeted "with most suspicious
attention . . . and ought never to be adopted till after having been long and carefully
examined." A. SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONs 250 (1933). The historical stereotype of in-
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example is that of price-fixing defendants who attack a plaintiff
because of his lower prices (or extra services) to buyers, or his
higher prices (or fewer demands for service) to sellers. 08 In this
case the plaintiff's rivalry on the merits threatens the defendants'
gains from and ability to continue their output-restraining price
fixing.
Industry self-regulation also may threaten output when it is
used to enforce an agreement between rivals fixing nonprice
dimensions of their products or services. A standard setting agree-
ment between rivals that is intended to render their products uni-
form or of standard quality provides an example of such an agree-
ment.20 9 As discussed above, although such an agreement is not
condemned as immediately as price fixing, it interferes with the
free play of market forces and may reduce gains from trade. If the
agreement does not aid productive efficiency in some way, such as
by lowering costs or increasing demand, it, along with any
attempts to enforce it by destroying deviating rivals, should like-
wise be condemned.
At least two features of this danger to output are worth noting
at the outset. First, and most important, the defendants already
are violating the antitrust rules against price fixing and other re-
lated concerted conduct even before (and regardless of) their
action against the plaintiff. These existing antitrust rules, there-
fore, ought to be the only rules needed to address this danger. In
other words, full enforcement of the well-established rules against
price fixing and other related concerted conduct should eliminate
this danger to output. No need exists for anything like Silver's sep-
arate "group boycott" rule. Thus, a major simplification of anti-
trust doctrine is possible. In making this point, the Chicago School
serves as Occam's razor, slicing away the needless special rules for
dustry self-regulation is the medieval craft guild, which used criminal sanctions to enforce
compulsory licensing requirements in order to preserve local price-fixing agreements. This
stereotype evokes the worst danger from industry self-regulation, but, as discussed infra
text accompanying note 210, the danger is one the rules against price fixing and other
related concerted behavior adequately address.
208. The temptation for defendants to abuse self-regulation in order to maintain a
price-fixing agreement is greatest when the defendants are the plaintiff's horizontal rivals.
This may be one reason for emphasizing the horizontality of the boycott. See L. SULLIVAN,
supra note 16.
209. E.g., United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 405 (1927) (agreement
not to make second grade pottery); Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S.
20, 145 (1912) (agreement not to make inferior "seconds"); United States v. Institute of
Carpet Mfrs., 1940-43 Trade Cas. 56,097 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) (agreement to make only stan-
dard rugs and carpets).
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"group boycotts."21 0 Second, whether the defendants hurt the
plaintiff by a concerted refusal to deal rather than by some other
method is immaterial to this danger. A concerted refusal to deal is
just one of many tactics for enforcing a price-fixing agreement
against a price cutter. Extortion, arson, sabotage, bribery of the
plaintiff's employees, theft of trade secrets, and other methods of
harassment also may be used. In short, as the Chicago School has
emphasized, no reason supports treating a "concerted refusal to
deal" as a category of conduct that warrants separate antitrust
treatment or a separate conceptual category.21' A more appropriate
category would be "concerted efforts to maintain price fixing or
other related concerted conduct." If we ignore the harm to the
plaintiff, a more general category could be simply "price fixing or
other related concerted conduct."
Were the maintenance of such output-restraining conduct the
only danger to output, industry self-regulation cases would not
need to be considered "boycott" cases at all. Clearly, then, the
danger to output would call for Judge Posner's rule condemning
boycotts only when they are used to enforce an output-restraining
practice that is objectionable on the basis of substantive antitrust
policy.212 The court's attention could focus entirely on whether the
defendants were otherwise engaged in such a practice, not on the
defendants' action toward the plaintiff. Of course, this approach
gives the plaintiff much less than the traditional approach does.
For example, no presumption against the legality of the defend-
ants' concerted conduct arises merely because the conduct places a
rival at a competitive disadvantage.
In the vast majority of industry self-regulation cases, however,
the plaintiff cannot show the defendants are engaged in price fix-
ing or other related concerted conduct. What danger to industry
output does the defendants' action present in those circumstances?
Although the defendants' action certainly has harmed the plaintiff,
economic theory no longer provides such a clear basis for claiming
that the defendants' conduct has restrained industry output and
imposed a welfare loss on society.
Oligopoly theory, however, suggests two situations in which
the defendants' conduct, by increasing the chance of oligopolistic
coordination, would threaten to reduce output: when the defend-
210. R. POSNER, supra note 28, at 217.
211. Id. at 200.
212. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
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ants' conduct reduces the number of rivals to a number that makes
coordination more likely and when the conduct helps to maintain
agreements that facilitate coordination. The first situation arises
only when coordination is a serious possibility 213 in light of the
small number of rivals, the homogeneity of products, and other
factors that make coordination feasible. 14 In this situation, the
argument runs, courts should condemn the defendants' action in
order to provide a prophylactic measure against an oligopolistic
industry structure. As discussed above,2 15 Judge Posner's rule ig-
nores this problem. His rule effectively requires the plaintiff to
show that the defendants are engaged in a substantive antitrust
violation that they attempt to enforce through their action against
the plaintiff. Oligopolistic coordination itself, however, is not an
antitrust violation. Defendants, therefore, would not subject them-
selves to attack merely by eliminating a rival and thereby creating
an industry structure more amenable to successful coordination.
Injuring the plaintiff also could help to maintain agreements
that facilitate coordination. For example, an agreement to an-
nounce price increases publicly weeks in advance of the increase's
effective date facilitates price coordination by assisting rivals in co-
ordinating their own increases and by reducing the risk of being
the first to increase. 1 ' The plaintiff's failure to comply with the
agreement may unsettle this coordination. Handicapping or ex-
cluding the plaintiff through industry self-regulation may be a ra-
tional way for the defendants to maintain their output-restraining
coordination.
The important point, however, is that the danger of the
defendants' attacking the plaintiff in order to maintain an agree-
ment facilitating coordination does not require Silver's special rule
for boycotts any more than the danger of price fixing does. The
injured plaintiff already may sue under existing authority con-
demning concerted action that unduly facilitates oligopolistic coor-
213. The "incipency" notion posits that eliminating a rival poses an incipient threat of
reducing output even when the number of remaining rivals is far too numerous for coordina-
tion or collusion to be feasible. See, e.g., Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207,
213 (1959). The incipiency notion has been dismissed summarily by others, however. See R.
BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX 205-06 (1978).
214. For a list of such factors, see F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, 157-82 (1970) and R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, supra note 69, at
101-07.
215. See supra text accompanying notes 74-76.
216. E.g., Universal Lite Distrib. v. Northwest Indus., 452 F. Supp. 1206, 1217 (D. Md.
1978), afl'd in part, 602 F.2d 1173, 1174-75 (4th Cir. 1979).
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dination. The combination to injure the plaintiff could be analyzed
in the same way as combinations to exchange price, cost, and prod-
uct information, 17 combinations to engage in artificial product
standardization, 218 or combinations to use delivered price sys-
tems.2 19 This analysis balances any efficiency-enhancing benefits of
the defendants' concerted action against the action's danger to
output from action facilitating coordination. Once again, the dan-
ger to output does not explain or appear to be the predicate for
Silver's separate rule for "group boycotts."
Silver's rule might be acceptable if the defendants' action cre-
ated an inference that defendants probably are engaged in price
fixing that the plaintiff for some reason is unable to prove. If so,
any concerted conduct that hurts a rival could be condemned-or
at least presumed illegal-as a safeguard against this other likely,
but unprovable, output-restraining conduct. Such an inference,
however, is not warranted. As noted in the discussion of benefits,
defendants not engaged in price fixing might rationally hurt the
plaintiff for a number of reasons. To condemn the defendants be-
cause their action is presumed to signify unlawful price fixing is to
ignore the many other reasons that may prompt the action.
Some, nevertheless, may claim that a court ought to condemn
the defendants' action against the plaintiff-at least in the absence
of obvious efficiency-enhancing benefits-because of the mere pos-
sibility that the action was taken to enforce unprovable price fix-
ing. This argument assumes that the gain in output that results
from inhibiting occasional instances of unprovable price fixing out-
weighs the loss that results from inhibiting the wide variety of
joint activities that may hurt the plaintiff. The assumption seems
groundless, at least when defendants do not, together, possess the
monopoly power needed to reduce industry output significantly.
But without knowing how much unprovable price fixing or other
related concerted conduct exists, how often industry self-regulation
signals this conduct's presence, and what the resulting output loss
is, disproving the assumption is difficult. To forego the subtle effi-
ciency gains provided by some joint activities because the activities
might be helping to enforce unprovable conduct that restrains out-
217. E.g., United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978); United
States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
218. E.g., National Macaroni Mfgs. Ass'n v. FTC, 345 F.2d 421 (7th Cir. 1965); C-O-
Two Fire Equip. Co. v. United States, 197 F.2d 489, 493 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S.
892 (1952).
219. E.g., FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683 (1948).
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put seems, on balance, an indefensible choice.
The erroneous assumption underlying Pacific Stationery22 is
that the defendants' behavior threatens output whenever the de-
fendants have sufficient power to exclude or handicap seriously the
plaintiff. What this assumption overlooks is that the mere ability
to injure the plaintiff seriously is not at all the same as the ability
to reduce output. Defendants may have the power to hurt the
plaintiff severely only because their joint activity has lowered costs
or increased demand substantially. Yet these defendants just as
clearly may lack the capacity to reduce output by collusion or coor-
dination because of the large number of rivals or because of other
factors. In general, the defendants' ability to exclude the plaintiff
depends on the plaintiff's ability to function successfully despite
the defendants' action. In contrast, the defendants' ability to re-
strict output depends on the elasticity of demand facing them at a
competitive price. To be sure, rivals attempting output-restraining
conduct are assisted by their ability to exclude others from the
market. As some commentators have explained, however, the ca-
pacity to exclude is at most a helpful condition for reducing out-
put, not a sufficient one.221 To condemn the defendants' action
whenever the power to exclude exists is to admit de facto that
other concerns besides output are operating.
b. Dangers to Output in the Absence of Price Fixing, Related
Concerted Conduct, or Oligopolistic Coordination
Suppose, however, that neither price fixing, related concerted
conduct, nor oligopolistic coordination is a plausible concern in
light of the many rivals on the plaintiff's horizontal level, defend-
ants' meager market share, or other facts apparent to the court.222
What danger to output does the defendants' action against the
plaintiff present in this situation?
This is the single most difficult question our example cases
present. On one hand, it is axiomatic that the defendants would
not devote any resources to excluding, handicapping, or raising the
costs of the plaintiff unless the defendants believed it was benefi-
220. Brief for government, Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery
and Printing Co., 105 S. Ct. 2613 (1985). The government attorneys argued, without expla-
nation, that the defendants' ability to exclude served as a measure for the danger to output.
221. See W. LIEBELER, supra note 69, at 50-54.
222. I am attempting to posit a case where a plaintiff cannot prove, or at least will be
hard pressed to prove, that the defendant will ever possess monopoly power or, for that
matter, any significant influence over industry output and price.
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cial for them to do so. The benefit, however, could spring from a
host of sources, as the previous subsection demonstrated. It also
seems axiomatic that the defendants who display the "anticompe-
titive animus" referred to in Pacific Stationery, that is, the de-
fendants who hurt the plaintiff solely to avoid the plaintiff's ri-
valry, must believe that their market either is not or will not be
perfectly competitive and that handicapping or eliminating the
plaintiff will affect output. On the other hand, the continued exis-
tence of many other rivals on the plaintiff's horizontal level,
against whom output-restraining conduct cannot be shown, sug-
gests that in most cases the effect on output will not be significant.
It also suggests that the defendants may well have some efficiency-
enhancing motive for their action, even if they cannot articulate it.
One can too easily infer a danger to output from finding that
the defendants acted with an anticompetitive animus, that is,
acted solely in order to avoid the plaintiff's rivalry. Assuming the
defendants are not willing to pay to satisfy their spite, this finding
means only that the defendants anticipate gaining more from
injuring the plaintiff than that action cost. A great many busi-
nesses rationally can anticipate short-term gain from injuring a ri-
val,223 regardless of whether their action provides efficiency-en-
hancing benefits. Even businesses in a competitive market may
gain if a rival's entry is impeded.2 4 The operation of a rival, for
example, may increase another's selling cost or impose other exter-
nalities. To take an example from door-to-door selling, the more
homes that one salesman visits in a neighborhood, the lower the
probability that any customer will buy from a rival salesman. 2 5
Thus, the danger to output does not necessarily warrant the Vesu-
vian reaction of courts on finding anticompetitive animus. The dif-
ficulty of assessing the magnitude of an output effect and the many
possible efficiency-enhancing benefits of defendants' action tempt
one to ignore the danger to output altogether. Judge Posner's rule,
by absolving defendants unless they have otherwise engaged in
price fixing or other output-restraining conduct, seems to yield to
223. Nevertheless, many commentators agree with the Chicago School and suggest
that rivals have no incentive to combine in order to exclude an equally efficient rival unless
they are engaged in price fixing or related output-restraining conduct. See, e.g., H.
HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 275-76 (1985).
224. See infra note 226.
225. Goldberg, The Free Rider Problem, Imperfect Pricing, and the Economics of
Retailing Services, 79 Nw. U. L. REv. 736, 738-39 (1984) (one's business activity can increase




To see no danger to output whatsoever from the defendants'
action, however, overstates the point at least a little. This view
ignores the possibility that actions that reduce the number of ri-
vals may decrease the elasticity of demand for the defendants'
products (may make the demand curve more negatively sloped)
even without price fixing or other related concerted conduct. Al-
though economists have no validated analysis of the effect of lower
elasticity on output, lower elasticity at least tends to make possible
output restriction by enabling defendants to force up price by of-
fering a smaller supply. To be sure, a small number of rivals does
not imply necessarily a low elasticity of demand. A few rivals pro-
ducing the same or similar product can render the demand for an-
other's products highly elastic, provided the rivals can expand
their supply quickly in response to a price increase. The practical
difficulties of directly measuring demand elasticity make any gen-
eralization suspect. Nevertheless, a positive relation between the
number of rivals and the demand elasticity facing each of them
still is widely presumed.226 The possibility that injuring the plain-
tiff will decrease the elasticity of demand facing plaintiff's rivals
may have no policy implications, however. A court has no way to
identify those industry self-regulation cases in which this possibil-
ity exists. The presence of low elasticity of demand itself tells lit-
tle, for it could be the result of lower costs or a more highly valued
product.
Seeing no effect on output from the defendants' action also
overlooks the possibility of improving output through judicial
intervention. For instance, the excluded plaintiff, if allowed to
share the advantages of those in the defendants' group (or if other-
wise protected from the harm produced by the defendants' action),
might prove to be a more efficient, lower-cost rival. In other words,
the plaintiff not only would operate at a lower cost than his rivals,
but would expand his output while maintaining his lower costs.
Thus, if the defendants favored the plaintiff rather than hurt him,
the plaintiff's rivalry and that of other low-cost producers might
increase industry output. The defendants' action is thus analogous
to imposing a tariff on a lower-cost, foreign producer.22 7
226. See L. REYNOLDS, MICROECONOMIcs 77 (1973).
227. A. ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN, supra note 112, at 151-57. Others have claimed that
industry self-regulation may retard the rate of which low-cost firms replace high-cost firms.
L. SCHERER, INDUSTRY MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 12-13 (2d ed. 1980);
Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust 127 U. P. L. REv. 1051 (1977).
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Defendants' fear of a low-cost rival may explain many indus-
try self-regulation cases. Defendants and other rivals of a low-cost
plaintiff, although pricing at their marginal cost, rationally may
seek to hurt the plaintiff through industry self-regulation, even
though they realize that they will continue to face rivalry from
other, high-cost rivals. This may explain, for example, why the
AMA seeks to bar chiropractors from hospitals by threatening the
hospitals with loss of accreditation.228 Assuming that the AMA
neither is motivated entirely by scientific concerns nor is orches-
trating a huge price-fixing conspiracy, the AMA may fear that chi-
ropractors, who have lower long-term costs, will be able to price at
or above their marginal costs and still undersell medical doctors.
The AMA may believe that the total cost of denying the chiroprac-
tors access to a hospital, including the extra revenue from the hos-
pital that is foregone in return for the hospital's promise to boycott
the chiropractors, will be trivial compared to the costs in lost sales,
market share, and profits if chiropractors were not so
handicapped.229
To be sure, defendants may defend their action on the ground
that the lower-cost plaintiff always can prevail financially by dupli-
cating the defendants' joint activity. For example, the especially
efficient doctor who has been denied staff privileges can build or
buy a rival hospital, and the efficient real estate agent who has
been denied access to the defendants' multiple listing service can
organize his own service. If the defendants' joint activity is viewed
strictly as a type of rivalry on the merits, courts have no warrant
for compelling the defendants to admit a rival, regardless of his
228. See Wilk v. American Medical Ass'n, 719 F.2d 207 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
467 U.S. 1210 (1984).
229. The wish to handicap the low-cost rival also may explain the defendants' behav-
ior in the famous case, Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealer's Ass'n v. United States, 234
U.S. 600 (1914). The defendant retailers agreed to circulate to each other the names of
lumber wholesalers suspected of selling directly to consumers. This agreement induced
retailers to refuse to deal with the direct-selling wholesalers. The retailers' behavior easily
could be explained if they were fixing prices, but the court did not claim that they were.
How then can we explain the retailer's behavior? Again, the explanation may be the retail-
ers' fear that the direct-seller's wholesalers would be lower cost rivals at the retail level. The
defendants may have believed that their cost in letting these low-cost rivals compete as
retailers unmolested exceeded their total cost of conducting the boycott.
To be sure, the defendants' strategy should only succeed in select circumstances. R
POSNER & F. EASTERROOK, supra note 69, at 718-721. For instance, if the volume of direct
sales is sufficient to support a wholesaler at an efficient level of production, the boycott
eventually should fail. The fact that such boycotts appear so frequently in the lumber in-




costs. Indeed, compelling defendants to admit anyone will create
suboptimal incentives for investment in the defendants' joint
activity. At a theoretical level, this reply is unanswerable. Consum-
ers may be better off in the long run if the excluded doctors or real
estate agents are compelled to duplicate the defendants' joint
activity. At a practical level, however, the reply often will seem in-
genuous in light of the difficulty of duplicating the defendants'
joint activity, and in light of our culture's commitment to giving
each individual an equal opportunity to compete. A court's temp-
tation to intervene on behalf of the low-cost rival whose unim-
peded (or equally benefited) performance would increase output is
likely to be irresistible. In other words, forcing the defendants to
share their joint actions' efficiency-enhancing advantages with ri-
vals like the plaintiff might appear to be an opportunistic way for a
court to increase output, especially when the plaintiff is the special
low-cost rival. That this judicial action will distort the incentive
for investment in the defendants' efficiency-enhancing joint activ-
ity may seem too attenuated a concern.
With perfectly functioning judicial machinery, a careful anti-
trust rule could address the danger of excluding the low-cost rival.
The rule could require the injured plaintiff to show, first, that he
had lower costs than his rivals; second, that he could expand his
output to supply a substantial share of the market while maintain-
ing his lower costs; and third, that duplication of the defendants'
joint activity is not a realistic possibility. Of course, even an oppor-
tunistic court willing to interfere in the defendants' joint activity
then should take into account the need to preserve incentives to
undertake the joint activity. For instance, a plaintiff-realtor that a
court allowed into a multiple listing service should be required to
pay an amount that would help to insure an appropriate incentive
for the creation of the service.
Such a cost-based test, however, does not lend itself to judicial
administration. Nor does there seem to be any other feasible way
to identify the low-cost rival. No group of industry self-regulation
cases seems so likely to involve a low-cost plaintiff as to warrant a
presumption against the defendants once the plaintiff shows his
injury. In light of the risk of judicial error and the cost of litiga-
tion, a cost-based test would sacrifice unduly the benefits of indus-
try self-regulation discussed in the preceding section. Arguably,
therefore, the possibility that the plaintiff is a special low-cost rival
should not affect the choice of the most appropriate legal ap-
proach. This may explain why Judge Posner's rule generally ig-
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nores the danger to output from injuring the low-cost rival.23
If the defendants' industry self-regulation enhances efficiency,
its exclusionary effect can be viewed as identical to the exclusion-
ary effect of offering lower prices or better quality. If one believes
that the defendants' industry self-regulation provides no efficiency-
enhancing benefits at all, however, it could be said to pose the
same type, if not the same degree, of danger to output that govern-
ment regulations such as occupational licensing pose.231 Like the
industry self-regulation discussed in this subsection, occupational
licensing hurts a potential rival, but still leaves a sufficient number
of rivals to render price fixing or oligopolistic coordination implau-
sible. Yet economists claim that occupational licensing restrains
output for various reasons, each of which also may apply to indus-
try self-regulation.32
First, occupational licensing increases all rivals' costs by at
230. R. POSNER, supra note 28, at 207-11. Posner may mean only that his rule is the
most appropriate proxy for the danger to efficiency in light of the costs of litigation and
judicial error. That is, he may admit his rule, by allowing defendants to handicap the low-
cost rival, will impair efficiency in some instances. He may believe, however, that any other
rule will condemn or inhibit too many efficiency-enhancing joint activities. The best net
result is reached, therefore, by adopting his rule and accepting occasional losses.
231. "The combination of inadequate information and professional values [give indus-
try self-regulation] a standardizing effect equivalent to one imposed by legal requirements."
Robbins, Allied Health Manpower, 7 INQUIRY 55, 56-57 (1969-70); see also, Kissam, Govern-
ment Policy Toward Medical Accreditation and Certification: The Antitrust Laws and
Other Procompetitive Strategies, 1983 Wis. L. REV. 1, 48; Handler, Recent Developments in
Antitrust Law: 1958-59, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 843, 864 (1959) (boycott analogized to a private
licensing system).
232. E.g., Gellhorn, The Abuse of Occupational Licensing, 44 U. Cm. L. REV. 6 (1976);
Maurizi, Occupational Licensing and the Public Interest, 82 J. POL. ECON. 399 (1974) (licen-
sers adjust entry standards to protect income of established practitioners). Most economists
associated with the Chicago School oppose occupational licensing, which they believe often
stems from the industry members' anti-competitive efforts. See Moore, The Purpose of
Licensing, 4 J.L. & ECON. 93 (1961); Stigler, supra note 19 (regulation is a means of transfer-
ring wealth to those being regulated); Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regula-
tion, 19 J.L. & EcoN. 211 (1976) (same). Yet they view private certification and registration,
which may impose a similar effect, much more favorably. E.g., Elzinga, supra note 164, at
114. They tend to emphasize the lack of formal coercion and the possible efficiency-enhanc-
ing benefits of such industry self-regulation. Although this toleration of private self-regula-
tion may appear flagrantly inconsistent with the Chicago School's opposition to government
regulation, a defense for the different stances exists. Industry self-regulation can be seen as
evolving from consumers' wishes as expressed in the market place. Arguably, the self-regula-
tion would not continue unless consumers wished it, that is, unless the market supported it.
Self-regulation's success in the market provides a guarantee that it is in fact efficiency en-
hancing. In contrast, government regulation enjoys no similar guarantee. Of course, this de-
fense also would call for toleration of price-fixing agreements that continued over time. The
continuation of such agreements supplies equally solid evidence of their efficiency-enhanc-
ing character. Yet, the Chicago School remains opposed to them.
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least the amount needed to satisfy the licensing authorities. Simi-
larly, industry self-regulation efforts that entail a type of certifica-
tion will increase rivals' costs by the amount needed to acquire
whatever certification the defendants are offering. The cost of cer-
tification also may fall more heavily on small firms because the
cost is not likely to increase with additional units of output. Thus,
large firms may use industry self-regulation to impose a greater
percentage increase in the small rivals' costs than they incur them-
selves. Of course, the cost of private certification may be less than
the cost of governmental licensing to the extent that the private
certification is not, practically speaking, mandatory.
Second, by raising the costs of all rivals, occupational licensing
restricts entry into the industry. A basic economic postulate main-
tains that entry by a new producer will increase output at least
slightly. The entry will produce an income transfer by causing
existing producers to lower prices as well as a real output gain,
most of which the entrant captures.33 Some of the existing pro-
ducers' resources then will be released for other uses. Even the en-
try of a higher cost rival will increase output if consumer demand
for the good has increased. This postulate helps explain why firms
like our defendants' have an incentive to use industry self-regula-
tion to exclude even those rivals who are no more efficient than
they. 2 . The firms may be seeking to avoid the short-term costs of
losing their existing sales and market share. These costs might in-
clude the cost of moving to a different geographic or product mar-
ket. Whenever these costs of tolerating a plaintiff's entry exceed
the cost of excluding the plaintiff through industry self-regulation,
the latter becomes a rational strategy.
Third, occupational licensing reduces the supply of traders. If
the remaining traders are for some reason unable to expand their
output, the reduction in the supply of traders may reduce industry
supply and thus industry output. Reduction in output, of course, is
more likely to occur when the traders remaining in the industry
are individuals rather than firms, because firms presumably are
able to expand output indefinitely. 35 Thus, the exclusion of indi-
233. A. ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN, supra note 112, at 151-57.
234. Many who study business management believe a business invariably has an inter-
est in using industry self-regulation to injure or exclude a rival. The successful use of indus-
try self-regulation to this end is one part of "domain management." See, e.g., Kotter, Trade
Associations and Environmental Strategies, 4 AcAD. MGMT. REv. 87, 90 (1979)




viduals usually creates more danger to output than the exclusion of
products.2 6 The amount by which occupational licensing reduces
output also will depend on the number of individuals excluded. In
general, the greater the number excluded, the greater the threat to
output. Of course, industry self-regulation does not reduce the sup-
ply of traders as obviously as does a flat legal ban. Compared to
government licensing, its methods for reducing supply, such as the
denial of access to essential facilities, are more easily seen to re-
semble rivalry on the merits.
Fourth, occupational licensing also can restrain the use of effi-
cient methods by industry producers.23 7 The promulgation of a
mandatory design standard (or a performance standard that func-
tions as a design standard), for example, freezes technology.
Mandatory standards inhibit firms from making differently
designed products. Even when a new product better fulfills the reg-
ulator's objectives, the product must incur the costs of satisfying
the regulator of that fact. The voluntary standards imposed by
standard setters, such as the American Society of Mechanical
Engineers, also will impose a cost on noncompliers, which tends to
freeze technology in much the same way. 38
What policy implications, however, follow from believing that
industry self-regulation threatens output even in the absence of
price fixing or other related concerted conduct? To some extent,
the threat to output supports Silver's traditional approach of
erecting a presumption in the plaintiff's favor whenever concerted
conduct seriously injures him. The defendants then will bear the
burden of showing that their conduct enhanced efficiency. But
what a broad rule this would be! After all, many types of conduct
other than industry self-regulation seriously injure rivals, but have
not been thought to raise antitrust concerns. Bribing a rival's em-
ployees to sabotage the rival's operations, bribing government reg-
236. S. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 212 (1982).
237. Id. at 115-16.
238. An additional danger of self-regulation not mentioned in the text is its historic
tendency to lead to government regulation. States often adopt as mandatory the standards
of private standard-setting organizations, thus creating the danger to output traditionally
associated with government regulation. See, e.g., Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas,
Light & Coke Co., 273 F.2d 196, at 200 (7th Cir. 1959) (private standards accepted by the
government), rev'd, 364 U.S. 656 (1961); Note, Compliance with Due Process: A Solution to
Strict Liability for Private Standard-Setting Organizations under A.S.M.E. v. Hydrolevel,
48 ALB. L. REv. 146, 150 (1983). Some believe the very presence of the private standards
invites the legislators to regulate. See L. BENHAM & A. BENHAM, The Informers' Tale, in
REGULATING THE PROFESSIONs 317 (R.D. Blair & S. Rubin eds. 1980).
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ulators to interfere with the rival's operations or increase his cost,
misinforming the Internal Revenue Service about his tax pay-
ments, intimidating his customers, spying upon and publicizing his
trade secrets, erecting a blank sign to block his advertising sign are
all examples. Some of this behavior may not even be tortious. Yet
each example poses the same threat to output as the industry self-
regulation considered in this subsection.
Moreover, gauging the threat to output that the defendants'
particular action poses will require a more refined tool than those
available to courts. Surely a trial court is in no position to ascer-
tain, for example, whether a plaintiff's rivals will be able to in-
crease their output, thereby eliminating the danger that the plain-
tiff's exclusion will reduce industry output. Nor does a court have
any basis for ascertaining how many firms the defendants must at-
tack before a significant danger to output arises.23
The uncertainty of the danger to output and the inability of
the judicial system to resolve that uncertainty through litigation
both counsel against a generalized approach to these cases based
on the danger to output. In particular, the danger to output does
not justify the harsh presumption against the defendants' conduct
established by Silver's traditional approach, especially in light of
the chance that the defendants' action will provide some efficiency-
enhancing benefits. The substantial risk that a court will fail to
appreciate these benefits when they do exist makes Silver's ap-
proach even more troubling.
The traditional approach's emphasis on the reason for the
defendants' injuring the plaintiff further suggests that the ap-
proach is not geared to the danger to output. The traditional ap-
proach seems to treat as a smoking gun any evidence showing that
the defendants' true reason was dislike of the plaintiff's lower
prices, better quality product, or other efforts at rivalry.2 40 In con-
trast, evidence that the defendants injured the plaintiff because of
his unethical and criminal acts elicits a less hostile judicial reac-
tion.241 Explaining this different judicial reaction on output
grounds is difficult. As discussed above, the "anticompetitive' mo-
239. I am ignoring here Professor Dewey's argument that, given the degree of industry
concentration, profit rates measure whether output is at a competitive level. Dewey, Indus-
trial Concentration and the Rate of Profit: Some Neglected Theory, 19 J. L. & EcoN. 67
(1976).
240. E.g., Hydrolevel Corp. v. American Soc'y of Mech. Eng'rs, at 664, 665 (E.D.N.Y.
1979), aff'd, 635 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd, 456 U.S. 556 (1982).
241. E.g., Molinas v. National Basketball Ass'n, 190 F. Supp. 241, 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
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tive itself does not prove price fixing or other related concerted
conduct. Defendants not engaged in such illegal output-restraining
conduct may fear the plaintiff's rivalry on the merits for many rea-
sons. The defendants may fear that the plaintiff will be that spe-
cial low-cost rival whose unimpeded operation would reshape the
industry. They may fear externalities from the plaintiff's opera-
tion, the elimination of which actually would enhance efficiency.
The fact finder's conclusion that the defendants injured the
plaintiff arbitrarily seems to produce a judicial reaction almost as
hostile as that produced by a finding of "anticompetitive" motive.
Again, however, the defendants' arbitrariness has little relation to
output. United States v. Terminal Railroad Association of St.
Louis2 42 often is cited as an example of concern for arbitrary exclu-
sions. In this case a railroad association obtained control over the
railroad terminal and transfer system at the only feasible point for
crossing the Mississippi River near St. Louis. The Court feared the
association arbitrarily might deny use of the system to railroads
that were not originally members of the association. Clearly, the
exclusion would put these railroads at a severe competitive disad-
vantage on some routes. As long as there was full utilization of the
system, no price fixing or related concerted conduct by those with
access to the system, and no reason to think the excluded railroads
were or would be lower-cost rivals, however, the arbitrariness or
reasonableness of the exclusion should be immaterial. 43
242. 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
243. Professor Areeda would condemn industry self-regulation that arbitrarily
excludes a plaintiff. For example, he would condemn a group of one hundred producers who
gang up to prevent the 101st firm from entering their market:
The hypothetical boycott should be condemned by antitrust law for three overlapping
reasons. First, the 100 firms would be acting irrationally to devote any resources to
excluding the 101st firm from the market, unless they believed it helped their profits to
do so. That is, they must be assuming that there would be a price output effect. (Per-
haps they are protecting the public from a crook, but that is a different issue.) Given
that certain proof of anything is both difficult and socially costly, it is both convenient
and sensible to assume that business people are acting in their own self-interest and to
assume that an unambiguously exclusionary purpose tends to indicate an anti-competi-
tive effect. Second, as a general proposition, entry opportunities free of private
restraint are critical to the achievement of economic efficiency. Third, when a chal-
lenged restraint is of a type that generally impairs competition and no offsetting re-
deeming values are offered, it is prudent for antitrust law to condemn it without bur-
dening the legal system with having to prove a detrimental power or effect. The strong
fairness claims of allowing access to markets is entirely congruent with economic effi-
ciency and not opposed to it.
Areeda, Introduction to Antitrust Economics, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 523, 536-37 (1983).
This argument ignores the possibility that defendants may have an efficiency-enhancing
reason for their action that they are unable to articulate or that the court is unable to
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In short, no reliable inference about the harm to output can be
drawn from the reason for the defendants' action. At most, the
defendants' reason for acting will shed light on whether their ac-
tion is likely to produce efficiency-enhancing benefits. The empha-
sis that courts place on the defendants' reason betrays their con-
cern with matters other than output.
c. Conclusions About the Danger to Output
The danger of reduced output that the defendants' action
presents does not begin to justify applying Silver's rule to our orig-
inal example cases. The danger to output is most acute when
defendants are engaged in unlawful cartel behavior or when de-
fendants' actions help to maintain agreements that facilitate oligo-
polistic coordination. In these very instances, however, Silver's ap-
proach is not needed. Other well-established lines of authority give
the plaintiff an adequate basis for suit. In other instances, the dan-
ger of the defendants' action reducing output is highly uncertain
and thus would not warrant an approach as hostile and as sweep-
ing as Silver's. On one hand, the glib assumption that defendants'
actions never pose any danger to output except when defendants
with monopoly power fix prices or other terms of sale is unwar-
ranted. 4 On the other hand, however, the factors that determine
the existence and severity of the danger are not likely to be mea-
surable or identifiable in a litigation setting. Nor do any useful
"proxies" for the danger to output appear. As is often the case, the
issue becomes how courts should proceed in the face of uncer-
tainty. To understand why courts have proceeded as they have,
that is, to understand why Silver's approach has prevailed, re-
quires a search for dangers other than the danger of reduced
output.
appreciate. Economics study continues to identify efficiency-enhancing aspects of conduct
that formerly were not appreciated. E.g., 0. WILIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES, ANALY-
SIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975). In general, Areeda's argument, by presuming a busi-
ness practice illegal even in the absence of demonstrable power or effect as long as no re-
deeming values for the practice are offered, reflects the inhospitality tradition in antitrust.
244. For example, Professor Liebeler, a major proponent of the Chicago School, begins
with the premise that the possibility of price fixing or related concerted conduct is the only
danger to output from the reduction of rivals and the resulting high concentration of a
market. Liebeler, Market Power and Competitive Superiority in Concentrated Industries,
25 UCLA L. REv. 1231, 1235-37 (1979).
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2. Dangers Unrelated to Output
Because the danger to output alone does not explain Silver's
rule, what other dangers might a court see in the defendants' self-
regulation? The language of the cases gives little guidance. A need
and an opportunity for some speculation arise.
Merely listing the other dangers likely to cause judicial con-
cern will show that they are dangers more commonly thought to lie
within the province of tort law. They are dangers thought to be
addressed less by antitrust laws than by the tort of unfair competi-
tion or other torts that also trace their origin to that primitive tort,
"the intentional (and unjustified) infliction of temporal injury on
another.241 5 This standard for liability invites the courts to fashion
a general code of conduct for concerted business behavior that is
not based solely on concern for output. Such a code aims to indi-
cate, for example, proper and improper methods for a combina-
tion's use of its influence. Under this standard, whether the de-
fendants' action warrants liability depends less on its threat to
output and more on considerations of morality, ethics, conve-
nience, compensation, equity, and the allocation of power between
groups.2 4
6
Some of these dangers unrelated to output also underlie
existing business tort categories. As already noted, arbitrary, negli-
gent, or otherwise unreasonable product certification poses the
same dangers addressed by the torts of injurious falsehood and
trade libel.47 In Structural Laminates v. Douglas Fir Plywood
Association, 2 4 for example, the defendant association promulgated
245. See Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194, 199 (1904); Mogul Steamship Co. v.
McGregor, Gowen and Co., 23 Q.B.D. 598, 613 (1889), afl'd, A.C. 25 (1891).
246. "Power" is used here in the more general, dictionary sense, not in the narrow
sense of monopoly power.
So pervasive was hostility to concerted private power in traditional antitrust law that
Professor Neale identified the control of private power, rather than efficiency, as the unify-
ing goal of antitrust. A. NEALE, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE U.SA 487 (2d ed. 1960).
Ian Macneil believes the hostility to private power extends to unilateral power as well:
"American legal rules and institutions, common law and others, limit unilateral power in
contractual relations of all kinds, whatever may be its source, overcoming all policy consid-
erations, including economic efficiency, where other policy considerations are deemed to lead
to excessive unilateral power." Macneil, Economic Analysis of Contractual Relations: Its
Shortfalls and the Need for a "Rich Classificatory Apparatus," 75 Nw. L. REv. 1018, 1060
(1981).
247. See supra text accompanying notes 89-91; see also VE-RI-TAS Inc. v. Advertis-
ing Review Council of Denver, 411 F. Supp. 1012 (D. Colo. 1976) (Better Business Bureau's
criticism of weight-reducing salon seen as antitrust rather than trade libel case), aff'd, 567
F.2d 963 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 906 (1978).
248. 261 F. Supp. 154 (D. Or. 1966), af'd per curiam, 399 F.2d 155 (9th Cir. 1968),
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Commercial Standard forty-five providing that only five-ply ply-
wood consisting of five pieces of veneer was acceptable for one-half
inch sheathing. The Department of Commerce adopted Commer-
cial Standard forty-five with the result that the plaintiff could not
represent his three-ply plywood as meeting the Department of
Commerce standard, a serious competitive disadvantage that prob-
ably contributed to the plaintiff's withdrawal from the business. In
court the plaintiff presented substantial evidence that the defend-
ant association knew three-ply plywood performed as well as five-
ply plywood. Viewing Commercial Standard forty-five as a state-
ment that three-ply plywood is not acceptable and recognizing that
this statement of these defendants would be credited far more
than a similar statement by a single rival suggests the close simi-
larity to trade libel. The special characteristics of this trade libel
case include: (1) concert of action, (2) by a group of the plaintiff's
rivals, (3) who gain substantial influence through the widespread
belief that they are acting impartially, scientifically, and with spe-
cialized knowledge.
Other dangers are not addressed so clearly by existing busi-
ness tort categories. Concerted conduct that harms a rival because
of his price cutting, for example, does not fit an existing tort cate-
gory, but probably would be found objectionable even when the
plaintiff can show no effect on output. Because the rival's price
cutting may be considered appropriate and desirable conduct that
should be encouraged, the court will encourage the conduct by con-
demning private action that imposes an unnecessary cost or pen-
alty upon it. Jury service illustrates analogous, desirable conduct
that courts protect by recognizing a tort cause of action against
certain private parties, like employers, who would penalize it. 249
Moreover, the defendants' injury to the plaintiff because of his ri-
valry seems a flagrant abuse of the power the defendants gain from
their collaboration. In short, the bases for the suit are the inequity
inflicted on an appealing plaintiff, the defendants' apparent abuse
of power, and the judicial wish to encourage what the court deems
to be a desirable form of rivalry. Let us dub this danger "improper
concerted response to proper rivalry." The deliberate vagueness of
"improper" and "proper" reminds us that the focus of concern is
on the desirability of the defendants' method of responding to the
plaintiff's rivalry. The impulse for concern is the belief that the
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1024 (1969).
249. See, e.g., Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975).
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plaintiff's method of rivalry, for example, lower prices, better ser-
vices, higher quality, better marketing, or other types of rivalry on
the merits, is preferable on economic and noneconomic grounds to
the defendants' concerted behavior against him. Courts may enter-
tain this belief, wisely or not, even when economists properly see
the defendants' conduct as a subtle form of efficiency-enhancing
rivalry on the merits.250 A more general label for this danger, such
as "unfair competition," is less accurate and specific. The label is
less accurate because it suggests that the unfairness to the plaintiff
is the sole concern; it is less specific because it does not convey
that the reason the defendants attacked the plaintiff was his
proper rivalry.
A more severe example of "improper concerted response to
proper rivalry" arises when the defendants give as a subterfuge
some other reason for injuring the plaintiff. In this case the
defendants' ploy and the defamation-like harm their counterfeit
reason causes the plaintiff aggravate the defendants' abuse of
power. The case now resembles an aggravated form of trade libel.
In Hydrolevel,251 a standard-setting case, the individual defend-
ants obtained responsible positions in the American Society of
Mechanical Engineers and used those positions to suggest, in the
name of the ASME, that the plaintiff's safety device did not satisfy
the ASME's safety standards. The jury found that the defendants
acted to protect their company from the plaintiff's rivalry and
without regard to the safety of the plaintiff's device. The defend-
ants appeared to be industry leaders acting in the public interest
to keep the market free from dangerous products by examining
products impartially and publishing the findings. In reality, the de-
fendants were using their influence and opportunity to act in con-
cert to place the plaintiff at a competitive disadvantage to their
corporate employer. Moreover, the court probably realized that the
plaintiff's defamation-like injury would be especially difficult to re-
pair. The hypocrisy and deception involved in the defendants' mis-
use of their positions, their "ganging up" on the plaintiff,252 and
250. In Klor's, Inc v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207 (1959), for example, the
Court may have deemed Broadway-Hale's attempt to persuade suppliers to stop selling to
Kors as an improper response to Kors' proper price cutting. Yet, others have explained
that Broadway-Hale's action was an efficiency-enhancing attempt to overcome a free-rider
problem.
251. Hydrolevel Corp. v. American Soc'y of Mech. Eng'rs, 635 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1980),
aff'd, 456 U.S. 556 (1982).
252. The editors of the Restatement imposed special limits on concerted action in §
765 and explained in the comment why they did so. See supra text accompanying note 119.
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their power over the plaintiff from this collaboration against him
are emotionally charged features of the defendants' conduct. These
features may explain the hostile judicial reaction to this conduct
better than the danger to output does. Indeed, in Hydrolevel there
was no claim of price fixing or other related concerted conduct,
and thus a clear danger to output would arise only if the defend-
ants' employer had monopoly power that the plaintiff's continued
operation threatened. Let us dub the special concern presented
when defendants give a false reason for injuring the plaintiff as the
danger of "concerted deception from an impartial position." This
label suggests that the concern arises both from the defendants'
deception and from the influence the defendants possess because
they appear to be acting impartially and in the public interest.
Focusing explicitly on the method by which defendants hurt a
plaintiff helps explain the results lower courts have reached under
Silver's traditional approach. For example, in Feminist Women's
Health Club v. Mohammed253 the plaintiff doctors associated with
an abortion clinic won a preliminary injunction against the staff
doctors who had recommended that the hospital deny the plain-
tiffs staff privileges. The court suggested that the result might be
different if the doctors merely had set standards for obtaining
privileges.254 These doctors, however, had taken concerted action
to prevent the plaintiffs from meeting the standards. Specifically,
the defendant-doctors refused to provide aftercare services at the
abortion clinic. As a result, the clinic did not meet the relevant
standard for aftercare services, and the plaintiff-doctors associated
with the clinic thereby failed to qualify for staff privileges. Other
cases draw a similar distinction between defendants who suggest
and report standards that the plaintiff does not meet, on the one
hand, and those who attempt to enforce those standards through a
variety of otherwise legal avenues, on the other. In American Med-
ical Association v. United States2 55 the AMA tried to suppress
group health medical plans by denying hospital privileges in the
District of Columbia to doctors who participated in the plans. The
Circuit Court distinguished the AMA's concerted efforts at persua-
sion from this attempt by the AMA to enforce its beliefs.2 56
253. 586 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied sub nom. Palmer v. Feminist Women's
Health Center, 444 U.S. 924 (1979).
254. Id. at 546-47 ("[D]efendants not only sought to enforce a certain standard for
aftercare, but conspired to assure that the clinic would be unable to meet that standard").
255. 130 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1942), aff'd, 317 U.S. 519 (1943).
256. Id. at 250; see also American Medical Ass'n, [1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG.
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Neither the language of Silver's traditional approach nor that of
the Chicago School's approach, however, allows for such a distinc-
tion.257 The best explanation for the distinction is that the courts,
on tort grounds, approve of one form of concerted conduct and dis-
approve of the other.2 58 Let us dub this danger "improper enforce-
ment of standards" in order to focus attention not on the stan-
dards themselves, but on the methods taken to enforce them.
The AMA's efforts to deny renegade doctors access to hospi-
tals in the District of Columbia offer an example of an association
enforcing standards through denial of access to an essential facil-
ity. This enforcement method is one that often raises the spectre
of abuse of power and the ire of courts. One can even see this en-
forcement method at work in Mohammed because the aftercare
services of the defendant doctor can be looked upon as a facility
essential to the plaintiff-doctors. Another example of a suspect en-
forcement effort is granting a special status, such as valuable certi-
fication, to customers who buy only from firms that comply fully
with the defendants' standards. Standard-setting associations may
grant valuable certification to buyers who purchase only that
equipment the association approves. Those buyers in turn may
gain from advertising the certification. 59 Unlike the mere certifica-
tion of products, granting a special status to complying buyers may
seem such an effective marketing device that disadvantaged rivals
view the tactic as unfair or coercive.
One subset of improper enforcement methods includes what
could be called "concerted secondary pressure not required by
rivalry." "Secondary pressure" here means pressure on neutral
parties to take sides in a dispute that does not concern them di-
REP. (CCH) 1 21652 (restrictions on partnerships between doctors and nondoctors found to
violate FTC Act § 5).
257. Indeed, the methods differ only by degree and have no economic significance.
Note, Developments in the Law, Judicial Control of Actions of Private Associations, 76
HARV. L. REv. 983, 1048 (1963) (only degree separates the reporting of standards and test
results from the enforcement of those standards).
258. Compare the defendant's victory in Roof Fire Alarm Co. v. Royal Indem. Co., 202
F. Supp. 166 (E.D. Tenn. 1962), afl'd, 313 F.2d 635 (6th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 373 U.S.
949 (1963), in which the defendants merely suggested standards, to the plaintiff's victory in
Radiant Burners Co. v. Peoples Gas, Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961), in which the
defendants took an action that they knew would prevent the noncomplying plaintiff from
competing successfully.
259. Moore v. Boating Indus. Ass'n, 754 F.2d 698 (7th Cir. 1985) provides a recent
example. The BIA's refusal to certify the plaintiff's boat light meant that those buying from
the plaintiff also would be denied the BIA's seal of approval. The added pressure on the
plaintiff's customers may have contributed to the plaintiff's antitrust victory.
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rectly in order to induce the neutral party to act against the plain-
tiff. The most well-known analogy is to secondary boycotts in labor
disputes. Examination of labor,260 antitrust,2 61 and unfair competi-
tion2 6 2 cases reveals a deep-seated tradition of judicial hostility to-
ward concerted secondary pressure that is based on several
grounds: the concerted secondary pressure is an effective way for
one group to wield its power against rivals; it tends to polarize so-
ciety by increasing the number of people aligned in a dispute and
by highlighting the existence of social conflict; and it entails more
coercion of a neutral party than seems to be economically neces-
sary.63 Of all the types of abuses of power addressed by traditional
260. E.g., Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921); see generally,
Note, Secondary Boycotts and the First Amendment, 51 U. CH. L. REV. 811 (1984). Profes-
sor Coons has described the severe treatment of secondary boycotts in labor law and
believes the same impulse operated in cases like FOGA. Coons, Non-Commercial Purpose as
a Sherman Act Defense, 56 Nw. U.L. REV. 705, 731-38 (1962).
261. Statements denouncing secondary boycotts are legion in antitrust opinions. E.g.,
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); see also Note, The Use of Economic
Sanctions By Private Groups: Illegality Under the Sherman Act, 30 U. CH. L. REV. 171
(1962).
262. Pressuring neutrals to refrain from dealing with a rival or enemy has often been
deemed a tortious interference with business. E.g., American Mercury Inc. v. Chase, 13 F.2d
224 (D. Mass. 1926) (defendant's threatening distributors with prosecution if they distrib-
uted certain books deemed illegal); Yoder v. Helmuth, Chicago Daily News, Nov. 5-11
(1947) (C.P., Wayne County, Ohio) (defendant Amish leaders tortiously urged others not to
deal with plaintiff).
The Restatement Second sets out the factors now used when a business prevents a rival
from entering a contract and the courts must distinguish proper rivalry from tortious sec-
ondary pressure:§ 768 Competition as Proper or Improper Interference.
(1) One who intentionally causes a third person not to enter into a prospective
contractual relation with another who is his competitor or not to continue an existing
contract terminable at will does not interfere improperly with the others relation if (a)
the relation concerns a matter involved in the competition between the actor and the
other and (b) the actor does not employ wrongful means and (c) his action does not
create or continue an unlawful restraint of trade and (d) his purpose is at least in part
to advance his interest in competing with the other.
(2) The fact that one is a competitor of another for the business of a third person
does not prevent his causing a breach of an existing contract with the other from being
an improper interference if the contract is not terminable at will.
RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 124, at §§ 766(B), 767, 768.
These tort rules may seem too generalized to give lower courts and parties guidance
about permissible concerted conduct. Yet, as the Restatement editors argue, "factual pat-
terns develop and judicial decisions regarding them also develop patterns. . . that begin to
evolve.., rules defining conduct that is not improper." RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note
124. at § 767 (comment b).
263. NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 692 (1951) (sec-
ondary boycotts widen disputes); NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001, 447
U.S. 607, 617-18 (1980) (Blackmun J., concurring) (pressuring neutrals is itself contrary to
public policy). Other tort contexts also reveal judicial hostility to secondary pressure. For
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tort law, secondary pressure is one type that courts condemn most
quickly and consistently. Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court's
antitrust opinions containing the most hostile language toward in-
dustry self-regulation, Klor's and FOGA, involved secondary pres-
sure. In Klor's a rival of the plaintiff pressured the plaintiff's sup-
pliers into refusing to deal with the plaintiff.2 4 In FOGA style
pirates' rivals pressured the pirates' customers and suppliers into
refusing to deal with the pirates. 265 The incredible rule emerging
most clearly from FOGA, but implicitly from KIor's as well, is that
self-regulation, at least when it involves an agreement to refuse to
deal, is unlawful despite the defendants' purpose or justification.
This rule, the predecessor of Silver's rule, can be explained best by
recognizing that secondary pressure triggers the most virulent and
unqualified judicial condemnation. Like the publication of false
and libelous statements, secondary pressure arouses such hostility
that courts in tort cases will condemn it without inquiry into the
defendants' purpose or justification.6 6
The judicial concern about secondary pressure also helps to
instance, one way a collection agency or creditor attempting to collect a debt will subject
itself to liability is to enlist the debtor's employer, relatives, neighbors, or the public in the
controversy. The courts consider this behavior so "outrageous" that it warrants liability
even when the only harm is emotional distress. E.g., Barnett v. Collection Serv. Co., 214
Iowa 1303, 242 N.W. 25 (1932); Booti v. American Fin. Corp., 224 So. 2d 512 (La. App.
1969); Quina v. Roberts, 16 So. 2d 558 (La. App. 1944); LaSalle Extension Univ. v. Fogarty,
126 Neb. 457, 253 N.W. 424 (1934); Moore v. Savage, 359 S.W.2d 95 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962),
writ of error refused, 362 S.W.2d 298 (1962). For other references to the long hostility to-
ward secondary boycotts, see Bilder, East-West Trade Boycotts: A Study in Private, Labor
Union, State, and Local Interference with Foreign Policy, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 841, 893 n.246
(1972).
264. Klor's v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
265. Fashion Originators' Guild of Am. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 456 (1940).
266. Secondary pressure imposed for religious reasons creates a close legal question.
Bear v. Reformed Mennonite Church, 462 Pa. 330, 341 A.2d 105 (1975) (reversing lower
court dismissal of plaintiff who was excommunicated and shunned by church). Whether sec-
ondary picketing on behalf of civil rights and consumer interests is permitted may turn on
whether the nature of the dispute or the solution sought to be imposed by the plaintiff
touches on a public interest. See generally Hersbergen, Picketing by Aggrieved Consum-
ers-A Case Analysis, 59 IOWA L. REv. 1097 (1974); see also Madison, Mississippi's Second-
ary Boycott Statutes: Unconstitutional Deprivations of the Right to Engage in Peaceful
Picketing and Boycotting, 18 How. L.J. 583 (1975); Sandifer & Smith, The Tort-Suit for
Damages. The New Threat to Civil Rights Organizations, 41 BROOKLYN L. REV. 559 (1975).
Exceptions may be created for other situations when secondary pressure implicates first
amendment values.
The best approach to analyzing these cases is to recognize that secondary pressure is
presumed illegal and to ask whether the defendants' use of the tactic is within the ambit of
a privilege secured to the defendants by the common law, by legislation such as that regulat-
ing labor disputes, or by the first amendment.
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clarify some of the bizarre language for which the FOGA and
Kor's decisions are famous. For instance, in Kior's, Justice Black
condemns the agreement between Broadway-Hale and its suppliers
not to supply Kor's on the ground that "such agreements, no less
than those to fix minimum prices, cripple the freedom of traders
and thereby restrain their ability to sell in accordance with their
own judgement. ' ' 28 7 The statement cannot be explained by the
Court's concern about output or by the usual standards for deter-
mining whether the manufacturer's refusal to sell to Klor's was
voluntary. To make sense of this statement, the secondary pressure
not to supply Klor's that Broadway-Hale imposed on the manufac-
turers must be seen as an evil in itself. It is such secondary pres-
sure, Justice Black seems to say, that cripples the manufacturer's
freedom to trade in accord with its judgement. Whenever such sec-
ondary pressure does not seem to be a necessary feature of a sale,
like the sale between the manufacturers and Broadway-Hale, Jus-
tice Black would condemn it.
Of course, in economic terms secondary pressure is a part of
rivalry. Each seller tries to persuade a potential buyer to buy from
him and, to that extent, boycott his rivals. A seller may exert this
pressure by means of the appeal of a higher quality product or ser-
vice, a lower price, or easier credit terms. The members of a joint
venture whose products compete in this way could be said to be
engaged in "concerted secondary pressure." In order to exempt the
commendable secondary pressure involved in obvious forms of ri-
valry on the merits this danger is dubbed "concerted secondary
pressure not required by rivalry." This danger has not necessarily
been evaluated properly; indeed those who point out that the de-
fendants' action in Kor's was an attempt to overcome the free-
rider problem insist that the secondary pressure enhanced effi-
ciency. 2 8 Nevertheless, the Kor's opinion is best understood as re-
flecting the Court's hostility to what it perceived as unnecessary
concerted secondary pressure.
A danger arising less from defendants' method than from their
action's effect is the danger of allowing defendants to enforce an
orthodoxy not required by any public policy. The fear, for
instance, is that the only doctors denied staff privileges or disci-
267. 359 U.S. at 212 (quoting Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211, 213
(1950)).
268. Liebeler, Book Review, 66 CAL. L. REv. 1317, 1323-33 (1978) (review of R BORK,
THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLIcY AT WAR WITH ITSELF (1978)).
1986] 1589
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
plined by medical disciplinary boards will be the mavericks2" who
undersell colleagues, operate abortion clinics, or employ innovative
or unconventional methods. Deferring to defendants on the ground
that they alone possess the expertise needed for these judgments
creates the danger that defendants will impose an unwarranted
orthodoxy on the entire industry. 270 As a result, the choices offered
to the public are decreased. The fear that defendants will establish
an unwarranted orthodoxy again is a concern about allowing one
private group too much power to determine its rivals' fate. Let us
dub this the danger of "concerted enforcement of orthodoxy."
Again, the danger may be unrelated to output, and judicial reac-
tion to this danger may reflect nothing more than a judicial unwill-
ingness to accept the narrow range of choices that survive the
struggle of the marketplace.2 7 1 The religion of free opportunity
insists on more toleration of and support for mavericks and eccen-
trics than the logic of economic efficiency produces.
A closely related danger more expressly embraced by the
courts is that the defendants' self-regulation amounts to an extra-
judicial agency encroaching on the judicial and legislative domains.
The concern is that highly self-interested defendants may arrogate
to themselves quasi-governmental police functions that should
belong, according to the courts, only to the government.7 2 Part of
this concern could be called the "jealousy" impulse-the unrealis-
tic notion that only the government should possess the power to
control business conduct. A related impulse is the judicial hostility
toward vigilantism-a private group's attempt to make and impose
behavioral rules on others.273 Let us dub this danger "unreasonable
269. Some research suggests medical disciplinary boards direct their energy not at the
incompetent or the corrupt, but primarily at the mavericks. The standard of "unprofes-
sional conduct" provides a cover for these attacks. Dolan, The Law and the Maverick
Health Practitioner, 26 ST. Louis U.L.J. 627, 664, 667 n.153 (1982).
270. Professor Chafee recognized the difficulty of meaningful judicial review of techni-
cal determinations by industry members and warned judges against entering this "dismal
swamp." Note, Developments in the Law, Judicial Control of Actions of Private Associa-
tions, 76 HARV. L. R.v. 983, 999 (1963).
271. If consumers preferred the services of the mavericks, the market presumably
would ratify that choice. Eventually the maverick's product would prevail despite the
actions of defendants.
272. Black's opinion in FOGA, 312 U.S. at 465, is a classic statement of this concern:
"[T]he combination is in reality an extra-governmental agency, which prescribes rules for
the regulation and restraint of interstate commerce, and provides extra-judicial tribunals for
determination and punishment of violations, and thus 'trenches upon the power of the
national legislature and violates the statute.'" Id. (quoting an earlier antitrust case, Addys-
ton Pipe and Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 242 (1899)).
273. The holding in another industry self-regulation case American Medical Ass'n v.
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concerted encroachment on the government domain." '274 This dan-
ger accounts in part for antitrust law's long concern with "exclu-
sionary" behavior, a concern that rarely can be defended on eco-
nomic grounds.
The "jealousy" concern becomes especially acute when
defendants injure a plaintiff in order to discourage conduct that
the legislature and the courts have expressly approved or at least
tolerated. An example is Silver itself, in which the suspected rea-
son for the defendants' action against the plaintiff was the plain-
tiff's lawful, left-wing political beliefs and associations. 5 In con-
trast, the courts resent encroachment on their domain less when
defendants attack a plaintiff for conduct that the government, had
it considered the matter, probably would have condemned. An ex-
ample is Molinas v. National Basketball Association, in which a
court approved the NBA's lifetime exclusion of an athlete for bet-
ting on athletic events.276 For the same reason, disciplinary action
that a sporting league takes against an athlete for undue violence
during a contest also would receive lenient judicial treatment. Dis-
ciplinary action based on an athlete's unpopular but lawful politi-
cal beliefs or lifestyle probably would produce a much more hostile
judicial response. Yet, in economic terms, if an athlete with unpop-
ular political views diminishes the marketability and appeal of the
sporting league's product more than the athlete who is unduly vio-
United States, 130 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1942), af'd, 317 U.S. 519 (1943) denounced defend-
ants as vigilantes:
Except for their size, their prestige and their otherwise commendable activities, their
conduct in the present case differs not at all from that of any other extra-governmental
agency which assumes power to challenge alleged wrongdoing by taking the law into its
own hands. . . . [A]lthough persons who reason superficially concerning such matters
may find justification for extra-legal action to secure what seems to them desirable
ends, this is not the American way of life.
130 F.2d at 249.
274. Another type of concerted conduct that resembles encroachment on the govern-
ment domain is a concerted threat to arrest the plaintiff. Here the defendants are claiming
that the plaintiff's conduct is not merely socially undesirable, but illegal. Perhaps because
such threats (unlike the mere publication of the defendants' evaluation of the plaintiff's
actions or products) imply an element of coercion, courts have considered them tortious. See
Dearborn Publishing Co. v. Fitzgerald, 271 F. 479 (N.D. Ohio 1921); New Am. Library of
World Literature v. Allen, 114 F. Supp. 823 (N.D. Ohio 1953); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Melko,
96 A.2d 47, 25 N.J. Super. 292 (1953), modified, 103 A.2d 256, 14 N.J. 524 (1954); see also
Note, Entertainment: Public Pressures and the Law, 71 HARv. L. REV. 326 (1957).
275. Silver v. N.Y.S.E., 373 U.S. 341, 365 (1963).
276. Molinas v. National Basketball Ass'n, 190 F. Supp. 241, 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
Even when the plaintiff's conduct is criminal, however, courts often have condemned private




lent, the judicial reaction should be just the reverse.277
Another factor that affects the "jealousy" concern is whether
the plaintiff has consented previously to the defendants' extrajudi-
cial rule. For example, those who join trade associations, boards of
trade, or other joint ventures knowing that they thereby subject
themselves to the rules of a majority of the venture elicit less sym-
pathy when those rules injure them. Professor Areeda has sug-
gested, for example, that the dress designers in FOGA whom the
FOGA membership found guilty of style piracy were better able to
attack FOGA's extrajudicial rulemaking because they were outsid-
ers who had no relation to FOGA itself.178 In contrast, the com-
modity brokers who were members of the Chicago Board of Trade
and who were injured when a majority of fellow members passed
the "call" rule against price negotiations after the close of the trad-
ing session could expect less judicial sympathy. 79 The restraint
imposed when one has been outvoted by a majority of his fellow
group members, Areeda seems to suggest, lacks the aura of coer-
cion that surrounds the imposition of a private rule on an outsider.
Finally, the concern about encroachment on the government
domain becomes most acute when the defendants' action clearly
mocks the religion of fair opportunity and the distinction between
the proper spheres of private and public power. This distinction,
central to liberal ideology, distracts attention from the entrench-
ment and pervasive presence of private power and strives to pro-
mote the myth that an individual's opportunity for economic suc-
cess is limited only by his talents, the impersonal forces of demand
and supply, and the laws of public officials. Industry self-regulation
that seems to proclaim the emptiness of this myth frustrates one of
the law's most important ideological goals. For example, industry
self-regulation that threatens to prevent a person from laboring at
a vocation for which he has long trained-such as the exclusion of
an athlete from a sporting league-constitutes a greater encroach-
ment on the government domain than industry self-regulation that
merely denies a product a seal of approval. The two cases may be
indistinguishable economically, but the religion of free opportunity
will subject the first kind of industry self-regulation to greater
scrutiny and will oppose such self-regulation found to be arbitrary
277. See Gerhart, The Supreme Court and Antitrust Analysis: The (Near) Triumph
of the Chicago School, 1982 Sup. CT. REV. 319, 330 (1983).
278. P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS § 375a, at 511 (3d ed. 1981).
279. See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
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or unreasonable. 280 The religion of free opportunity helps to
explain the law's ancient commitment to the notion that private
power should not prevent a person from working at his vocation.
After all, the religion of free opportunity looks at the world
through the eyes of the individual person or firm. It adopts his
time frame. It ignores the past. It insists that the individual firm
be given opportunity more or less equal to that other firms enjoy
even though the other firms may have gained their current advan-
tages through many generations of attempts to craft efficient gov-
ernance structures.
Another danger is that of "concerted injury through unreason-
ably insufficient procedures." This umbrella category includes a
variety of specific dangers that stem from the insufficient proce-
dures defendants have followed. One specific danger is that the
defendants (such as the members of a shopping mall) have used a
biased decisionmaker (like one of the plaintiff's immediate busi-
ness rivals) in deciding to exclude the plaintiff from the mall when
they cheaply and easily could have used a more neutral decision-
maker. As a result, the defendants have increased unreasonably
the substantive dangers already discussed, such as the danger of
"improper concerted response to proper rivalry." A second specific
danger is that the failure to afford available inexpensive proce-
dures, like a statement of the reasons for the defendants' action,
unreasonably prevents a court from determining whether the other
dangers mentioned here arise.
Recognizing industry self-regulation's noneconomic dangers
helps to explain Silver's concern about the reason for the defend-
ants' action. This concern leads courts to condemn not only acts
responding to the plaintiff's rivalry, but also arbitrary acts and acts
motivated by a reason not in accord with public policy. Denying
hospital staff privileges to a doctor because of his hair color is an
example of an arbitrary action. Denying staff privileges because
the doctor is willing to testify against fellow doctors in medical
malpractice suits is an example of an action contrary to public pol-
icy. In effect, Silver calls for courts to review the reasonableness of
the concerted action of private groups just as they review the rea-
sonableness of some governmental actions.
Identifying and labeling the dangers other than those to out-
280. Professor Chafee called the judicial tendency to intervene when the defendants
effectively controlled access to a vocation the "strangle-hold policy." Chafee, The Internal
Affairs of Associations Not For Profit, 43 HARv. L. REV. 1000, 1021-23 (1930).
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put that self-regulation presents necessarily suggest factors that a
faithful follower of the traditional approach ought to consider in
deciding whether the defendants' conduct is actionable. A lower
court, however, also would want to know how much weight to give
each danger. For example, the intense hostility towards concerted
secondary pressure reflected in earlier cases suggests that such con-
duct should be actionable without more once the court is satisfied
that the secondary pressure is neither an inseparable part of nor-
mal rivalry nor efficiency enhancing. Thus, the defendants' motives
would be immaterial. The plaintiff would not need to prove that
the defendants had monopoly power or that the concerted second-
ary pressure was likely to exclude the plaintiff from the market
entirely. 81 The recent case of Wilk v. AMA282 illustrates the utility
of this approach. In that boycott case the American Medical Asso-
ciation, the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals, and
related groups were charged with having committed a variety of
acts that hurt the plaintiff-chiropractors. Many of the acts con-
sisted merely of speeches, publications, and advertisements in-
veighing against chiropractic primarily on the ground that it is un-
scientific. One act, however, was the Joint Commission on
Accreditation of Hospitals' pointed threat that any hospital that
allowed a chiropractor to use its facilities would lose its accredita-
tion. Unlike the AMA's speeches, this threat and the defendants'
willingness to act upon it represented a tactic to which the chiro-
practors could not respond. Not surprisingly, nothing in other anti-
trust approaches, or at least nothing in the formal rules emerging
from those approaches, gave the court a basis to distinguish this
threat from the defendants' many other acts. The approach pro-
posed here, on the other hand, would allow a court to condemn
this act alone. If the act were insufficiently related to efficiency
concerns, it plainly would fit the description of "concerted second-
ary pressure." Although there may be no economic justification for
treating this act differently from the defendants' other acts, this
act more acutely raises the tort dangers of "concerted secondary
pressure."
Most of the tort dangers identified here, however, do not elicit
281. Perhaps courts would create an exception based on first amendment values when
consumers exert concerted secondary pressure. Examples would be the consumer boycott of
retailers that sell certain brands of grapes or the consumer boycott of convention facilities in
states that have not passed the Equal Right Amendment. E.g., Missouri v. National Org. for
Women, 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980).
282. 719 F.2d 207 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1210 (1984).
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the unqualified judicial condemnation given "concerted secondary
pressure." When the defendants' conduct raises these other dan-
gers, the traditional tort inquiry-which asks whether the defend-
ants' conduct constitutes a privileged method for intentionally
injuring the plaintiff-will be more complex. The inquiry will re-
quire judicial assessment of the defendants' purposes and justifica-
tions and of the defendants' and the plaintiff's relative power.
2 83
The inquiry further requires assessing the degree of danger the de-
fendants' conduct presents. The previous discussion identified
some factors affecting the degree of danger. The danger from con-
duct involving "concerted encroachment on the government do-
main" increases when Congress expressly has authorized or at least
decriminalized the plaintiff's conduct. The danger from conduct
involving "concerted deception from an impartial position"
depends upon the plaintiff's ability to challenge the counterfeit
reason the defendants give for their action and upon the extent to
which the defendants claim to be and generally are viewed as act-
ing impartially in the public interest. When suppliers and consum-
ers see defendants as rivals promulgating standards in their own
interest, the danger probably should be ignored.
Although courts could approach many industry self-regulation
cases under existing or newly created tort categories, many other
industry self-regulation cases avoid easy categorization. In the
sports discipline context, for example, a player expelled from a
league for life for a past drug conviction may want to claim that
the penalty was unreasonably disproportionate to the offense. Yet
such a claim would not fit into any tort category. While a court
could posit a specific tort category to address this danger-perhaps
"unreasonably banning a person from his vocation"-at some point
attempting to specify further categories of tortious action becomes
futile. A better approach may be simply to evaluate whether the
defendants' conduct fits in the broad tort category "business injury
by improper concerted action. 2
84
Those who claim that antitrust's only goal is the balancing of
allocative and productive efficiency will deny that any of these
other dangers should affect the antitrust treatment of industry
283. W. PROSSER, supra note 131, at § 50.
284. The dangers described are specimens of a genus. They are specimens of the
noneconomic dangers from centralization of private power. Many other specimens of this
danger exist, but the dangers described in the text are the ones industry self-regulation
most clearly presents. Naming these dangers may help to illustrate the noneconomic con-
cerns that have been built into traditional antitrust doctrine.
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self-regulation cases. Fair enough. Discussing what the goals of
antitrust ought to be is a profitless endeavor. I contend only that
Silver's traditional approach reflects some of these dangers and
cannot fully be understood or applied if these dangers are ignored.
The legislative history of the Sherman Act and the judicial sys-
tem's methodological inability to assimilate economic policy make
the influence of these dangers understandable. Moreover, when the
efficiency consequences are difficult to predict, one should expect
these noneconomic dangers to be weighed more heavily. The diffi-
culty of predicting economic consequences is a striking feature of
industry self-regulation cases, at least when defendants are not
able to articulate an efficiency-enhancing benefit, yet neither pos-
sess monopoly power nor are engaged in price fixing or related con-
certed conduct.
I suspect further that if the antitrust laws never had been
passed, either the law of business torts, the law of private associa-
tions, or the law of common-law conspiracies28 5 would have devel-
oped in order to address these dangers explicitly and would have
condemned more of the behavior (although without treble dam-
ages) than Silver now condemns. Unfortunately, but not surpris-
ingly in light of Silver's treble damage bonanza, the current law of
business torts, especially the law governing concerted action injur-
ing a rival, is seriously underdeveloped.8 6 Much business behavior
that arouses the courts' ire does not fit comfortably into any cur-
rent business tort category. Nor will appropriate business tort cate-
gories develop as long as Silver survives. For under Silver each
plaintiff will prefer to have his case treated as an antitrust viola-
tion. Thus, a court would need to consider whether to announce a
new business tort without assistance from counsel.
The difficulty of announcing new types of torts is exacerbated
because industry self-regulation cases so often are brought in fed-
eral court with jurisdiction grounded on the antitrust laws. As a
result, a court faced with such a case would have no jurisdictional
285. For example, Pennsylvania's common-law tort action for conspiracy could be
applied to much industry self-regulation that now is attacked under Silver. See Franklin
Music Co. v. American Broadcasting Co., 616 F.2d 528, 549 (3rd Cir. 1979) (describing
Pennsylvania's civil conspiracy law); see generally W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW, THE COMMON LAW AND ITS RivALs 385-92 (1926); W. PROSSER, supra note 131, § 46, at
293 (elements and limits of the common-law action for conspiracy).
286. Note, The Pick-Barth Doctrine: Should Unfair Competition Belong Under the
Sherman Act, 31 BAYLOR L. REV. 253, 260-1 (1979) (explaining the limited viability of busi-
ness torts). See also Note, The Law of Commercial Disparagement: Business Defamation's
Impotent Ally, 63 YALE L.J. 65 (1953).
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difficulty in dealing with an antitrust claim under Silver. In order
to announce a new type of business tort, however, a federal court
would need to find pendent jurisdiction over the tort action and
would need to hold that the relevant state court, if faced with the
defendants' action, likewise would create the same business tort.
Whether the case is labelled "antitrust" or "tort," however, this
Article contends that these cases ought to be viewed as tort cases
in substance and approached accordingly.
IV. CONCLUSION
Silver's traditional approach toward industry self-regulation
cases assumes that the law should impose a constraint on private
concerted power. It assumes businesses should not be able to band
together to inflict economic harm on a rival without some system
of checks and balances like those deemed necessary to control the
government. It assumes that a "fair" opportunity to compete
requires access on more or less equal terms to essential support
facilities. The originators and defenders of Silver's approach have
some reason for embarrassment. Nothing in the Constitution in-
sists on their assumptions. Their best legal source lies in the com-
mon law of torts, a field that at least in the eyes of perceptive com-
mentators always has lent itself to checking abuses of private
power and to allocating power between private groups. Another
source lies further afield-in that reflex of the liberal tradition to
limit all aggregations of power, public or private, in whatever form.
In refreshingly sharp opposition to Silver's traditional
approach is the Chicago School approach. Save in the relatively
rare instance when the private group possesses monopoly power
and clearly threatens to reduce output, the Chicago School rejects
entirely any a priori postulate that law ought to constrain private
concerted power. It sees no inherent reason for greater judicial
scrutiny when the act that hurts a rival is concerted rather than
unilateral. Indeed, concerted activity that injures a rival is either
efficiency enhancing or an attempt to enforce output-restraining
activity that already is an antitrust violation. In either case, such
concerted activity does not itself warrant special judicial interest
or a separate judicial approach. In the absence of a clear loss in
consumer welfare, the antitrust laws ought to be serenely indiffer-
ent to the allocation of private power. They ought to allow all pri-
vate associations to act toward their rivals with the same uninhib-
ited freedom a single business enjoys. They ought not strive to
reset the clock for each entrepreneur in order to obliterate the
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advantages that others gain from their past collaborations. Rather
than controlling private groups, however powerful, the antitrust
laws ought to encourage them to become more efficient.
Seeing this clash between different visions of liberalism gives
little comfort to a trial judge faced with an industry self-regulation
case to be decided under the current law. A judge who is alert to
the wide variety of benefits and dangers industry self-regulation
presents will see that the "group boycott" concept is too general to
be of use. He rightly will suspect any general approach that
attempts to govern all concerted conduct placing a rival at a signif-
icant competitive disadvantage. Moreover, the search for a less
general approach to govern subsets of such conduct has not
progressed far enough. For instance, the division of these cases into
"horizontal" and "vertical" boycotts still operates at too high a
level of generality and also fails to focus on the factors intuitively
felt to be critical. What is needed, instead, is an approach that rec-
ognizes two points. First, the history of industry self-regulation
cases shows concern with the desirability of the defendants' con-
duct on noneconomic as well as economic grounds. Second, what
all parties need is to have courts get on with the business of identi-
fying permissible and impermissible concerted conduct in the most
specific manner possible, dealing candidly with economic and
noneconomic considerations. By adopting a tort approach, courts
will see the need to classify these cases more extensively based on
the particular industry context and on the particular conduct.
They will see the need to evolve standards that provide guidance
to prospective parties and that enable some of these cases to be
resolved short of trial. They will see the need to abandon the gen-
eralities that continue to substitute for thought.
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